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Dear Mr. Sewell,
You commented that "The Soviets were not very
charitable towards the Chinese, and apparently held them in low esteem
(unofficially) and had no use whatsoever for the North Koreans, who they rarely
mentioned at all. The "Unified Air Army" of PLAAF/KPAFAC pilots is usually just
referred to as "the Chinese air forces." This case was generally the same for
the Luftwaffe in WW-II in Russia.
Though there were individual pilots of the Axis
forces who showed exceptional personal abilities, for the most part
the contributions of the Romanian and Hungarian pilots were only good for the
supporting roles. I have also noticed in my research that not every German
pilot and unit was exceptional in their performance in combat.
Whenever someone started to show personal aptitude,
they were given the opportunity to transfer to one of the more famous squadrons.
I have even noticed that individual pilots in the more famous units and
other units flying in the immediate vicinity of these same top scoring units,
were not filled with the same combat victories as some of the more renown
outfits.
It seemed that the Luftwaffe pilots continued to
have that same chronic symptom of individual glory called "neck rash" in their
rush for their own Knight's Cross. As the effectiveness of the Soviet
Guards units started to make themselves known over the battlefield it
also started to make it ever so much harder to attain aerial victories. As such,
by 1944 the requirement for a KC was lowered from 100 to 75.
One thing that does come through in Xiaoming's book
is the fact that Mao was more concerned with his own agenda of building up the
PLAAF into a force for his own plans against the Nationalists rather than the
protection of any Korean interests. This was also proven later in Indochina,
Vietnam, and even today.
North Korea seems to be allowed to be the unruly
child going throughout the store destroying everything in its path and making
itself very noticed by everyone, while at the same time the PRC acts like the
unawares tutor that is just there to keep it from getting into too much trouble.
And North Korea is still being used as a trip-wire for PRC interests in the
Pacific-rim, to keep America just distracted enough to not keep watch on China's
larger intentions.
I thoroughly enjoyed reading Xiaoming's book and
feel that it does offer an interesting glimpse into the PRC and PLAAF
mindset.
Harold
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 10:44
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings Over
the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Mr. Sewell,
The main point that I have been trying to make in
most of my tedious quotes from my writings is the fact that when it came to
the fighting of the VVS in southern Russia in 1944, their combat claims were
pretty closely watched for accuracy. Only after independent verification from
other sources would a claim be credited. Though these factors were still not
fool proof, they did bring them into some form of rational ratios as per the
German claims at the same time. In the end, almost every combat claim was
inflated by every nation; sometimes by as high as a factor of two or three
hundred per cent. Even the German claims during
this same time period were consistent when it came to their fighting the 15th
AF in later 1944.
Combat tactics seemed to more closely followed in
the Guards units, but this still did not endure that one of these pilots did
not do something stupid or that they were not surprised in the middle of a
combat mission. The main point that I wanted to make was the fact that the
veteran VVS pilots did indeed give a better showing of themselves in combat
than the newer pilots, as was also the case for the US pilots. Hours in the
cockpit also did not translate to being a better combat pilot, but it did
help. As Randy Cunningham so correctly stated, something like: train
like you are going to fight.
Concerning combat losses on both sides of the
Korean War, I would discount most claims in a general sense by a factor of 2
to 3 as you state. For the more experienced pilots on both sides I would use a
factor of 0.80 to 0.90%. Better pilots on both sides were more apt to
have been able to actually sustained lethal damage to their
opponent.
Also I am not a linguist, I rather feel that in
my writing I have adopted the use of using the original designation with its
translation in a parenthetical statement. This is just a quirk that I prefer
for material that I am going to have published.
Thank you for your response.
Harold
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 7:05
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings
Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Harold,
I'm trying to figure out what your point
is but so far am not absorbing it.
I worked with Xiaoming on his
book and while the Soviets kept very good records on their losses and
claims, the Chinese were bigger on absolutes and not very good on details. I
also mentioned to him that they may have done "NKVD Math" or cut their
losses by 50% while multiplying their clams by a factor of 4 or 5.
The Soviets lost at least 357 aircraft which can be accounted for by
day/date/time and pilot involved, and a good number of those even have the
claiming pilot credited (per Seidov and German). But as Joe Brennan and I
have been discussing on this group, most of their claims -- between 75% and
90%, depending upon whose definitions one uses for "air to air loss" -- are
just that, and not validated. Likewise, about 20-30% of the US ones seem to
be exaggerated, especially early in the war when both sides essentially had
their "A" team in there.
>From what you describe and what the
Soviets (and now Russian historians) wrote about it, it doesn't seem to
match up well with WWII combat operations. They had many of the same
problems we did in learning the ropes of jet combat, and while most of the
"basics" are the same -- cover your wingman, close in before firing, get on
his tail, use your advantages and play to his weaknesses -- it doesn't match
with the description of WWII combat.
One of the main problems the
Soviets faced was life at 7 g with no G suits, which tended to either
fatigue or cripple pilots and render them invalids in 100-150 missions. If
you physically can't take it, you can't get the most from your machine.
Other than the single pass and run for home tactic used in Vietnam by the
VPAF, that doesn't help if you need to stay and fight to repulse fighters
and fighter-bombers.
They also suffered badly with new pilots, who
they all cite as not being aggressive enough and trying to use their heavier
weapons at long range to kill small targets like fighters and
fighter-bombers. Their aces (numbers vary as to how many with a high of 63
being given in extreme cases, but probably about 7-10 honest ones) all
closed to near point-blank range before firing with the exception of
engaging hapless B-29s.
The Soviets were not very charitable towards
the Chinese, and apparently held them in low esteem (unofficially) and had
no use whatsover for the North Koreans, who they rarely mentioned at all.
The "Unified Air Army" of PLAAF/KPAFAC pilots is usually just referred to as
"the Chinese air forces."
I give Xiaoming high marks for being the
first one to take a stab at this, but when the source doesn't want to
cooperate (something like my asking the CAFH for their losses in Korea eight
years ago and being stiffed; were it not for DPMO we probably would never
have seen how bad they really were) you can't really blame the messenger.
Cookie Sewell
AMPS
PS Are you are a Russian linguist?
Curious as you keep putting the Russian terms in text into non-Russian
terms, such as "pulk" for regiment. The correct Russian word is "Polk" (as
in Polkovnik for colonel or "regimental commander").
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