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RE: "The Inchon Landing: An Example of Brilliant Generalship"



Ed:

Good point.  However, the partisan raids were only annoyances to the
Communists, instead of the serious threats.  Since 1951 till the end of the
conflict, there were constantly 35%-40% of CPVA and NKPA's strength tied
down for the coastal defense.  I felt that most analysis of Inchon landing
had
paid too much attention on its immediate operational success and ignored its
long term psychological effects on Communists' strategic planning later in
the war.

Jack

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu
[mailto:owner-KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu]On Behalf Of Ed Evanhoe
Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2003 8:10 PM
To: KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu
Subject: RE: "The Inchon Landing: An Example of Brilliant Generalship"


Jack,

There also was the fact that UN-supported partisans held all the islands
off both coasts of North Korea and had partisan units operating inside the
country. By 1952 there were 22,000 plus partisans on the islands broken
down into 6 partisan infantry regiments plus a partisan airborne regiment
(about battalion size) in the Yongdongp'o area.  This does not include
agent operations that were active in North Korea.

The Johns Hopkins ORO report, 1954, credits the partisans with tying down
75,000 Chinese and North Korean troops at any one time.  The Chinese used
"partisan hunting" to train newly arrived troops.

Ed

 >>At 07:57 PM 8/12/2003 -0700, you wrote:

>That might not be a good option after Chinese entered the war.  Another
>landing like Inchon was always a big concern for Communists after 1951.
>CPVA and NKPA both assigned a lot of dedicated troops to guard the
>coast lines.  In September 1951, CPVA alone had 4 armies (which were
>actually corps) at the west coast and 2 and half armies at the east coast
>of Korea peninsula solely for this duty.
>
> >From December 1952 to April 1953, in response to the UN's preparation
>for a possible landing, Communists increased the strength of the coast
>defense.  There were at least 6 CPVA armies, 2 NKPA armies, and 16
>tank regiments deployed along the west coast, and another 2 CPVA
>armies, 2 NKPA armies and 1 tank regiment along the east coast.
>
>So it was not likely for UN to achieve another big success as in Inchon.
>
>Jack