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I am reading Red Phoenix on the VVS in
WW2.
In fact it will be the forth time gleening out
information.
One of the reasons the VVS used the Staking Method
were several reasons.
Lack of time to teach dogfighting
techniques.
Easier to develop Teaming tactics with those who
survived the Training.
The combat proven survivors were moved to elite
teams or Trainers.
(Gengis Khan did this with his armies)
Many of the early planes except the Mig 3 performed
well only below 15000 ft.
I do not think even the later La7, Yak 3 or 9
models were ever competant in the high altitude role.
Russians doggedly supported their Army with massive
air support.
Flying the lower altitudes gave the
higher flying German aircraft a distinct advantage
and used well tested Boom and Zoom to pummel the
lower flying planes.
Yet the vast majority of German Aircraft were shot
down a lower altitudes.
The Russians played a bait game to attract the
Germans to attack and
used B&Z tactics to force them into energy
waisting turns compromising excape.
The P39 could climb with the German 109 with the
deletion of the 4-30 cal up to 18K
Regardless of the tactics the Russians lost 2 to 1
over the whole course of the war.
But Russia could sustain the losses better with new
manufactured aircraft
and their factories were never attacked by the
Germans to slow production.
This was a war of attrition. Who had more war
materiale and men(women) was going to win.
Especially with the Allies on the Western
fronts eating away at German resources.
The attrition developed excellent Russian
pilots.
I am wondering if the Sabers had a true 2 to 1
ratio over the Russians.
Over the cource of the Korean air battles Sabers
may have achieved a 4 to 1 ratio.
Again the Experienced pilots over Chinese and
Korean Trainees.
Few becoming Aces.
I have made this request to see if any of
the Mechanics were interviewed
by the professional history writers.
They maintained the AC and would expect that
they
could give a different account of who was lost,
injured or missing.
As well as what planes were used, lost and
damaged.
I kind look at the AC Mechanics like a Barber.
Barbers get all the news
and turn out to be subliminal Psycologists. They
hear all the stories!
Dan Fahey
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 9:45
AM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings Over
the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea
As with any book on military history, the actual
combat records of the opposing sides are sometimes very hard or near
impossible to reconcile with the existing facts. It is also imperative for the
author/historian to have a complete working knowledge of the subject matter
that they are attempting to write about. Mr. Xiaoming Zhang has done a
credible effort in attempting to broach a monumental task.
Having finished an as yet unpublished work on how
the VVS was able to defeat the Luftwaffe in the Ukraine during the early and
middle parts of 1944, I read Mr. Zhang's work with some interest. Though there
are some obvious holes in this work's coverage of the subject matter, there
was some significant amounts of material that could be gleaned for the
person familiar enough with the combat operations of the VVS and its proxies
in Korea.
When Xiaoming Zhang started discussing the
aspects of the different periods of Soviet combat operations and their
efficacy, as well as the growth of the PLAAF into its combat role on the
battle field, this allowed me to compare his research with what was known of
how the VVS faced down and eventually defeated the Luftwaffe in southern
Russia in 1944 when they met each other on almost equal terms.
In the "Red Wings" book there is some discussion
of how the tactics of layering of MiG-15 formations over specific areas of the
front lines, and to restrict their use in very well defined areas of
operations. This specific tactic was exactly similar to how the VVS was able
to claim aerial superiority in southern Russia in 1944.
One of the tactics that the VVS used quite
successfully was their "maliy teatr - frontu", "small theater
fronts." Such operations were to be accomplished with the usage of combined
units of leghiy (light) and tyazhely (heavy) fighter squadrons,
regiments, corps, and divisions. Though any fighter squadron could be
interchanged on the battlefield from one type of mission to another, some form
of specialized role was assumed in the tactical assignments given to a unit
depending on the actual type of fighter aircraft that they were equipped
with.
Within these frontu; some method had
to be introduced in order to protect their own important supply shipments
being carried out by the 1st ATD and other important missions of the
5th VA. On 22 May 1944, Leytenant (L-y., Lieutenant)
Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov of the 240th IAP (302 IAD, of the
4th Gv.IAK) developed the idea of a convoy system for the entire 5th
VA. In essence, Popkov envisaged a system where transport and combat
aircraft could fly through the entire 5th VA area of responsibility
with complete assurance of safety from intruding German intrusions by setting
up a continuous chain of standing patrols of fighter aircraft that would
escort the particular aircraft from one area of responsibility to another
while keeping within the tactical control of the escorting fighter’s own
unit.
What had inspired Popkov to develop his
convoy system for the VVS had been due to his combat experiences during
the battle of Kursk in July 1943. Vitalii Popkov had led a group of five
Lavochkin fighters of the 5th Gv.IAP on a combat patrol in order to
cover the advances of attacking Soviet ground forces.
When spotting a formation of eighteen Ju 87s
and six Bf-109s, Popkov ordered one para of the La-5s to engage the
Bf-109 escorts, while he and the rest of the Soviet fighters intercepted the
Junkers. This group of Schlachtfliegern immediately abandoned their
mission and made a quick retreat.
Almost immediately afterwards Popkov spotted
another group of German assault-aircraft, this time escorted by five Bf-109s.
And almost without hesitation, Vitalii Popkov decided to make a surprise
attack and, within a short space of time, had succeeded in shooting down two
of the Luftwaffe aircraft. The other 5th Gv.IAP pilots claimed a
further eight aerial victories, and damaged another three aircraft. Not a
single member of this second attack group succeeded in reaching their targets;
the remaining German aircraft escaping in the melee.
On 7 June 1944, the 5th Gv.IAP was
transferred from Terasapol to Luck, and while operating from this airfield,
Popkov flew many successful combat missions in the Lvov area. As the
Eskadrillii-Kommandr (Esk.Kdr., Squadron Commander) of the
5th Gv.IAP, on 25 June 1944, Popkov defended the bombers of Gen.
Ivan Polbin’s 2nd Gv.BAK. And on 21 August 1944 the fighters of the
5th Gv.IAP, then under Popkov's command, downed six German planes. In
the winter of 1945, the regiment was stationed at the fields near
Gostyn.
Speaking of Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov himself
and of his convoy system, Gen. Ivan Polbin stated that:
". . . As the need to replenish the units
of the 5th VA with new units, aircraft, and aircrews, and to implement the
combat training of these new aircrews to the latest combat tactics and
techniques, Popkov’s convoy system ensured a relatively safe environment
behind the Soviet front lines for these very important missions to be
accomplished."
Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov would end the war
with 41 personal and seventeen shared aerial victories.
Just as had been developed for the aerial
control of the VVS aircraft in and around Stalingrad in November 1942
through January 1943, so too were the specific traffic patterns of Soviet
aircraft throughout the zone of control of the 5th VA. It was highly
stressed within all flying units to stay completely within their specific
corridors and areas of flight, and to make specific efforts against "dangerous
wandering", because of the standing orders of the 5th VA and the
15th Anti-aircraft Army to shoot down any unidentified, unauthorized,
or intruding aircraft.
A follow on benefit from the Soviet’s tight aerial
umbrella that they attempted to throw over their own front lines, it placed
further hindrances and problems for the Luftwaffe to gather much needed
aerial reconnaissance information.
What can be gleaned from the above narrative is the fact
that the "maliy teatr
- frontu" tactics could be extremely effective against the best of
pilots. Interestingly enough, on
14 March 1944 St.-l-y. Ivan Kozhedub would be involved in an
"maliy teatr - frontu" mission that is responsible for the
almost shooting down of Oblt. Wilhelm ("Willi", radio call-sign
of "Rabitski") Batz, who only survives this aerial combat by the
narrowest of margins, by crash-diving and overstraining his
aircraft.
"Willi" Batz recorded that he almost became
a victim to one of these "maliy teatr - frontu" tactics. It
seems that Batz presumed to think that his radio call-sign of
"Rabitski" was safe enough to not change each month as the standing
orders required. Not expecting the efficiency of the Soviet’s VNOS’
ability to identify individual Luftwaffe pilots, Batz was soon
identified after taking off and was soon surrounded by a trap set up by
St.L-y. Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (GSS), commander of the
240th IAP (302 IAD, 4th Gv.IAK).
After successfully evading the first assault by the
zveno (section of four) being led by Kozhedub himself, Batz out-dove
the following La-5FNs that had first surprised him. Leveling out some
2000 meters (1250 feet) below the initial attack, Batz soon found himself
surrounded with an even lower zveno that was waiting for him to pull
out of his dive. Continuing on through this second group of attacking
Lavochkins from the 240th IAP, Batz had to make it back to his home
airfield at tree-top level. After safely landing his Bf-109G-6, Batz was told
that his aircraft was a total write-off due to being overly strained during
his high-speed dives to outpace his attackers.
What is not brought out sufficiently in Mr. Zhang's book
was the efficacy of the VVS' ability to counter ground-attack efforts with
their AAA. An interesting
anecdotal exchange occurred between Lt. Walther Krause and another
Hs-129 pilot of IV.(Pz)/SG.9 when they were ordered to attack an
advancing Soviet tank formation in February 1944:
"At present only two aircraft are
serviceable, so we are only able to piss around. When VIII Fliegerkorps
orders us to fly, we ask them whether they would like us to operate our two
aircraft singly or in waves! Otherwise, morale in the Staffel
(10.(Pz)/SG 9) is quite good. . ."
The first pilot to earn the
Ritterkreuz for his tank killing abilities in the Hs-129 was
Hptm. Rudolf-Heinz Ruffer of 11.(Pz)/SG.9 for his total of 72
tank kills in 80 combat missions, receiving the award on 9 June 1944. It
should also be noted that less than a handful of Hs-129 pilots would earn that
distinction during the war. Unfortunately for Ruffer, He was killed by Russian
anti-aircraft fire in July 1944.
And as there were these Panzerjager-Staffeln in
every Schlachtgruppen specifically tasked with tank killing missions,
there were corresponding VVS Gvardeyskiy units tasked with
okolvnichy missions to specifically seek out and destroy the
Luftwaffe’s tank-killers. In essence, hunters that were hunting other
hunters.
Concerning the German efforts during these relief missions to the Crimea,
Obst. Walther Krause stated in a personal letter to Williamson Murray
that the Luftwaffe’s specialized antitank forces, like that of
III./SG.2 mentioned earlier, would be rushed from one section of the
front to another to counter some new Soviet armored thrust. And as the
cumulative effects of a lack of operational aircraft continued to mount, due
to maintenance breakdowns and the constant commitment to combat missions,
aircraft serviceability rates started to plummet. Eventually, Obst.
Krause states that they were losing as many aircraft as the number of tanks
that they destroyed. In his own words: ". . . hardly a cost-effective
employment of aircraft."
And finally as it concerns the effectiveness of the Soviet's AAA against
ground-attack aircraft, one can draw their own conclusions from the losses
suffered by the French Air Force in its attempt to resupply and support their
forces trapped at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In Bernard Fall's "Hell In A Very
Small Place" and in John Prados' "Operation Vulture," the Vietminh's AAA would
be the deciding factor in the losses suffered by the French aerial operations
during this specific conflict. And in both of these books, there was a clear
fear of an escalation of the conflict if the PLAAF made even a token
appearance in the skies over Indochina, even with MiG-9s.
One can only wonder about the eventual outcome if the 200 B-29s had been
committed to the aerial support of Dien Bien Phu. Though it is doubtful
whether MiG-9s could have had the range to intercept any bombardment missions
to DBP, their appearance in the area would have shaken the FEAF and USN
commanders in their convictions of the outcome of continued aerial missions in
Indochina.
In closing, Mr. Xiaoming Zhang's book should be taken with a grain of salt
for what it is, an attempt to shed some light on an unknown subject up to this
time. The book is more than adequate in that attempt and a good read.
Harold
Stockton
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