Re: Inchon Invasion

[Ed Evanhoe <evanhoe1@korean-war.com>]

Dick,

At 11:43 AM 9/9/2003 -0500, you wrote:
> (snip)
>
> The daring of Navy Lieutenant, Eugene Clark, is a story in itself. He, 
> along with two South Korean naval officers, infiltrated the mouth of 
> Inchon Harbor several weeks before the invasion and secured vital 
> information about mining that gave US minesweepers the coordinates they 
> needed to clear the landing approaches. <<
The two Koreans who went on this operation with Lt. Eugene Clark were 
interpreters loaned to him by 8th Army G-2, not ROKN naval 
officers.  Suggest you read Clark's account of what happened:  THE SECRETS 
OF INCHON by Commander Eugene Franklin Clark, Putman, 2002.  I found it a 
bit "colorful" since some of the inter-island movements he described are 
impossible within the described time frame when using a sail junk because 
of the tidal flow. I know because I operated from those same islands later 
and also discussed this op with many of the islanders, including many of 
those mentioned in Clark's book, about this operation while there.

Also suggest you read the US Navy Battle Reports, Vol, V, Chapter 16, pgs 
176-191, THE CLARK EXPEDITION plus, if you can get a copy, the log for the 
HMS Charity for that time period.

And the only "mines" Clark found were a sting of buoys, this according to 
his own account.

And as for Geh In Ju, mentioned by Young Kim, several things wrong with his 
time line/biography.  When the war in Korea began KLO was in the process of 
being disbanded.  All detachments in Korea had been deactivated and their 
people transferred to HID. On 25 June 1950 all that remained of KLO was a 
basement office, at FECOM G-2 in Tokyo with one (1) captain, two (2) 
sergeants and a civilian clerk.  There was a mad rush to reconstitute KLO 
with the advent of war but by early August 1950, when Clark submitted his 
plan for the Inch'on Approach Island operation, it was barely operational 
in Korea and, at that time, depended primarily on Intel furnished by ROKA 
G-2 and HID.  It's few Korean personnel were within the Pusan Perimeter, 
not in the islands off Inch'on.  The Tokchok-Kundo islands had a National 
Police Combat Battalion (actually more of reinforced company than a 
battalion) on them and a small HID detachment.  The National Police were 
scattered on the islands the North Koreans didn't have the manpower to take 
and hold. Bottom line to this is KLO was a FECOM G-2 operation, under U.S. 
command and control, not under any ROKA, ROKN or HID command.  Palmido was 
taken by a mixed bag of National Police and local militia with Clark in 
command.  I have never seen anything to suggest that HID/Geh had more than 
background role in this operation.

Ed