Re: Russian Power In Far East During Korean War

[Ed Evanhoe <evanhoe@arbuckleonline.com>]

Harold,

>>At 08:08 AM 7/13/2003 -0500, you wrote:
> Mr. Joe Brennan stated that he did not think that the Soviets/Chinese were 
> very vulnerable to any *non-nuclear* attack by the US on the Asian 
> landmass, esp. one coming out of Korea. On the contrary, it was just this 
> nuclear big-stick that these two powers were trying to avoid in an 
> outright confrontation.<<
I agree with Joe Brennan on point one.  We did not have the capability of 
waging a "non-nuclear" war on the Chinese mainland in the 1950's.  And I 
agree with you that China & Russia did not want an outright confrontation 
that would bring a nuclear response by the U.S.

>  >>When the NSC paper about the possible use of a "nuke" on Shanghai was 
> leaked, though this paper was never given any real consideration at the 
> time, this was what it took to get the PRC to push through the cease-fire 
> talks in Korea in 1953.<<
This may have been one of the deciding factors but there were others, 
including beginning to set up logistics in Japan (very overtly) for three 
additional divisions from the U.S. -- 1 airborne, 1 Marine & 1 regular 
infantry  - to be used in a joint airborne/seaborne landing in North 
Korea.  By early 1953 the Korean War had already cost Communist China much 
more than they could afford to lose in combat-experienced 
officers/NCO's/men, plus equipment, and still defend the mainland against a 
return by Chinese Nationalist forces, especially if ChiNat forces went back 
in conjunction with a landing in North Korea by UN/U.S. forces.

> >> Truman's and Eisenhower/Dulles' "brinkmanship" with respect of the 
> nukes were what kept China from moving on Taiwan in 1949, 1953 and 1956. 
> There are many sources about these matters that support how close we came 
> to dropping the BIG ONE, of our limited inventory, during this period.<<
Agree there are sources supporting this contention but there are others 
that maintain Eisenhower & and the JCS used nukes as a background threat 
but would have only used these as a last resort.

> >> What does become clear through all of this is that Stalin and Mao were 
> willing to trade off local forces for bigger gains internationally. China 
> clearly still thinks that it won the Korean war because it gave them 
> international prestige at Geneva in 1954.<<
True.

>  >>Another factor that seemed to limit the Soviet projection of power 
> during this time period was that Korea was consuming far too much of 
> Russia's gross national product, to the point that the Five Year Plan had 
> still not been implemented since the end of WW-II. Though Stalin was able 
> to place pressure through proxy states to achieve his international aims, 
> there still was a limit to how much material that they could just give away.<<
Again agree.

>  >>In the end though it must be remembered that the Cold War was won by 
> the US outspending the communist's ability to counter our production 
> capabilities for defense. And, the PRC is still not willing to move 
> overtly against the Spratley Islands or Taiwan as long as it thinks that 
> this would result in an open confrontation with the United States.<<
True.

Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523
Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Web Site:  http://www.korean-war.com