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Dear Joe,
You wondered about analysis of combat between two
factions during either WW-II of Korea. I have studied singular battles and
tried to relate after-action reports when available and have found that combat
claims are easily overestimated by large margins. One case in point was
different in my forthcoming book where the attacking force of Soviet aircraft
were jumped over a Luftwaffe airfield.
The Soviet claims were grossly overestimated over
the actual German loss records for this same time period. The German claims
could easily be verified with the number of crashed Soviet aircraft in the area.
In the end, combat is not something that can ever be completely examined to
finality. A good example is the number of Japanese aircraft claimed shot down
during Iwo Jima and Okinawa. How many ships' gun-crews claimed the same aircraft
shot down, all seeing the same aircraft crash into the ocean?
Harold
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 5:12
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings Over
the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
I have never seen a close analysis of Soviet
claims v. actual Axis air combat losses for WWII. I wonder was it possible to
do that in the period you studied? In Bergrstrom and Mikhailov's Black
Cross/Red Star series, unique as it is, they don't really seem to do that, not
in a comprehensive way at least. It may not be possible for very large scale
conflicts. My sense is even for say the western front in 1944 it's very
difficult, so many air forces and units overlapping one another. It's much
more tractable in Korea at least sticking to the simple assumption that
then-secret records are usually correct on losses and their causes if
the side sustainin the loss knew the cause, while claims can be
wrong by almost any indeterminate amount depending on many circumstances.
That is, high claims cannot by themselves prove loss records wrong. I
know many take a more complicated approach when it comes to Soviet claims and
US losses in Korea.
I do know one other smaller conflict where Soviet
claim accuracy can be compard to Korea (I mentioned once long
before), the 1939 Nononhan/Khalkin Gol border war with Japan. Soviet
claims by most sources totalled 660 JAAF a/c in air combat. Losses from post
WWII Japanese sources range from 90-115. Latter number is from Coox's landmark
"Nomonhan" (mainly about the stunning Soviet victory on the ground) using
Japanese general staff records, my count of what he mentions some losses AAA
or other. Assuming 100 losses this would be broadly in line
with the Soviet claim accuracy in Korea: enemy losses ~15% of Soviet
claims (seems possibly a bit less in Korea). Total MiG losses to UN
fighters seem to have been ~70's% of confirmed UN fighter victories, not
counting a few dozen almost completely inaccurate B-29 claims and subject to
some debate since NK MiG losses are not known and Soviet and Chinese ones
have both been quoted differently over time. ~550-600 total MiG's v. ~800
claims. So claim discount ratio's in Korea seemed to vary a lot by AF, not
just by experience of individual pilot. Digression: As a general devil's
advocate about all pilots in all AF's in all wars, isn't it possible higher
scoring pilots were so partly because they were more enthusiastic claimers?
Documentation of ace claims I've seen have a tendency to assume real losses on
the other side correspond to the ace's claim, not his lessor known sdn
mates' claims in the same combats, but it's really very hard to know who
shot down who exactly in most cases. It's not intuitive to me higher scorers
would score a higher % of real kills relative to their higher claims though I
wouldn't rule it out. Pilot experience wouldn't seem the key point as much as
somewhat related factor, unit success. I think it's indicated by many episodes
that the side that feels less hard pressed in the combat claims more
accurately. That is heavier losses tend to go with more exaggerated claims,
and the VVS seems to usually have been the ones taking the heavier losses
in 1939, GPW and Korea unless all three opponents cooked their books (actually
the JAAF though outscoring the VVS probably between 3:2 and 2:1 in
1939 exaggerated their claims almost as much). Anyway, VVS accuracy in
Korea seems similar to at least one ealier conflict of theirs (1939) and USAF
accuracy in Korea was also broadly similar to USAAF fighter claim
accuracy in WWII in Europe 44-45 period.
Joe
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 11:44
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings
Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Mr. Sewell,
The main point that I have been trying to make
in most of my tedious quotes from my writings is the fact that when it came
to the fighting of the VVS in southern Russia in 1944, their combat claims
were pretty closely watched for accuracy. Only after independent
verification from other sources would a claim be credited. Though these
factors were still not fool proof, they did bring them into some form of
rational ratios as per the German claims at the same time. In the end,
almost every combat claim was inflated by every nation; sometimes by as high
as a factor of two or three hundred per cent. Even the German claims during this same time period were consistent
when it came to their fighting the 15th AF in later 1944.
Combat tactics seemed to more closely followed
in the Guards units, but this still did not endure that one of these pilots
did not do something stupid or that they were not surprised in the middle of
a combat mission. The main point that I wanted to make was the fact that the
veteran VVS pilots did indeed give a better showing of themselves in combat
than the newer pilots, as was also the case for the US pilots. Hours in the
cockpit also did not translate to being a better combat pilot, but it did
help. As Randy Cunningham so correctly stated, something
like: train like you are going to fight.
Concerning combat losses on both sides of the
Korean War, I would discount most claims in a general sense by a factor of 2
to 3 as you state. For the more experienced pilots on both sides I would use
a factor of 0.80 to 0.90%. Better pilots on both sides were more apt to
have been able to actually sustained lethal damage to their
opponent.
Also I am not a linguist, I rather feel that in
my writing I have adopted the use of using the original designation with its
translation in a parenthetical statement. This is just a quirk that I prefer
for material that I am going to have published.
Thank you for your response.
Harold
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 7:05
PM
Subject: Re: Book review: Red Wings
Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air...
Harold,
I'm trying to figure out what your point
is but so far am not absorbing it.
I worked with Xiaoming on his
book and while the Soviets kept very good records on their losses and
claims, the Chinese were bigger on absolutes and not very good on details.
I also mentioned to him that they may have done "NKVD Math" or cut their
losses by 50% while multiplying their clams by a factor of 4 or 5.
The Soviets lost at least 357 aircraft which can be accounted for
by day/date/time and pilot involved, and a good number of those even have
the claiming pilot credited (per Seidov and German). But as Joe Brennan
and I have been discussing on this group, most of their claims -- between
75% and 90%, depending upon whose definitions one uses for "air to air
loss" -- are just that, and not validated. Likewise, about 20-30% of the
US ones seem to be exaggerated, especially early in the war when both
sides essentially had their "A" team in there.
>From what you
describe and what the Soviets (and now Russian historians) wrote about it,
it doesn't seem to match up well with WWII combat operations. They had
many of the same problems we did in learning the ropes of jet combat, and
while most of the "basics" are the same -- cover your wingman, close in
before firing, get on his tail, use your advantages and play to his
weaknesses -- it doesn't match with the description of WWII combat.
One of the main problems the Soviets faced was life at 7 g with no
G suits, which tended to either fatigue or cripple pilots and render them
invalids in 100-150 missions. If you physically can't take it, you can't
get the most from your machine. Other than the single pass and run for
home tactic used in Vietnam by the VPAF, that doesn't help if you need to
stay and fight to repulse fighters and fighter-bombers.
They also
suffered badly with new pilots, who they all cite as not being aggressive
enough and trying to use their heavier weapons at long range to kill small
targets like fighters and fighter-bombers. Their aces (numbers vary as to
how many with a high of 63 being given in extreme cases, but probably
about 7-10 honest ones) all closed to near point-blank range before firing
with the exception of engaging hapless B-29s.
The Soviets were not
very charitable towards the Chinese, and apparently held them in low
esteem (unofficially) and had no use whatsover for the North Koreans, who
they rarely mentioned at all. The "Unified Air Army" of PLAAF/KPAFAC
pilots is usually just referred to as "the Chinese air forces."
I
give Xiaoming high marks for being the first one to take a stab at this,
but when the source doesn't want to cooperate (something like my asking
the CAFH for their losses in Korea eight years ago and being stiffed; were
it not for DPMO we probably would never have seen how bad they really
were) you can't really blame the messenger.
Cookie
Sewell
AMPS
PS Are you are a Russian linguist? Curious as you
keep putting the Russian terms in text into non-Russian terms, such as
"pulk" for regiment. The correct Russian word is "Polk" (as in Polkovnik
for colonel or "regimental commander").
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