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Von Hardesty's book is a good general primer on
this subject but does not have, nor do I think that it was ever intended to
have, the real depth that such a subject demands.
As to the Soviet's collecting their best and
brightest in Guards units from 1943 on was an easy expedient to counter the
early war experience that the Luftwaffe pilots had gained. When the VVS started
to exploit their strengths and the German weaknesses, gained combat experience
and discipline, their lethality over the front-lines started to
grow.
In my as yet unpublished manuscript on the fighting
in the Ukraine illustrates, even the best Luftwaffe aces were subject to fatal
mistakes over the battlefield. A case in point is that as aerial victories were becoming more
difficult to achieve in Russia against the Gvardeyskiy pulkiy, the
requirements for the RK had been dropped from 100 to 75 in September
1943.
As stated earlier, by
31 May 1944 both sides were nearing complete exhaustion. Whether you were a
Luftwaffe Experten or a GSS of a Gvardeyskiy pulkiy,
experience was no guarantee that you were going to survive the present combat
sortie sufficiently enough to be able to fly the next mission of the day, much
less the next victory.
Despite the individual prowess on the
part of Hapt. Gerhard Barkhorn, success had not come without some cost;
having been shot down nine times in his combat career, and being forced to bale
out of his aircraft once, he had been wounded twice. The race for the lead
position as the top scoring Luftwaffe Experten was fiercely
competitive, and Barkhorn was not about to slacken up his pace for
that much sought after title of the best of the best, irrespective of his
own personal fatigue.
The day’s missions for 31 May 1944 were
slated to be more of the same as the days before, flying escort for the
Schlachtflugzeug. While escorting Hans-Ulrich Rudel’s aircraft for his
sixth mission of the day, Barkhorn, being fatigued, allowed his mind to daydream
about his recent elite status among the Jagdverbande. Earlier in the day
Barkhorn had shot down a P-39 from the 7th Gv.IAK for his 270th
kill, which then followed with an Il-2, a Yak-9, and a Yak-3 (probably a
Yak-1b) following, for his 273rd victory. And with that score of 273,
this placed Barkhorn as the best of the best in all the world. Hptm.
Gunther Rall’s (III./JG.52) was at 268 victories, Walter Novotny at 255,
and Lt. Erich "Bubi" Hartmann (9./JG.52) was then at
227.
Barkhorn’s thoughts of notoriety and
his current fatigue kept him from concentrating entirely on keeping a good
look-out while in a combat situation. At just that moment in time, Barkhorn’s
thoughts were shatteringly brought back to reality when he was bounced by a
7th IAK P-39 Airacobra, and he found himself being shot down in his
Bf-109G-6 (WNr 163195, "< < + "Black 5" and nick-named "Christl").
Gerhard Barkhorn received severe wounds to his right arm and leg which put him
out of action for four months, and in Barkhorn’s own words, :
"I got a message (from the
ground controller) that there were Russian fighters about, but I was very
tired and negligent. I didn't look behind me. I had 273 victories at the time,
and I remember thinking about getting 275, and perhaps later 300. The next
victory was me!"
In order to explain what happened from
the other side of the weapons that shot down Germany’s then leading ace, post
war official Soviet archival material must be consulted. After the war there
were a number of interviews of the famous war-time VVS pilots to record
their thoughts concerning specific actions and missions of note so that these
accounts could be used to help train future VVS pilots.
In a series of audio tapes that were
made with Pplk. Aleksandr Pokryshkin, commander of the 9th Gv.IAD
at the time, the issue of Barkhorn’s downing was brought up. After consulting
the logs of the 16th Gv.IAP for that date, when he was that regiment’s
commander, Pokryshkin found one of his many infraction reports that he often
made out concerning each of the pilots under his command.
While the 16th Gv.IAP was
involved on a fighter sweep in the Iassy region, one of the younger pilots of
the regiment broke formation to go after a string of Jabo-rei Fw-190s
that were at very low altitude. Mal.L-y. V.S. Petuhov was written up for
"For violating war current (breaking formation)", when he then "chased
Fw-190s around the church near Iassy without any success." Petuhov returned
to his formation to the full derision of his commander.
Almost immediately after Petuhov’s
return to formation, Iosef Ignatievich Grafin of the 104th Gv.IAP
swept into the formation to report his victory over a very lazy Bf-109 pilot.
Grafin’s after action report says that he had noticed an aircraft acting very
strange for being over the front. It seems that at that ". . . time I dove
for the opponent, that lived as if he had no flock, (and appeared to be)
void (or unawares of anything until) my volleys overtook
him."
Iosef Ignatievich Grafin was no neophyte to the
battlefield, with two "Gold Stars" of the "GSS" to his credit. Grafin is
reported to have been taken completely by surprise by the actions of Barkhorn
that day as they were completely at odds with everything that he had ever heard
or seen when facing one of the deadly Experten. Up until the time that
Iosef Grafin had gained the safety of numbers of the other P-39s of the 16th
Gv.IAP, did he feel that the entire incident had not been a very elaborate
German trap in an attempt to lure him to his death. Without knowing it at the
time, Iosef Ignatievich Grafin had just shot down the very best fighter pilot in
the entire world, because his victim was not following the very basics of all
combat flying tactics; to pay attention at all times.
What does come through from both sides of this
conflict in 1944 is the fact that one could easily substitute these same events
to those that took place over the Yalu between 1950 to 1953. With proper aerial
discipline and following established fighter combat tactics, either side could
stay alive over the battlefield. But, on the other hand, even the very best
fighter pilots in the world are open to being shot down if they are not up to
their very best capabilities at all times. As always is the case in aerial
combat, "beware the Hun or MIG in the sun."
Harold Stockton
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 9:51
AM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings Over
the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea
I am reading Red Phoenix on the VVS in
WW2.
In fact it will be the forth time gleening out
information.
One of the reasons the VVS used the Staking
Method were several reasons.
Lack of time to teach dogfighting
techniques.
Easier to develop Teaming tactics with those who
survived the Training.
The combat proven survivors were moved to elite
teams or Trainers.
(Gengis Khan did this with his
armies)
Many of the early planes except the Mig 3
performed well only below 15000 ft.
I do not think even the later La7, Yak 3 or 9
models were ever competant in the high altitude role.
Russians doggedly supported their Army with
massive air support.
Flying the lower altitudes gave the
higher flying German aircraft a distinct advantage
and used well tested Boom and Zoom to pummel the
lower flying planes.
Yet the vast majority of German Aircraft were
shot down a lower altitudes.
The Russians played a bait game to attract the
Germans to attack and
used B&Z tactics to force them
into energy waisting turns compromising excape.
The P39 could climb with the German 109 with the
deletion of the 4-30 cal up to 18K
Regardless of the tactics the Russians lost 2 to
1 over the whole course of the war.
But Russia could sustain the losses better with
new manufactured aircraft
and their factories were never attacked by the
Germans to slow production.
This was a war of attrition. Who had more war
materiale and men(women) was going to win.
Especially with the Allies on the Western
fronts eating away at German resources.
The attrition developed excellent Russian
pilots.
I am wondering if the Sabers had a true 2 to 1
ratio over the Russians.
Over the cource of the Korean air battles Sabers
may have achieved a 4 to 1 ratio.
Again the Experienced pilots over Chinese and
Korean Trainees.
Few becoming Aces.
I have made this request to see if any of
the Mechanics were interviewed
by the professional history writers.
They maintained the AC and would expect that
they
could give a different account of who was lost,
injured or missing.
As well as what planes were used, lost and
damaged.
I kind look at the AC Mechanics like a Barber.
Barbers get all the news
and turn out to be subliminal Psycologists. They
hear all the stories!
Dan Fahey
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 9:45
AM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings
Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea
As with any book on military history, the
actual combat records of the opposing sides are sometimes very hard or near
impossible to reconcile with the existing facts. It is also imperative for
the author/historian to have a complete working knowledge of the subject
matter that they are attempting to write about. Mr. Xiaoming Zhang has done
a credible effort in attempting to broach a monumental task.
Having finished an as yet unpublished work on
how the VVS was able to defeat the Luftwaffe in the Ukraine during the early
and middle parts of 1944, I read Mr. Zhang's work with some interest. Though
there are some obvious holes in this work's coverage of the subject matter,
there was some significant amounts of material that could be gleaned
for the person familiar enough with the combat operations of the VVS and its
proxies in Korea.
When Xiaoming Zhang started discussing the
aspects of the different periods of Soviet combat operations and their
efficacy, as well as the growth of the PLAAF into its combat role on the
battle field, this allowed me to compare his research with what was known of
how the VVS faced down and eventually defeated the Luftwaffe in southern
Russia in 1944 when they met each other on almost equal terms.
In the "Red Wings" book there is some
discussion of how the tactics of layering of MiG-15 formations over specific
areas of the front lines, and to restrict their use in very well defined
areas of operations. This specific tactic was exactly similar to how the VVS
was able to claim aerial superiority in southern Russia in
1944.
One of the tactics that the VVS used
quite successfully was their "maliy teatr - frontu", "small
theater fronts." Such operations were to be accomplished with the usage of
combined units of leghiy (light) and tyazhely (heavy) fighter
squadrons, regiments, corps, and divisions. Though any fighter squadron
could be interchanged on the battlefield from one type of mission to
another, some form of specialized role was assumed in the tactical
assignments given to a unit depending on the actual type of fighter aircraft
that they were equipped with.
Within these frontu; some method
had to be introduced in order to protect their own important supply
shipments being carried out by the 1st ATD and other important
missions of the 5th VA. On 22 May 1944, Leytenant
(L-y., Lieutenant) Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov of the 240th IAP
(302 IAD, of the 4th Gv.IAK) developed the idea of a convoy
system for the entire 5th VA. In essence, Popkov envisaged a system
where transport and combat aircraft could fly through the entire 5th
VA area of responsibility with complete assurance of safety from
intruding German intrusions by setting up a continuous chain of standing
patrols of fighter aircraft that would escort the particular aircraft from
one area of responsibility to another while keeping within the tactical
control of the escorting fighter’s own unit.
What had inspired Popkov to develop his
convoy system for the VVS had been due to his combat experiences
during the battle of Kursk in July 1943. Vitalii Popkov had led a group of
five Lavochkin fighters of the 5th Gv.IAP on a combat patrol in order
to cover the advances of attacking Soviet ground forces.
When spotting a formation of eighteen Ju
87s and six Bf-109s, Popkov ordered one para of the La-5s to engage
the Bf-109 escorts, while he and the rest of the Soviet fighters intercepted
the Junkers. This group of Schlachtfliegern immediately abandoned
their mission and made a quick retreat.
Almost immediately afterwards Popkov
spotted another group of German assault-aircraft, this time escorted by five
Bf-109s. And almost without hesitation, Vitalii Popkov decided to make a
surprise attack and, within a short space of time, had succeeded in shooting
down two of the Luftwaffe aircraft. The other 5th Gv.IAP
pilots claimed a further eight aerial victories, and damaged another three
aircraft. Not a single member of this second attack group succeeded in
reaching their targets; the remaining German aircraft escaping in the
melee.
On 7 June 1944, the 5th Gv.IAP was
transferred from Terasapol to Luck, and while operating from this airfield,
Popkov flew many successful combat missions in the Lvov area. As the
Eskadrillii-Kommandr (Esk.Kdr., Squadron Commander) of the
5th Gv.IAP, on 25 June 1944, Popkov defended the bombers of
Gen. Ivan Polbin’s 2nd Gv.BAK. And on 21 August 1944 the
fighters of the 5th Gv.IAP, then under Popkov's command, downed six
German planes. In the winter of 1945, the regiment was stationed at the
fields near Gostyn.
Speaking of Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov
himself and of his convoy system, Gen. Ivan Polbin stated
that:
". . . As the need to replenish the
units of the 5th VA with new units, aircraft, and aircrews, and to implement
the combat training of these new aircrews to the latest combat tactics and
techniques, Popkov’s convoy system ensured a relatively safe environment
behind the Soviet front lines for these very important missions to be
accomplished."
Vitalii Ivanovich Popkov would end the war
with 41 personal and seventeen shared aerial victories.
Just as had been developed for the aerial
control of the VVS aircraft in and around Stalingrad in November 1942
through January 1943, so too were the specific traffic patterns of Soviet
aircraft throughout the zone of control of the 5th VA. It was highly
stressed within all flying units to stay completely within their specific
corridors and areas of flight, and to make specific efforts against
"dangerous wandering", because of the standing orders of the 5th VA
and the 15th Anti-aircraft Army to shoot down any unidentified,
unauthorized, or intruding aircraft.
A follow on benefit from the Soviet’s tight aerial
umbrella that they attempted to throw over their own front lines, it placed
further hindrances and problems for the Luftwaffe to gather much
needed aerial reconnaissance information.
What can be gleaned from the above narrative is the fact
that the "maliy
teatr - frontu" tactics could be extremely effective against the
best of pilots. Interestingly
enough, on 14 March 1944 St.-l-y. Ivan Kozhedub would be
involved in an "maliy teatr - frontu" mission that is
responsible for the almost shooting down of Oblt. Wilhelm
("Willi", radio call-sign of "Rabitski") Batz, who only
survives this aerial combat by the narrowest of margins, by crash-diving and
overstraining his aircraft.
"Willi" Batz recorded that he almost
became a victim to one of these "maliy teatr - frontu"
tactics. It seems that Batz presumed to think that his radio call-sign of
"Rabitski" was safe enough to not change each month as the standing
orders required. Not expecting the efficiency of the Soviet’s VNOS’
ability to identify individual Luftwaffe pilots, Batz was soon
identified after taking off and was soon surrounded by a trap set up by
St.L-y. Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (GSS), commander of the
240th IAP (302 IAD, 4th Gv.IAK).
After successfully evading the first assault by
the zveno (section of four) being led by Kozhedub himself, Batz
out-dove the following La-5FNs that had first surprised him. Leveling
out some 2000 meters (1250 feet) below the initial attack, Batz soon found
himself surrounded with an even lower zveno that was waiting for him
to pull out of his dive. Continuing on through this second group of
attacking Lavochkins from the 240th IAP, Batz had to make it back to
his home airfield at tree-top level. After safely landing his Bf-109G-6,
Batz was told that his aircraft was a total write-off due to being overly
strained during his high-speed dives to outpace his attackers.
What is not brought out sufficiently in Mr. Zhang's book
was the efficacy of the VVS' ability to counter ground-attack efforts with
their AAA. An interesting
anecdotal exchange occurred between Lt. Walther Krause and another
Hs-129 pilot of IV.(Pz)/SG.9 when they were ordered to attack an
advancing Soviet tank formation in February 1944:
"At present only two aircraft are
serviceable, so we are only able to piss around. When VIII
Fliegerkorps orders us to fly, we ask them whether they would like us to
operate our two aircraft singly or in waves! Otherwise, morale in the
Staffel (10.(Pz)/SG 9) is quite good. . ."
The first pilot to earn the
Ritterkreuz for his tank killing abilities in the Hs-129 was
Hptm. Rudolf-Heinz Ruffer of 11.(Pz)/SG.9 for his total of 72
tank kills in 80 combat missions, receiving the award on 9 June 1944. It
should also be noted that less than a handful of Hs-129 pilots would earn
that distinction during the war. Unfortunately for Ruffer, He was killed by
Russian anti-aircraft fire in July 1944.
And as there were these Panzerjager-Staffeln in
every Schlachtgruppen specifically tasked with tank killing missions,
there were corresponding VVS Gvardeyskiy units tasked with
okolvnichy missions to specifically seek out and destroy the
Luftwaffe’s tank-killers. In essence, hunters that were hunting other
hunters.
Concerning the German efforts during these relief missions to the Crimea,
Obst. Walther Krause stated in a personal letter to Williamson Murray
that the Luftwaffe’s specialized antitank forces, like that of
III./SG.2 mentioned earlier, would be rushed from one section of the
front to another to counter some new Soviet armored thrust. And as the
cumulative effects of a lack of operational aircraft continued to mount, due
to maintenance breakdowns and the constant commitment to combat missions,
aircraft serviceability rates started to plummet. Eventually, Obst.
Krause states that they were losing as many aircraft as the number of tanks
that they destroyed. In his own words: ". . . hardly a cost-effective
employment of aircraft."
And finally as it concerns the effectiveness of the Soviet's AAA against
ground-attack aircraft, one can draw their own conclusions from the losses
suffered by the French Air Force in its attempt to resupply and support
their forces trapped at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In Bernard Fall's "Hell In A
Very Small Place" and in John Prados' "Operation Vulture," the Vietminh's
AAA would be the deciding factor in the losses suffered by the French aerial
operations during this specific conflict. And in both of these books, there
was a clear fear of an escalation of the conflict if the PLAAF made even a
token appearance in the skies over Indochina, even with MiG-9s.
One can only wonder about the eventual outcome if the 200 B-29s had been
committed to the aerial support of Dien Bien Phu. Though it is doubtful
whether MiG-9s could have had the range to intercept any bombardment
missions to DBP, their appearance in the area would have shaken the FEAF and
USN commanders in their convictions of the outcome of continued aerial
missions in Indochina.
In closing, Mr. Xiaoming Zhang's book should be taken with a grain of
salt for what it is, an attempt to shed some light on an unknown subject up
to this time. The book is more than adequate in that attempt and a good
read.
Harold
Stockton
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