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I have never seen a close analysis of Soviet claims
v. actual Axis air combat losses for WWII. I wonder was it possible to do that
in the period you studied? In Bergrstrom and Mikhailov's Black Cross/Red Star
series, unique as it is, they don't really seem to do that, not in a
comprehensive way at least. It may not be possible for very large scale
conflicts. My sense is even for say the western front in 1944 it's very
difficult, so many air forces and units overlapping one another. It's much more
tractable in Korea at least sticking to the simple assumption that
then-secret records are usually correct on losses and their causes if
the side sustainin the loss knew the cause, while claims can be
wrong by almost any indeterminate amount depending on many circumstances.
That is, high claims cannot by themselves prove loss records wrong. I know
many take a more complicated approach when it comes to Soviet claims and US
losses in Korea.
I do know one other smaller conflict where Soviet
claim accuracy can be compard to Korea (I mentioned once long before),
the 1939 Nononhan/Khalkin Gol border war with Japan. Soviet claims by most
sources totalled 660 JAAF a/c in air combat. Losses from post WWII Japanese
sources range from 90-115. Latter number is from Coox's landmark "Nomonhan"
(mainly about the stunning Soviet victory on the ground) using Japanese general
staff records, my count of what he mentions some losses AAA or
other. Assuming 100 losses this would be broadly in line with the
Soviet claim accuracy in Korea: enemy losses ~15% of Soviet claims
(seems possibly a bit less in Korea). Total MiG losses to UN fighters seem
to have been ~70's% of confirmed UN fighter victories, not counting a few dozen
almost completely inaccurate B-29 claims and subject to some debate since NK MiG
losses are not known and Soviet and Chinese ones have both been quoted
differently over time. ~550-600 total MiG's v. ~800 claims. So claim
discount ratio's in Korea seemed to vary a lot by AF, not just by experience of
individual pilot. Digression: As a general devil's advocate about all pilots in
all AF's in all wars, isn't it possible higher scoring pilots were so partly
because they were more enthusiastic claimers? Documentation of ace claims I've
seen have a tendency to assume real losses on the other side correspond
to the ace's claim, not his lessor known sdn mates' claims in the same
combats, but it's really very hard to know who shot down who exactly in
most cases. It's not intuitive to me higher scorers would score a higher % of
real kills relative to their higher claims though I wouldn't rule it out. Pilot
experience wouldn't seem the key point as much as somewhat related factor, unit
success. I think it's indicated by many episodes that the side that feels less
hard pressed in the combat claims more accurately. That is heavier losses tend
to go with more exaggerated claims, and the VVS seems to usually have been the
ones taking the heavier losses in 1939, GPW and Korea unless all three
opponents cooked their books (actually the JAAF though outscoring
the VVS probably between 3:2 and 2:1 in 1939 exaggerated their claims
almost as much). Anyway, VVS accuracy in Korea seems similar to at least
one ealier conflict of theirs (1939) and USAF accuracy in Korea was also broadly
similar to USAAF fighter claim accuracy in WWII in Europe 44-45
period.
Joe
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 11:44
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings Over
the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Mr. Sewell,
The main point that I have been trying to make in
most of my tedious quotes from my writings is the fact that when it came to
the fighting of the VVS in southern Russia in 1944, their combat claims were
pretty closely watched for accuracy. Only after independent verification from
other sources would a claim be credited. Though these factors were still not
fool proof, they did bring them into some form of rational ratios as per the
German claims at the same time. In the end, almost every combat claim was
inflated by every nation; sometimes by as high as a factor of two or three
hundred per cent. Even the German claims during
this same time period were consistent when it came to their fighting the 15th
AF in later 1944.
Combat tactics seemed to more closely followed in
the Guards units, but this still did not endure that one of these pilots did
not do something stupid or that they were not surprised in the middle of a
combat mission. The main point that I wanted to make was the fact that the
veteran VVS pilots did indeed give a better showing of themselves in combat
than the newer pilots, as was also the case for the US pilots. Hours in the
cockpit also did not translate to being a better combat pilot, but it did
help. As Randy Cunningham so correctly stated, something like: train
like you are going to fight.
Concerning combat losses on both sides of the
Korean War, I would discount most claims in a general sense by a factor of 2
to 3 as you state. For the more experienced pilots on both sides I would use a
factor of 0.80 to 0.90%. Better pilots on both sides were more apt to
have been able to actually sustained lethal damage to their
opponent.
Also I am not a linguist, I rather feel that in
my writing I have adopted the use of using the original designation with its
translation in a parenthetical statement. This is just a quirk that I prefer
for material that I am going to have published.
Thank you for your response.
Harold
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 7:05
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings
Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Harold,
I'm trying to figure out what your point
is but so far am not absorbing it.
I worked with Xiaoming on his
book and while the Soviets kept very good records on their losses and
claims, the Chinese were bigger on absolutes and not very good on details. I
also mentioned to him that they may have done "NKVD Math" or cut their
losses by 50% while multiplying their clams by a factor of 4 or 5.
The Soviets lost at least 357 aircraft which can be accounted for by
day/date/time and pilot involved, and a good number of those even have the
claiming pilot credited (per Seidov and German). But as Joe Brennan and I
have been discussing on this group, most of their claims -- between 75% and
90%, depending upon whose definitions one uses for "air to air loss" -- are
just that, and not validated. Likewise, about 20-30% of the US ones seem to
be exaggerated, especially early in the war when both sides essentially had
their "A" team in there.
>From what you describe and what the
Soviets (and now Russian historians) wrote about it, it doesn't seem to
match up well with WWII combat operations. They had many of the same
problems we did in learning the ropes of jet combat, and while most of the
"basics" are the same -- cover your wingman, close in before firing, get on
his tail, use your advantages and play to his weaknesses -- it doesn't match
with the description of WWII combat.
One of the main problems the
Soviets faced was life at 7 g with no G suits, which tended to either
fatigue or cripple pilots and render them invalids in 100-150 missions. If
you physically can't take it, you can't get the most from your machine.
Other than the single pass and run for home tactic used in Vietnam by the
VPAF, that doesn't help if you need to stay and fight to repulse fighters
and fighter-bombers.
They also suffered badly with new pilots, who
they all cite as not being aggressive enough and trying to use their heavier
weapons at long range to kill small targets like fighters and
fighter-bombers. Their aces (numbers vary as to how many with a high of 63
being given in extreme cases, but probably about 7-10 honest ones) all
closed to near point-blank range before firing with the exception of
engaging hapless B-29s.
The Soviets were not very charitable towards
the Chinese, and apparently held them in low esteem (unofficially) and had
no use whatsover for the North Koreans, who they rarely mentioned at all.
The "Unified Air Army" of PLAAF/KPAFAC pilots is usually just referred to as
"the Chinese air forces."
I give Xiaoming high marks for being the
first one to take a stab at this, but when the source doesn't want to
cooperate (something like my asking the CAFH for their losses in Korea eight
years ago and being stiffed; were it not for DPMO we probably would never
have seen how bad they really were) you can't really blame the messenger.
Cookie Sewell
AMPS
PS Are you are a Russian linguist?
Curious as you keep putting the Russian terms in text into non-Russian
terms, such as "pulk" for regiment. The correct Russian word is "Polk" (as
in Polkovnik for colonel or "regimental commander").
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