Re: CCF intervenes

[robert guertin <wanaki@infionline.net>]

Ed,
I indeed condensed the time line, but the fact remains that Mao intended to
expel the UN from Korea. He was even more determined after his Armies had
escaped defeat with the commencement of the "Peace Talks", and at the
resumption of hostilities when his son was killed in an air raid behind the
Chinese front.
You are of course correct regarding the initial contacts with the Chinese
forces, but the plan for their commitment was agreed to in early August over
the objections of some of the Generals.
Part of the ultimate strategy once the warnings were ignored, primarily by
Gens. Willoby (sp) and Almond, was to destroy the First Marine Division, and
annihilate the lead S.Korean maneuver elements. It was believed that this would
induce the UN to totally withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.
There is of course much more to the dynamic, but I'm not writing a book.

Ed Evanhoe wrote:

> Robert,
>
> You condensed your timeline a little too much.  The first Chinese troops
> (as opposed to a few advisors/observers with the NK Army) did not start
> crossing into North Korea until 14 Oct 1950, this in northwest North
> Korea.  Chinese troops did not begin crossing into far northeast North
> Korea for another couple of week.  The Taebaek Mountain chain runs just
> inland from the Sea of Japan along Korea's east coast and extends from just
> north of P'ohang in South Korea northward to Wonsan.  The inland chaing is
> called the So-Taebaek Mountain Chain, while the mountains north, northwest
> & northeast of a rough Wonsan-Anju line are identified by different names,
> (I'll have to look up the names) but not as the Taebaek Mountains.
>
> And, I think you will find the first attack in late October 1950 by Chinese
> forces was a "warning" attack intended to tell the UN to stop and pull back
> to an Anju-Wonsan line, this after warning the UN in early October though
> various diplomatic channels that if UN forces came within 50 miles of the
> Yalu River, China would intervene - primarily to protect the dams on the
> Yalu and the vital electrical supply these provided industry in Manchuria
> the Chinese communists needed working if they were to keep their hold on
> the mainland.
>
> In other words, at that point in time China was willing to concede
> everything south of the Wonsan-Anju line, mainly because they were afraid
> if they became involved in Korea they would have to pull troops from the
> area around Taiwan and risk Chinese Nationalist force returning to the
> mainland.
>
> Ed