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As with any book on military history, the actual
combat records of the opposing sides are sometimes very hard or near impossible
to reconcile with the existing facts. It is also imperative for the
author/historian to have a complete working knowledge of the subject matter that
they are attempting to write about. Mr. Xiaoming Zhang has done a credible
effort in attempting to broach a monumental task.
Having finished an as yet unpublished work on how
the VVS was able to defeat the Luftwaffe in the Ukraine during the early and
middle parts of 1944, I read Mr. Zhang's work with some interest. Though there
are some obvious holes in this work's coverage of the subject matter, there was
some significant amounts of material that could be gleaned for the person
familiar enough with the combat operations of the VVS and its proxies in
Korea.
When Xiaoming Zhang started discussing the aspects
of the different periods of Soviet combat operations and their efficacy, as well
as the growth of the PLAAF into its combat role on the battle field, this
allowed me to compare his research with what was known of how the VVS faced down
and eventually defeated the Luftwaffe in southern Russia in 1944 when they met
each other on almost equal terms.
In the "Red Wings" book there is some discussion of
how the tactics of layering of MiG-15 formations over specific areas of the
front lines, and to restrict their use in very well defined areas of operations.
This specific tactic was exactly similar to how the VVS was able to claim aerial
superiority in southern Russia in 1944.
One of the tactics that the VVS used quite
successfully was their "maliy teatr - frontu", "small theater
fronts." Such operations were to be accomplished with the usage of combined
units of leghiy (light) and tyazhely (heavy) fighter squadrons,
regiments, corps, and divisions. Though any fighter squadron could be
interchanged on the battlefield from one type of mission to another, some form
of specialized role was assumed in the tactical assignments given to a unit
depending on the actual type of fighter aircraft that they were equipped
with.
Within these frontu; some method had
to be introduced in order to protect their own important supply shipments being
carried out by the 1st ATD and other important missions of the 5th
VA. On 22 May 1944, Leytenant (L-y., Lieutenant) Vitalii
Ivanovich Popkov of the 240th IAP (302 IAD, of the 4th
Gv.IAK) developed the idea of a convoy system for the entire 5th VA.
In essence, Popkov envisaged a system where transport and combat aircraft could
fly through the entire 5th VA area of responsibility with complete
assurance of safety from intruding German intrusions by setting up a continuous
chain of standing patrols of fighter aircraft that would escort the particular
aircraft from one area of responsibility to another while keeping within the
tactical control of the escorting fighter’s own unit.
What had inspired Popkov to develop his convoy system for the VVS had been due to his combat experiences during the battle of Kursk in July 1943. Vitalii Popkov had led a group of five Lavochkin fighters of the 5th Gv.IAP on a combat patrol in order to cover the advances of attacking Soviet ground forces. When spotting a formation of eighteen Ju 87s and six Bf-109s, Popkov ordered one para of the La-5s to engage the Bf-109 escorts, while he and the rest of the Soviet fighters intercepted the Junkers. This group of Schlachtfliegern immediately abandoned their mission and made a quick retreat. Almost immediately afterwards Popkov spotted another group of German assault-aircraft, this time escorted by five Bf-109s. And almost without hesitation, Vitalii Popkov decided to make a surprise attack and, within a short space of time, had succeeded in shooting down two of the Luftwaffe aircraft. The other 5th Gv.IAP pilots claimed a further eight aerial victories, and damaged another three aircraft. Not a single member of this second attack group succeeded in reaching their targets; the remaining German aircraft escaping in the melee. On 7 June 1944, the 5th Gv.IAP was transferred from Terasapol to Luck, and while operating from this airfield, Popkov flew many successful combat missions in the Lvov area. As the Eskadrillii-Kommandr (Esk.Kdr., Squadron Commander) of the 5th Gv.IAP, on 25 June 1944, Popkov defended the bombers of Gen. Ivan Polbin’s 2nd Gv.BAK. And on 21 August 1944 the fighters of the 5th Gv.IAP, then under Popkov's command, downed six German planes. In the winter of 1945, the regiment was stationed at the fields near Gostyn. Speaking of Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov himself and of his convoy system, Gen. Ivan Polbin stated that: ". . . As the need to replenish the units of the 5th VA with new units, aircraft, and aircrews, and to implement the combat training of these new aircrews to the latest combat tactics and techniques, Popkov’s convoy system ensured a relatively safe environment behind the Soviet front lines for these very important missions to be accomplished." Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov would end the war with 41 personal and seventeen shared aerial victories. Just as had been developed for the aerial control of the VVS aircraft in and around Stalingrad in November 1942 through January 1943, so too were the specific traffic patterns of Soviet aircraft throughout the zone of control of the 5th VA. It was highly stressed within all flying units to stay completely within their specific corridors and areas of flight, and to make specific efforts against "dangerous wandering", because of the standing orders of the 5th VA and the 15th Anti-aircraft Army to shoot down any unidentified, unauthorized, or intruding aircraft. A follow on benefit from the Soviet’s tight aerial umbrella that they attempted to throw over their own front lines, it placed further hindrances and problems for the Luftwaffe to gather much needed aerial reconnaissance information. What can be gleaned from the above narrative is the fact that the "maliy teatr - frontu" tactics could be extremely effective against the best of pilots. Interestingly enough, on 14 March 1944 St.-l-y. Ivan Kozhedub would be involved in an "maliy teatr - frontu" mission that is responsible for the almost shooting down of Oblt. Wilhelm ("Willi", radio call-sign of "Rabitski") Batz, who only survives this aerial combat by the narrowest of margins, by crash-diving and overstraining his aircraft. "Willi" Batz recorded that he almost became a victim to one of these "maliy teatr - frontu" tactics. It seems that Batz presumed to think that his radio call-sign of "Rabitski" was safe enough to not change each month as the standing orders required. Not expecting the efficiency of the Soviet’s VNOS’ ability to identify individual Luftwaffe pilots, Batz was soon identified after taking off and was soon surrounded by a trap set up by St.L-y. Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (GSS), commander of the 240th IAP (302 IAD, 4th Gv.IAK). After successfully evading the first assault by the zveno (section of four) being led by Kozhedub himself, Batz out-dove the following La-5FNs that had first surprised him. Leveling out some 2000 meters (1250 feet) below the initial attack, Batz soon found himself surrounded with an even lower zveno that was waiting for him to pull out of his dive. Continuing on through this second group of attacking Lavochkins from the 240th IAP, Batz had to make it back to his home airfield at tree-top level. After safely landing his Bf-109G-6, Batz was told that his aircraft was a total write-off due to being overly strained during his high-speed dives to outpace his attackers.What is not brought out sufficiently in Mr. Zhang's book was the efficacy of the VVS' ability to counter ground-attack efforts with their AAA. An interesting anecdotal exchange occurred between Lt. Walther Krause and another Hs-129 pilot of IV.(Pz)/SG.9 when they were ordered to attack an advancing Soviet tank formation in February 1944: "At present only two aircraft are serviceable, so we are only able to piss around. When VIII Fliegerkorps orders us to fly, we ask them whether they would like us to operate our two aircraft singly or in waves! Otherwise, morale in the Staffel (10.(Pz)/SG 9) is quite good. . ." The first pilot to earn the Ritterkreuz for his tank killing abilities in the Hs-129 was Hptm. Rudolf-Heinz Ruffer of 11.(Pz)/SG.9 for his total of 72 tank kills in 80 combat missions, receiving the award on 9 June 1944. It should also be noted that less than a handful of Hs-129 pilots would earn that distinction during the war. Unfortunately for Ruffer, He was killed by Russian anti-aircraft fire in July 1944. And as there were these Panzerjager-Staffeln in every Schlachtgruppen specifically tasked with tank killing missions, there were corresponding VVS Gvardeyskiy units tasked with okolvnichy missions to specifically seek out and destroy the Luftwaffe’s tank-killers. In essence, hunters that were hunting other hunters. Concerning the German efforts during these relief missions to the Crimea, Obst. Walther Krause stated in a personal letter to Williamson Murray that the Luftwaffe’s specialized antitank forces, like that of III./SG.2 mentioned earlier, would be rushed from one section of the front to another to counter some new Soviet armored thrust. And as the cumulative effects of a lack of operational aircraft continued to mount, due to maintenance breakdowns and the constant commitment to combat missions, aircraft serviceability rates started to plummet. Eventually, Obst. Krause states that they were losing as many aircraft as the number of tanks that they destroyed. In his own words: ". . . hardly a cost-effective employment of aircraft." And finally as it concerns the effectiveness of the Soviet's AAA against ground-attack aircraft, one can draw their own conclusions from the losses suffered by the French Air Force in its attempt to resupply and support their forces trapped at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In Bernard Fall's "Hell In A Very Small Place" and in John Prados' "Operation Vulture," the Vietminh's AAA would be the deciding factor in the losses suffered by the French aerial operations during this specific conflict. And in both of these books, there was a clear fear of an escalation of the conflict if the PLAAF made even a token appearance in the skies over Indochina, even with MiG-9s. One can only wonder about the eventual outcome if the 200 B-29s had been committed to the aerial support of Dien Bien Phu. Though it is doubtful whether MiG-9s could have had the range to intercept any bombardment missions to DBP, their appearance in the area would have shaken the FEAF and USN commanders in their convictions of the outcome of continued aerial missions in Indochina. In closing, Mr. Xiaoming Zhang's book should be taken with a grain of salt for what it is, an attempt to shed some light on an unknown subject up to this time. The book is more than adequate in that attempt and a good read. Harold Stockton |