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Dear Cookie and all,
I have followed this thread with some interest and must state
again that almost every AF aerial claims were overstated. Be that as it
may, it must also be stated that comparing a single loss to a claim is an almost
impossibility for any war. But there are some very noted examples of individual
single claims that can be verified. It must also be stated, that for the most
part, that official loss records cannot be absolutely be used as
final proof, as even the German loss records of WW-II have glaring
holes in them for different periods of the war.
But the Korean question still boils down to the fact that the US was not
committed to a victory on the ground or in the air, but rather a return to the
status quo. As such, and the same was wanted in Moscow as well so as to tie up
American interests away from Europe, Korea was only ever used by the US and
Moscow as a bleeding ground for the other side. And for that purpose alone, to
draw any conclusions about who won or lost would have to then be viewed about
how the US allowed itself to react in and toward Taiwan, Vietnam and in
NATO.
Certain things can be ascertained about the aerial victories in Korea.
NATO, as even today, is only interested in short term European interests. Korea
is still a hot bed of claims and threats from the North, and there is still no
clear road to peace.
It can also be stated that the Korean conflict did cause a significant
drain on Russian aerial production capabilities. The Lagg-15 and MiG-9s were
relegated to almost complete obscurity for battlefield use, and also ate up
precious production line capabilities. And the MiGs were clearly only a match
for the F-86s if backed-up by a clearly superior pilot, irrespective of how the
Chinese or NK want to interpret history. China was clearly blunted in its
ambitions to drive the US from Korea and from Taiwan, and a serious dent was put
into Russia's production capability to fight a lasting war of attrition against
the US, on the ground or in the air.
If nothing else was learned in Moscow, it was that they did not have
enough WW-II veterans to match the US in a protracted aerial war, and
that they also knew that any future war was not going to be like anything
that they had experienced in WW-II against the Germans. Contrary to many
individuals thoughts out there, the Germans could never have won the was against
Russia during WW-II, their strategic capability in steel and oil production was
just never there. But the US was something else for the Russians to think
about.
Moscow could interpret aerial losses and claims from both sides just
as well as Washington. One thing was clear to Uncle Joe, he just could not
afford to continue losing MiGs as fast as the US could shoot them down. And if
the Chinese could not interpret aerial losses equally well, why did not they
send any of their numerous MiG-9s down to Vietnam or their southern airfields to
threaten that area in 1954? To do so would have brought a response from the USN
navy carriers that they knew were there just in case of such an
eventuality.
I think that it is a very rewarding venture to try and establish individual
loss/claims on both sides of any conflict, but to get too close to such an issue
can be very much like trying to establish which British archer killed such and
such French nobleman at Augencourt. The French lost to tactics and to technical
superiority of the English long-bow to French armor. So too in Korea,
American tactics and material production capabilities just outspent the
Moscow/Beijing/Pyongyang will for a proletariat victory in the air or on the
ground. The jungles on SE-Asia were too much of a match for anything that
America could, or would be willing, to commit.
Harold Stockton
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