[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

interesting document

Found this in my files and think it is thanks to Cookie Sewell.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "Russia (USSR) In Local Wars and Regional Conflicts
          In the Second Half of the 20th Century"
Major General V.A. Zolotarev, Academic of the RAEhN, editor in chief
    V.A. Yaremenko, A.N. Pochtarev, A.V. Usikov, authors
      "Kuchkovo Polye" Publishing, Moscow 2000, 576 pp
                     ISBN 5-86090-065-1

           PART I: LOCAL WARS AND ARMED CONFLICTS
    IN WHICH SOVIET AND RUSSIAN FORCES HAVE PARTICIPATED

Chapter 2: Military-Political and Military-Strategic Support to Local Wars and Armed Conflicts

In the Far East and Southeast Asia (pp. 62-77)

The first classical experience of participation by Soviet forces in combat operations abroad after
the Second World War took place in February to October 1950 on the territory of the Peoples' Republic of
China, where they served to repulse raids by Kwamuontang Aviation against the Chinese people.

On 14 February 1950, a treaty between the USSR and the PRC was signed, in accordance which
the Soviet Union took upon itself the responsibility to "show aid to China" with all necessary means,
including military. This took into consideration a military cooperation between the two nations, which had
been going even during the Second World War. On that date, per Resolution No. 582-227ss of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR, a group of Soviet advisors was created to organize air defense for Shanghai.24

The decision to create a Soviet group of air defense forces in Shanghai was covered in Sino-Soviet
negotiations in December 1949 and in early February 1950. During the course of these negotiations, Mao
Zedong and Chou Enlai placed the question before I. Stalin and N. Bulganin relating to assistance by the
USSR in the creation of a Chinese national air force and navy in order to seize Taiwan (Formosa), where
the remaining forces of Chiang Kaishek had hidden themselves. The Chinese leaders attempted to receive
Moscow's sanction to conduct secret diversionary actions regarding Taiwan via the use of "their"
volunteers, as well as those volunteers "from the military members of peoples' democratic countries". But
at the same time, I. Stalin did not agree to these requests. He only agreed to create a "Chinese naval cadre"
at Port Arthur with a subsequent transfer of ships to China; have the Soviet General Staff prepare plans for
an air assault on Taiwan; and send an air defense group to the PRC with the necessary number of Soviet
advisors and specialists.25

Between 1950 and 1953, 3,642 advisors and specialists from the Soviet Army and Navy arrived in
China. By 1966, this number had reached 6,695 personnel (including 68 general officers, 6,033 officers,
208 short-service soldiers, and 386 civilian workers). During this period 1,514 Chinese service members
attended training in the military training establishments of the Soviet Union (including: Ground Forces, 97;
Air Defense Forces, 178; Air Forces, 466; Naval Forces, 608; Rear Services, 99; and other branches, 66).

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR had observations on the Kwamuontang Air
Forces which were based on the islands of Taiwan and Chekoushangdao, and which had begun to conduct
air raids on the cities of Shanghai, Nanking, Suchow, and locations where subunits of the Peoples'
Liberation Army (PLA) were deployed near Ninbo. The most intensive bombardments were carried out
against industrial objectives, electrical power stations, railroad junctions, and airfields. The PRC had no air
assets with which to counter these air strikes. 70% of the antiaircraft units in the Shanghai area were found
to be not combat ready.

Lieutenant General P. Batitskiy was designated as the commander of the Soviet PVO forces in
Shanghai, and his chief of staff was Colonel B. Vysotskiy. Deputy force commanders were: for Aviation,
Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Slyusarev; for Air Defense Artillery, Colonel S. Spiridonov, who was
also commanding the 52nd Air Defense Artillery Division. Chief military advisor to the Peoples Liberation
Army of China and military attache in that time frame was Lieutenant General P. Kotov-Legon'kov.

The combat formations of the group included: an operational group (group of forces command,
command of the 106th Fighter Aviation and 52nd Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions); the 29th Guards Fighter
(MiG-15), 351st Fighter (La-11), and 829th Mixed (Tu-2 and Il-10) Aviation Regiments; the 1st Guards
Searchlight Regiment; the 64th Independent Radio Technical Battalion for Aircraft Acquisition (OTRB
VNOS); independent radio technical and truck-mounted oxygen filling stations; the 45th Independent
Signals Company; and an transport aviation group (using Li-2 aircraft).

On 25 February, Lieutenant General P. Batitskiy arrived in Beijing, where he was met by the
commanding general of the PLA Air Forces, Chu De, to which he reported the consist and missions of the
force grouping. Here they made the decision to also include four Chinese mixed antiaircraft regiments (the
2nd, 3rd, 11th, and 14th) into the force grouping. Afterward, the group staff made a staff ride of the airfields at
the nodes of Shanghai, Nanking, and Suchow. On 27 February, the plan to concentrate the group in
Shanghai was validated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Army General
S. Shtemenko. The plan to finish concentrating the forces was to be completed by 23 March 1950.

Between 9 and 15 March the following elements arrived in Shanghai: the operational group of the
commander of Soviet forces; the command of the 106th PVO Fighter Aviation Division (IAD); the
command of the 52nd Antiaircraft Artillery Division (ZAD); and the command of the 64th OTRB VNOS.
The 351st Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) arrived at Suchow airfield from Dal'niy Airfield on 7 March,
but between 16 March and 1 April six aviation flights from this regiment were moved to Jiangfang airfield
(8 kilometers from Shanghai); three flights were set to provide cover of Suchow airfield, where the MiG-15
aircraft of the 29th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (GIAP) were being assembled, having been shipped
to that location from the USSR by railroad. The personnel and aviation commandant equipment from the
286th Independent Aviation Technical Battalion arrived on 9 March. On that day, the 829th Mixed Aviation
Regiment (SAP) operational group arrived in Nanking. During March and April, other Soviet units were
also relocated onto Chinese territory.

By 22 March the command post was fully equipped, and from there centralized command and
control of the forces was conducted.

In March the aircraft also began to arrive. 40 MiG-15 aircraft from the 29th GIAP arrived
disassembled at Suchow from Novosibirsk via railway shipment. Between 10 and 14 March they were
reassembled. By 1 April 39 aircraft were finished and relocated to their deployment area Dachan Airfiled
(10 kilometers northeast of Shanghai). At the same time, the 351s IAP was concentrated at Jiangfang
airfield.

One week later, the following had arrived: the 829th SAP moved from Dal'niy airfield to Suchow;
the 278th Motorized Technology Battalion had deployed to Dachan airfield; and the 286th to Jiangfang.
Regarding the 300th Battalion, which had been sent to China in October 1949, they had been relocated from
Beijing to Suchow.

After 23 March, the 1st Guards Searchlight Regiment occupied 19 positions in the Shanghai area,
and could acquire aircraft in an area of 10-20 kilometers around each position and 20-30 kilometers from
the center of the city.

The concentration and deployment of forces, combat technology and material means went
according to plan. The main body of the officer staff of the group arrived in China by air, preceding the
troops by 10-20 days, which put them in an advantageous position to solve a number of operational tasks.

In all, the Soviet Group of Forces consisted of: 118 aircraft (39 MiG-15, 40 La-11, 10 Tu-2
bombers, 25 Il-10 attack aircraft, and 4 Li-2 transports), 73 searchlights and 13 radar stations, 116 radio
sets, 31 receivers and 436 vehicles.27

Aerial reconnaissance of the enemy was organized in the following manner. Four pairs of VNOS
radar posts were set up (in Tsidun, Nanhoi, Haiyan, and Usyang) where they could keep continuous watch
on the air during daylight hours and pass along observation data to the main VNOS post which would then
inform the Group command post in Beijing and all other units. The VNOS radar post at Hun Tzyaolu, the
aviation radar means at Dachan and Jiangfang airfields, the antiaircraft artillery division, and the searchlight
regiment stood watch during the hours of darkness. Beside that, round the clock observation was carried out
by the air posts of the antiaircraft artillery, all searchlight points, observers at the VNOS posts, intelligence
personnel with the CPs of the Group and units, and Chinese VNOS posts.

During the period of deployment of the forces, landline communications were used in order to
ensure that there was a minimal possibility that the enemy could listen in on the work of the radar sets and
direction finding stations of the Group. In order to set up the combat telephone network, city telephone
cable networks were used via Chinese communications nodes (they did not use those networks which ran
through American telephone stations). During the period 7-15 March underground cable was laid from the
command post communications node to the mainline cable of the city telephone network. To ensure the
strictest secrecy, all of this work was performed at night. This guaranteed the access from the CP
communications node to the international station in Shanghai and to the nearest Chinese telephone station.
Radio communications were also only partially deployed. Control receivers operating within listening range
of the enemy monitored the radio nodes of the antiaircraft artillery units. Radio networks were prepared for
operations in case of a breakdown in the landline communications. Checks of the radio nets were performed
twice a day at the lowest necessary power settings with short signals.

The staff of the Soviet force grouping had previously determined the size of the enemy air forces
grouping, which consisted of four fighter, two bomber and two transport aviation regiments, one
reconnaissance aviation squadron, and one special purpose detachment. In all, they numbered 361 aircraft:
158 fighters (including 110 Mustangs and 48 Thunderbolts), 65 bombers (21 B-24 bombers, 28 B-25
bombers, and 16 Mosquito bombers), 16 reconnaissance aircraft, and 1 transport. The Kwamuontang
aircraft were primarily based at airfields on the island of Taiwan and the islands of the Chuashuan
archipelago.28

In accordance with Order No. 0040 from the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated 16
February 1950, the region of operations for the Group was strictly limited: 70 kilometers northeast of
Shanghai, Tsytsyyui, and more to the south of Hensha island, to the north coast of the gulf of Hangchow,
and to the city of Hangchow.

Operations of the Group was based upon the actions of the enemy, and was divided into two
stages.

During Stage 1 (24 February to 18 May) the enemy launched single plane raids on systematic
reconnaissance flights in the Soviet defense zone, as well as single plane raids or small groups during both
day and night to make raids on the airfields and objectives in the Shanghai area. Beside that, the
Kwamuontang aircraft would send over single plane or small group raids to attack PLA units along the
coast. In all, during this period the staff of the Group of Soviet Forces determined that the enemy launched
367 sorties during that period, 10 of which were at night.

During Stage 2 (18 May to 20 October) the enemy terminated all flights into the defensive zone,
and only with the beginning of combat operations in Korea did they begin to penetrate all of the borders of
the zone protected by the Soviet group along the route Taiwan South Korea Taiwan. In this period, the
Kwamuontang forces only managed to carry out 12 flights, 9 of which were at night.

On 7 March 1950, the 351st went on combat alert. The regiment was based at Suchow and had its
mission patrol the air and stand alert at the airfield at Readiness 1 and Readiness 2, and not to permit
bombers to hit the airfield or the railway junction. The first air combat took place on 13 March. A patrolling
flight of La-11s (led by V. Sidorov) acquired a B-25 medium bomber approaching Suchow from the south.
The flight commander made two attacks from the rear of the bomber at ranges of 800 to 400 meters. The
damaged aircraft fell into the mountains northwest of Nanking.

The next day, for their second air battle the La-11 patrol flight under the command of P. Dushin
shot down another B-25 and set one engine on fire, forcing it to make an emergency landing on its belly 5
kilometers northeast of the Suchow airfield. Six crewmembers were captured, but a seventh (the radio
operator) died. After this, enemy activity incidents slackened somewhat.

On 20 March, an unknown target was located 85 kilometers southeast of Shanghai. 9 La-11
fighters were sent up with a mission of destroying the intruder in the near approaches to Shanghai. After
spotting three Mustangs, the first pair of fighters proceeded to close with them. The Kwamuontang pilots
broke off and headed for the border of the forbidden zone. As it follows, when the bombers lost their
Mustang escorts, they dropped their bombs without results and also disappeared.

On 2 April two Mustangs flew into the area of the north coast of the Gulf of Hangchow, where
they were met by two Soviet fighters. Captail I. Guzhev surprised the enemy with his attack and shot down
the wingman with his first burst, and then nailed the leader's aircraft with his second.

Overall, the Kwamuontang aviation lost 7 aircraft between 20 February and 20 October (two B-24
bombers, two B-25 bombers, two Mustangs, and one Lightning), after which it was desirous to cease raids
on Shanghai. The main effort of the enemy air force then turned to the ground forces of the PLA. They
systematically conducted reconnaissance along the coast, attacked columns of trucks and strafed small
boats. But at the same time, they could not inflict any significant losses on the PLA.

To improve the combat skills in Chinese personnel, officers from the staff and subunits of the 52nd
ZAD systematically conducted exercises in the study of combat technology and in working out methods to
control units and subunits in combat. In all, they provided 2,591 hours of training exercises.

After 1 August, units of the Group began to carry out parallel combat service in accordance with
coded telegram No. 3365 from the Military Ministry of the USSR dated 13 June 1950, which instructed
them to teach and instruct the PLA air defense forces in preparation for turning over their combat
technology to that force. This was one and the same with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR dated 21 July, which offered the transfer to the Chinese government.

Between 13 and 17 October a combined Sino-Soviet commission was formed, which conducted a
selection of local personnel, and also the transfer and receipt of the combat technology and material means.
In the assessment of the commission, all of the items transferred were in good condition, but the Chinese
PVO units were only prepared and equipped to carry out combat with single raids or small groups of
attackers during daylight and clear weather conditions.

On 19 October 1950, all of the PVO systems in Shanghai were transferred to PLA command, but
the Soviet units were split part of them returned to the Motherland, and part of them were relocated to
Northeast China to form the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK) for participation in combat operations to
cover units and formations of the Chinese volunteers in North Korea.

Overall, the Soviet aviation units performed the following: 238 sorties in covering airfields and
intercepting enemy aircraft; 4,676 sorties as combat training flights; 193 sorties as transport aviation
movement support. In six air battles, Soviet fliers shot down 6 enemy aircraft, not losing a single aircraft to
the enemy. Beside that, the four Chines air defense regiments had shot down one additional aircraft (a B-24
bomber).

Non-returning personnel losses for the Group between February and October 1950 consisted of 3
men: 2 officers (pilots Makeyev and Prosteryakov) and 1 private. During that time, two aircraft (one
MiG-15 and one La-11) were lost. Soviet antiaircraft gunners also accidentally shot down one PLA Air
Forces aircraft (a Tu-2 bomber.)29

For their outstanding execution of their mission, the leadership of the PLA was very pleased with
the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces. All of the personnel serving with the Group were awarded the
Chinese Medal "For the Defense of Shanghai". By order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR dated 15 December 1950 (but not published in the press), for their outstanding completion of their
combat obligation the Order of Lenin was presented to Major Yu. Kolesnikov, Captain I. Shinkarenko,
Captain N. Guzhev, Senior Lieutenant S. Volodkin, and Senior Lieutenant P. Dushin. The Order of the Red
Banner was bestowed upon Lieutenant General P. Batitskiy, Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Slyusarev,
Colonel B. Vysotskiy, Colonel S. Spiridonov, Colonel M. Yaskushin, Senior Lieutenant V. Lyufar', Senior
Lieutenant N. Abramovich, Senior Lieutenant V. Sidorov, and Lieutenant S. Popov.

For that reason, the Group of Soviet PVO Forces in Shanghai was determined to have successfully
completed their mission. Their arrival in China was predicated not on military, but military-political and
moral-psychological aims. More significance came from training the Chinese personnel and transferring all
of the Soviet technology and weapons to them.

Simultaneously with the creation and combat operations of the Soviet Group in Shanghai, various
groups of PLA troops throughout the PRC, under the guidance of Soviet military specialists and advisors
who were deployed to carry out large-scale work with these troops, were rearmed and reformed into new
formations and units as their members were trained.

It follows to point out that during the mid 1950s there was a developing question between the
governments of the USSR and the PRC (the first of its type in the world) on equipping the Chinese armed
forces with missile (and including nuclear) weapons. Even by September 1956, in accordance with an inter-
governmental agreement a group of Soviet military specialists in missile technology had arrived to carry out
a staff ride of the work needed. After just over a year, Beijing received its first R-1 missiles with
conventional warheads, which gave a new "life" by train trip No. 23770, which moved them from Arsenal
No. 24 via the Mikhaylenki Station on the Southwest Railway. By January 1958, another 63 "technical
items" for the second-generation R-2 missile had been received, and the first missile battalion of the PLA
was deployed. Further plans for two-way military technical cooperation considered the use of "modern
missile armaments" by the PLA, including the "new generation R-5 missile" with nuclear warheads. But
the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations in 1959 meant that these plans would never be realized.30 Wide-scale
transfer of nuclear forces was performed by the Soviet Union a few years later during the Caribbean Crisis
(of which we will talk more later on).

But at the same time, let us return to the summer of 1950. At that time the cooperation between the
PRC and USSR was quite active, and that was directly connected with the start of the war in Korea.

***

As can be seen from the documents in our National Archives (the Archives of the President of the
Russian Federation and the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), initially
no thought was given to Soviet forces participating in the war in Korea. On the one hand, the Government
of the USSR, based upon the weekly reports from Ambassador to the DPRK T. Shtykov, and on
confidential information received from the North Korean government, had some deceptive views of the
events taking place on the Korean peninsula. Much of this came from the effects of the liberating
revolutions in China, Vietnam, in the Philippines, Malaya, and even Communist successes in Japan. In
South Korea itself, there was a complex and unstable internal situation. Moscow held hopes for an easy
victory by the Northerners. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership was worried that the direct
participation of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the war on the side of the North Koreans would bring
about a very negative reaction by the USA and the world: it was only natural that Moscow would want to
meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign Korea. It was due to just that sort of meddling that Moscow had
complained to Washington about its support for the Kwamuontang forces in China.31 The Kremlin was
clearly aware of the fact that participation by Soviet forces in the war on the Korean peninsula could cause
a crisis in the military-political situation in Europe, where the military bloc of NATO was created in 1949.
Moreover, Moscow was aware of information that indicated that military action by the army of North
Korean on the territory of South Korea would be treated the same as an offensive by the USSR into
Germany. The FRG was then included in an all-European defense system, so that any sort of measures
there would not bring about a similar chain of events. Drawing on that, at the beginning of the war in Korea
the leadership of the USSR made a precise establishment that only a limited number of Soviet military
advisors would enter the territory of North Korea to accompany the forces of the Korean Peoples' Army
(KPA) and South Korean partisans.

The participation of personnel from the Armed Forces of the USSR, in our view, can be divided up
into five separate stages of events on the peninsula:

Stage 1 Preparation. Military aid by the USSR in the creation and equipping of the KPA up to
the commencement of hostilities (1946 to 25 June 1950).

Stage 2 Beginning of the war. The North Koreans cross the 38th Parallel and develop their
offensive up to the Naktong River (25 June to 14 September 1950).

Stage 3 The counteroffensive by the UN multinational forces and their advance into the southern
part of the DPRK (15 September 24 October 1950).

Stage 4 Entry of the Chinese volunteers into the war. Withdrawal of UN forces to South Korea.
Combat operations by the sides on the 38th Parallel (25 October 1950 9 July 1951).

Stage 5 Combat operations by the sides during the course of negotiations for a ceasefire up to the
end of the war (10 July 1951 to 27 July 1953).

The Institute of Soviet Military Advisors was validated the same time as the creation of the KPA
8 February 1948. On that day, the first parade of the national army took place in Pyongyang, numbering
two infantry divisions, a security brigade, and officers' and political school cadets. Up until that time (since
mid 1946) the North Korean army had only been a quasi-official formation. With a new formal designation,
the Peoples' Committee of North Korea Department of National Defense was formed de jure with the
participation of Soviet military advisors. The latter were drawn from the generals and officers of the 25th
Army, which had liberated Korea from the Japanese in August 1945 and consisted of 470 personnel. By the
end of 1948 (after the declaration of the DPRK), by the decision of the Chief of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the USSR the number of Soviet military advisors was reduced to 209 men (1 general, 173
officers, and 35 sergeants). Lieutenant General N. Vasil'yev was named as the chief Soviet military
advisor, who was prepared to coordinate his activities with Soviet Ambassador T. Shtykov.32
Characteristically, the latter was named to this lofty diplomatic post from his duties as Deputy Commander
of Troops for Political Affairs in the Primorye Military District. He remained part of the cadre of the Armed
Forces with the retention of his rank of Colonel General.

Jumping ahead, we stress that the second ambassador to the DPRK, V. Razuvayev, was
simultaneously also the senior military advisor to the KPA until the end of April 1953, and also retained his
military rank as Lieutenant General. He replaced T. Shtykov and N. Vasil'yev in their posts as the end of
November 1950, when they were relieved of their duties for the "shameful work they performed during the
period of the counter-offensive by American and South Korean forces". More than that, on 3 February 1951
T. Shtykov was reduced in rank to Lieutenant General and 10 days later was dropped from the rolls of the
active Armed Forces into the reserves.

In accordance with the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 16 May 1950
and 29 November 1950, the tabular number of authorized advisors, instructors and educational personnel in
the KPA was set at 246 men. But at the same time, these positions were almost never completely filled due
to a shortage of officers who had practical knowledge of the work at the army level and were familiar with
the peculiarities of the Far East Theater of Military Operations.

By the start of the war, advisors were located with the Ministry of National Defense of the DPRK,
as well as in the commands of the arms of service and chiefs of service, in infantry divisions and
independent infantry brigades, infantry and artillery regiments, independent combat and training units, and
the officers' and political schools.

It was due in large part to the efforts of the Soviet military advisors that the Korean Peoples Army
was created. With the aid of the Soviet General Staff, they developed all of the KPA operational plans in
case of war on the Korean peninsula, and carried out terrain walks in the area of the 38th Parallel.33

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from North Korea, and later the withdrawal of the
Americans from the South, the Soviet leadership made the decision to keep 4, 293 military specialists in
North Korea. As for the Americans, they only left a military mission of 500 men in South Korea, headed by
General J. Roberts.

Among the number of objectives taught by the military specialists who stayed behind: three
aviation commandant units for technical servicing of the air routes from Vladivostok to Port Arthur, the
Heijin reconnaissance post, the HF station belonging to the Ministry of State Security in Pyongyang, the
translation post in Ranan, doctors in Soviet hospitals, Korean language newspaper editors, a school for
training national military cadres and the Seisin naval base, which numbered 54 combat vessels and
auxiliaries.34

At 0440 hours on 25 June, the war in Korea began, which commenced the second stage of the
participation of the Soviet military component, represented in the main by Soviet advisors and specialists.
All of them were located with the staff of frontal commander and commanding general of the KPA, Kim Il
Sung, as well as with the rear formations and units, as they were strictly forbidden by the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the USSR from crossing the 38th Parallel. This order remained in force for the course
of the war.

The primary striking force of the UN multinational forces was American aviation, which at the
beginning of the war numbered over 1,100 aircraft. The main force of their tactical aviation was
concentrated in the 5th Air Force, which was deployed in Japan. This air force included tactical bombers,
fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft. Strategic aviation was included as part of a specially created
temporary bomber command. Beside that, they also had transport, air assault, naval aviation, and air
defense aviation combined formations, formations and units located in the Far East, which could also be
called upon to carry out combat missions. The air forces of South Korea, which were only just being
organized, only consisted of a small number of T-6 training and liaison aircraft. By the end of the war, the
American air park would consist of nearly 2,400 aircraft.35

In the words of former US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, the coalition of forces was rather
passively concerned with the possibility of participating in combat operations and that America was only
there to show its solidarity. Subsequently, Washington viewed this as a limited war, for which it had no
doctrine, and defended an isolated nation that held no strategic interests for them. The principle goals of the
American intervention were to demonstrate that they would "punish the aggressor." At that time, the
Truman administration was certain that this was a place to show the "Global Communist Plan" and that the
offensive by Pyongyang was "only the first step in a Sino-Soviet strategy". They established the mission of
opposing Communist aggression throughout the Pacific Ocean basin. In the light of that context, it follows
to examine the sending of the 7th Fleet to the shores of Taiwan and the decision to increase the American
military aid to the French Army in Vietnam.36

When the UN multinational force counter-offensive began, it was a very hard time for the KPA.
They took heavy losses. Then the North Korean government turned to the Soviet leadership with a request
for "international air forces" to cover the combat order of the Korean army from the air. Soon these
"covering forces" began to form on Chinese territory, which in the end were combined to form the 64th IAK
which participated in the Korean war.37

With the aim of showing support to the commanding general of the Korean Peoples Army in the
control of forces in the DPRK, a group of generals from the General Staff of the Soviet Army, headed by
the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General M. Zakharov, was sent to Korea. From 1950 to 1952
this group was located in North Korea, and afterwards, it moved to China.

But at the same time, at this stage the leadership of the USSR first and foremost wanted to avoid
direct intervention in the conflict, having provided direct staff support to the DPRK via China, which more
than once had stated that they were prepared to provide any support to Pyongyang. At that point in time, the
USSR continued to actively supply military goods to both China and the DPRK. Under the direction of
experienced specialists from Soviet military aviation academies, pilots, navigators and engineer-technical
personnel drawn from both the Korean military and young civilians underwent intensive training, as well as
students composed of Soviet Koreans. After they completed their schooling, they were sent to the front.

Overall, the USSR (up until 1992) provided training and education to 2,614 Korean servicemen,
consisting of: Ground Forces 429; Air Forces 985; Air Defense Forces 817; Navy 175; Rear
Services 33; and other branches 175. Due to the looming threat that the UN forces were going to seize
North Korea, after 7 October 1950 the USSR evacuated all of the goods and personnel from its aviation
commandant elements, ships from the Seisun naval base, and the families of military advisors. In January
1951, they were sent back to the Motherland, along with an independent signal company.38

On 25 October 1950, the lead elements of the 13th Group Army of the Chinese Volunteers crossed
the Amnokkan River into North Korea. Now the fourth stage of the war began. At that point in time there
were 123 Soviet advisors with the KPA forces, part of the formations of which were to undergo five months
of intensive training and rebuilding inside China. Of that number (as of 17 November 1950) 11 of them
were with the staff of the Commanding General of the KPA and the Staff of the Rear Services, 55 with
various formations and units, 51 were located in China to train the personnel of 9 Korean infantry and tank
divisions and one aviation regiment, and 2 advisors were in the Soviet Union to deal with staging Korean
pilots through training.

Stalin, first and foremost, was nervous about the wide use of Soviet military personnel on Korean
territory. Therefore, after 15 September 1951 it was forbidden for them to accompany Korean army units on
operations in that country. The results of their participation in the first stages of the war and their selfless
work in "the demonstration of support to the KPA in its struggle with Anglo-American interventionists"
and "the limitless donation of their energy and methodology in all affairs for supporting the peace and
security of nations" were recognized by the DPRK in October 1951 as they presented their national
decorations to 76 Soviet military advisors.

The tabular number of advisors over the next two years of the war vacillated from 152 to 164
personnel. All of them, as is correct, worked in the central army directorates and training establishments. As
soon as the armistice agreement was signed, the chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.
Sokolovskiy, gave special dispensation which covered leaving a very small number of advisors in Korea,
but "the rest would be sent on a vacation." In January 1954, all Soviet advisors returned to Korea. At that
time it was forbidden to work in troop units that were carrying out the defense near the demarcation line.40

A limited amount of aid was provided to the Chinese Volunteers and Korean military personnel in
training for combat operations in North Korea on the territory of Manchuria, where it was carried out by
Soviet military advisors who were working with the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. Their numbers
varied from 1,069 to 347 servicemen. These Soviet military advisors did not take part in direct actions
carried out by the PLA, but some of them did manage to go into the DPRK with the staff of the Chinese
Volunteer Army command.

The most active part played in the last two stages of the war was played by a Soviet VVS
formation the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK). Even before it had arrived on Chinese territory, the
following mission had been set for it: protect political-administrative and economic centers from air strikes
and American aerial reconnaissance, as well as industrial objects, railroad junctions, bridges, force
concentrations, and other important objects in the areas of Mukden, Antung, Tsian, Dungfeng, and pay
close attention to covering the bridges over the Yalu River and electrical power stations in the Antung area.
Later on, in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 28 August 1951,
part of the subunits of the corps were relocated into North Korea, where its pilots would begin to carry out
active combat operations.41

The heart of the corps consisted of three fighter aviation divisions: the 28th IAD (67th and 139th
Guards IAP); the 50th IAD (29th and 177th IAP); and the 151st IAD (28th and 72nd IAP). Overall, the divisions
numbered 844 officers, 1,153 sergeants, and 1,274 soldiers. The headquarters of the corps was located in
the city of Mukden.42

The consist of the corps, which at various times was commanded by Major Generals of Aviation I.
Belov and G. Lobov and Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Slyusarev, was not consistent for the course of
the war. It basically consisted of 2 or 3 IAD, 1-3 independent night fighter IAP, 2 ZAD, 1 antiaircraft
searchlight regiment, and 1 aviation-technical division. The fighter aviation units of the corps were, as is
correct, drawn from VVS units in the military districts and the PVO defense districts located inside the
USSR. The troops were moved to their new deployment areas by railway. On average, units were rotated
after 8-14 month intervals of service in the theater of military operations. Overall, during the period of the
war and subsequent to the negotiations at Kaesong the corps rotated through 12 IAD, 2 independent fighter
regiments, 2 Naval fighter regiments, 4 ZAD, 2 aviation-technical divisions, and a host of other support
units. All of the division commanders, and most of the regimental commanders, had service in the Great
Patriotic War, where they had learned the skills of operational leadership.

The 64th IAK participated in combat operations from November 1950 to July 1953. The overall
number of personnel in the corps was set during 1952 as around 26,000 men. This number was maintained
until the end of the war. As of 1 November 1952, the corps consisted of 441 pilots and 321 aircraft (303
MiG-15 jet fighters and 18 La-11 propeller-driven fighters). Originally, the corps was equipped with the
MiG-15, the Yak-11, and the La-9.43 Ultimately these were replaced with more modern aircraft, to include
the MiG-17.

Besides its set number of personnel, the 64th IAK was also used to stage other military personnel
from the Soviet Army. For example, just on 12 September 1951, the corps was used for a period of 1 to 1 ½
months for the staging of 44 officers from the flying and technical directorates of an air army and the
central directorates, including 32 Air Forces, 7 Naval Air Forces, and 5 PVO Air Forces. 44

Up through November 1951 the 64th IAK was part of the Soviet VVS Operational Group in China
under the command of Chief Military Advisor to the PLA Colonel General S. Krasovskiy. Then it was
moved to become part of the Unified Air Army (OVA) which was commanded by Chinese General Liu
Chen. In December 1952 the OVA consisted of 3 Soviet, 4 Chinese, and 1 Korean aviation divisions.
Beside that, for its second- and third-line units that provided cover over the main airfields, there were
another 4 Chinese aviation divisions. Soviet pilots were provided with Chinese uniforms, given special
Chinese pseudonyms, and had their aircraft painted up with markings from the PLAAF.45

The success of Soviet pilots in carrying out combat missions was determined by the specifics of
the situation in which they found themselves operating, but included: a limited area of combat operations,
which to a great degree complicated their effect use of the combat capabilities of the MiG-15 fighters; the
necessity of conducting combat operations against a significantly numerically superior enemy air force; and
an extremely limited network of airfields available within the area of combat operations.

Together with that, there were commensurate factors which to a large part simplified their tasks.
The main one of those the long time that the airfields where the Soviet units were base remained outside
of the effect of American air force operations.

The main effort of the corps was the difficult responsibility of concentrating its efforts against the
main enemy force grouping, which consisted mostly of bombers and ground attack aircraft. Here is where
the combat "run" of the Soviet jet MiGs began, which wound up conducting aerial combat with the newest
American jet fighter of the time, the F-86 Sabre, which reached the front in 1951.

During the course of the war the Americans made a number of attempts to get their hands on one
of the Soviet fighters. In July 1951 this took place when a MiG-15 that had been shot down by the USAF
and British crashed on the west coast of North Korea. The aircraft struck in shallow water near Sinbito
island, where it was spotted by British pilots, after which the Americans sent warships to carry out an
operation to recover it. This was a violation of a strict ban on permitting such things to occur as laid down
by the Military Minister of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, and was
conveyed to the commander of the 64th IAK. In this case, the Americans were only able to recover the
damaged jet engine from this particular machine. Later, in the summer of 1952, the Americans were able to
obtain the fuselage of a MiG-15 which had to make a forced landing in the mountains of North Korea. The
complete aircraft could not be carried by their H-19 helicopter, and therefore its wings were blown off with
the use of hand grenades.47

A limited attempt by the Americans met with success in September 1953 when North Korean pilot
No Gim Sok surrendered his MiG-15bis (No. 2057) to them for $100,000 after he landed at the American
air base at Kimpo (K-14). The aircraft was immediately sent to the USA for testing at Eglin Field, where it
underwent full-scale flight testing. Today this aircraft is on display at the National Air and Space Museum
in Washington, DC. The loss of the aircraft was such that many thought that Korea should only be sent a
handful of new MiG-17 fighters, as the pilots of the corps asked the command on several occasions to
increase the number they were to receive, where they felt that they could use them to better counter the
improved models of the Sabre.48 It follows to point out that even in 1950 the Americans had captured two
operational Il-10 ground attack aircraft and one Yak-9T fighter at the Pyongyang and Wonsan airfields,
which were likewise sent back to the USA for testing and research.

On their part, the Soviet military command in North Korea took a number of measures to capture
American combat technology and weapons. "The Hunt for the Sabre" began nearly with the very first air
battles. Competent Soviet organs and scientific research institutes required a complete and undamaged
American aircraft. With this goal in mind, Special Group "Nord" arrived in China (Antung airfield) in April
1951, consisting of 12 pilots under the direction of Major General of Aviation Blagoveshchenskiy. During
May 1951 the group made 10 combat flights to capture a Sabre. But at the same time, they were fruitless.
The group was soon disbanded. The first F-86 was captured on 6 October 1951. It made a forced landing on
the coast of the Yellow Sea after an air battle, led on the Soviet side by Colonel Ye. Pepelyayev, and after a
short while was shipped via China to Moscow. Another Sabre was acquired on 13 May 1953 when it was
damaged by antiaircraft fire and made a forced landing in Chinese territory.

On 7 February 1952, an operation by military advisors Lieutenant Colonels A. Glukhov and L.
Smirnov was planned and carried out in the Genzan area to seize an American USAF helicopter. For this
operation, by Ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Lieutenant Colonel Glukhov was
awarded the Order of Lenin and Lieutenant Colonel Smirmov the Order of the Red Banner. With the
participation of military advisor Colonel A. Dmitriev and translator Senior Lieutenant Nekhrapov, the
helicopter was moved to the Antung airfield of the 64th IAK.49

In 1952, the primary strike group of the USAF (especially in daylight) was its ground attack
aviation, which was able to determine the situation for the most part. The enemy here enjoyed a 4:1
superiority in numbers. Together with this, and the fact that the 64th IAK made some corrections to the
tactics of their combat operations, which in the end led to a partial paralyzing of commensurate operations
by the Americans through the use of massive strike groups. Between them, those measures reduced the
effectiveness of the corps in air combat significantly and the corresponding American to Soviet losses went
from 7.9:1 to 2.2:1.50

During the time it conducted combat operations, the formations of the corps made 19,203 sorties.
During daylight hours, they fought 307 group air battles in which 7,982 crews participated, or 43% of the
total number of sorties. In add, during the period from November 1950 to January 1952 the corps shot down
564 enemy aircraft in battle. Their own losses amounted to 34 pilots and 71 aircraft.51 The effectiveness of
the operations of Soviet aviation and antiaircraft artillery made a corresponding rupture in the enemy's air
strikes, scattered his formations, and reduced the accuracy of his bombing.

Simultaneously with their conduct of air combat, the corps completed the mission of bringing in
the fighter units of the Unified Air Army (OVA). Even in October 1950, as the Chinese Volunteers were
moving into the DPRK, a group of Soviet military advisors were working with the command of the Unified
(Sino-Korean) formations. In late summer 1951 the first aviation formations of the OVA moved into the
airfields near the front. The advisor to the command of the OVA was Soviet General Galunov.52 The North
Korean Air Forces were headed by General Van Len, and his advisor was Colonel A. Petrachev.53

The OVA units were introduced into combat incrementally. The initial combat was carried out
against small groups of enemy, and later on, against major air strikes. During the first stage, the units of the
Soviet corps and the OVA practically flew together. In this, as is correct, the Soviet pilots bore the brunt of
the combat. Subsequently, the air army aircraft were in the first echelon, with the Soviet corps aircraft ready
to cover their withdrawal or join in if needed.

Starting in early 1953, the American command decided to actively carry out night bombing
operations. There was a corresponding growth in the activity of Soviet aviation, as the OVA was not
prepared to fly in heavy weather conditions. The average number of monthly sorties by Soviet pilots
jumped by 33%. In all, during day and night combat for the seven months of 1953 the Soviet pilots shot
down 139 enemy aircraft. The losses to the 64th IAK were 25 pilots and 78 MiG-15bis aircraft. The overall
correlation of losses between the USAF and the VVS of the USSR in 1953 was 1.9:1.

Combat operations by the VVS had a number of shortcomings. First of all was the fact that when
new pilots arrived from the USSR they had insufficient skills in operating jet aircraft and frequently were
not able to make the best use of their superiority. This shortcoming was worked out by group flights in
pairs, flights, and squadrons at top speed in separated combat order at increased intervals and distances. The
pilots were tested in isolated battles, where they could not always make full use out of their advantageous
conditions for air combat; surprise, the sun, clouds, smoke, inversion layers, etc. There was only limited use
in aerial combat of the superiority of the Soviet aircraft at their maximum ceiling.

Starting in July 1952, the antiaircraft artillery began to take an active part in combat operations, as
its force grouping had been created with the mission of all around cover of objects and providing the
maximum density of fire along the probable lines of bomber approach, and were determined to deal with
targets up to 8,000 meters in altitude and speeds of 130 mps ((470 kph/290 mph)).

In order to simultaneously acquire air targets and quickly cover them with fire, 50% of the
personnel at the antiaircraft batteries were kept at Readiness No. 1, and the rest at Readiness No. 2. During
the period of the raids (from the onset of darkness to dawn) all of the air defense means were at Readiness
No. 1. Just the 52nd ZAD alone, between September to December 1951, conducted 1,093 battery firings and
shot down 50 enemy aircraft.55

After 5 July 1952, the units of this division moved to take on the defense of the Supung hydro-
electric plant. Up until that date, Supung had been protected by the Chinese 50th ZAD. But on 23 July, after
a mass air strike by the enemy which involved 284 aircraft, this division was knocked out for two months.

The USAF command, using all of its effort to wipe out supplies to the front, systematically carried
out bombing of bridges, crossings, tunnels, and other North Korean lines of communication. For their
defense and the protection of Soviet antiaircraft division elements, they were provided with small caliber
horse-drawn batteries; at night, each battery also had a searchlight platoon attached to it.

As a whole, the antiaircraft artillery of the Soviet corps between March 1951 and July 1953
accounted for 16% of the enemy losses which were inflicted by the assets and personnel of the 64th IAK.

In order to support the active combat operations of Soviet aviation, it necessitated that corrections
be made to the plan for using supply units. This carried with it an additional obligation, connected in the
main to the growth in the volume of material means such as ammunition and fuel, oil and lubricants (GSM).
Thus the 18th Aviation Technical Division provided for 95,505 sorties (both combat and non-combat)
between June 1951 and September 1953, which required that they supply division and regimental
storehouses with 146,622 metric tons of GSM, 4,079 rail car loads of aviation technical goods, and 220 rail
car loads of weapons and ammunition which were all sent from the Soviet Union.56

It follows to point out that during the course of the war the North Korean Navy, with the help of
Soviet sailors, managed to lay over 3,000 Soviet-made mines in the coastal areas. These mine fields
significantly reduced the activities of the American Navy. The first US ship to strike a mine was the
destroyer USS Bram on 26 September 1950. The second one to come into contact with a mine was the
destroyer USS Manchfield; the third, the minesweeper USS Magpie. All of these were out of service for
quite a long time. Beside that, the mines blew up and sank one ship and seven trawlers.57

The war in Korea ended on 27 July 1953, after the signing of the Panmunjon agreement to a
ceasefire. The opposing sides each withdrew to their side of the 38th Parallel, where they had been when
combat operations broke out during the summer three years ago.

During the time of the war the 64th IAK conducted 63, 229 combat sorties, participated in 1,790 air
battles and shot down 1,309 enemy aircraft, including 1,097 by aviation and 212 by antiaircraft artillery.58
The Soviet side captured, and then turned over to the Chinese and Koreans, 262 American flyers.59 "For
successfully completing their government mission," the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR presented
awards to 3,504 members of the corps,60 22 pilots receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.61

Losses to Soviet aviation between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953 (e.g. including those losses
taken by our forces during the formation of the corps) were 125 pilots and 335 aircraft. As a whole, during
the war the Soviet forces suffered 275 non-returning casualties, of which 142 were officers (including 9
advisors) and 133 enlisted men from private and sergeant ranks.63

Western sources present somewhat different data. The most widely circulated figures are those
found in the British "Encyclopedia of Aerial Warfare". Here it states that during the Korean war
"Communist Aviation" (KPA aircraft, that of the Chinese Volunteers, and the 64th IAK) lost 949 aircraft in
the air and 89 more on the ground. Just the F-86 aircraft claimed the following: Tu-2 bombers 9; La-9
fighters 6; Il-12 transports 2; MiG-15 fighters 792; others 2. Overall this amounts to 811 aircraft.
The losses for F-86s in aerial combat were given as 78. This results in a corresponding victory to loss ratio
of 12.5:1 in favor of the Sabres. Overall losses for the USAF were given as 1,182 aircraft, including 368 US
Naval aircraft. During this war, the USAF and USN flew 167,552 and 107,303 sorties respectively, and
dropped 120,000 and 82,000 tons of bombs.64

Even with its overall complexity, during the Korean war 12 fighter divisions and 4 antiaircraft
artillery divisions acquired combat experience, including 30 fighter regiments, 10 antiaircraft artillery and 2
searchlight regiments, 2 aviation-technical divisions, and other support units. Over 40,000 Soviet
servicemen rotated through the 64th IAK.65

The war in Korea, ignoring its localization and limited area of armed conflict, drew into its orbit
some 21 governments, including 18 under the flag of the UN. It led to a sharp increase in international
tension and tremendous material and human losses. The DPRK lost 2,500,000 people (of which 500,000
were military), China 1,000,000 military, and the Republic of Korea, 1,470,000. The US lost 54,046 service
members, Great Britain 686, and 2,508 from the remaining countries.66 According to some other sources,
the US took 142,091 casualties in Korea, of which 33,629 were killed and 103,284 were wounded.67 After
signing the agreement to cease combat operations in Korea, Commander of the United Nations Forces
General Mark Clark stated: "After carrying out the instructions of my government, I am now the first
commander in the history of the USA to sign a ceasefire without obtaining victory."68

If one attempts to bring out the military-political results of the participation by the Soviet military
component in the war in Korea, then, in our view, it would have the following "achievements": a) the
creation of a Korean Peoples' Army and its training in lightning warfare for unification of the country in its
first stage; b) the disruption of the offensive operations of the UN forces in subsequent stages; c)
strengthening the position of the DPRK and PRC as sovereign allied nations of the Soviet Union; d)
heightening the confrontation between the USSR and USA in the international arena as a whole and in the
Far East in detail.

The war in Korea was characterized by specific operational-strategic results. First, it permitted the
Soviet Union to attempt to create and for the first time make use of an operational force grouping of Soviet
forces in large-scale combat operations, consisting in the main of the formations and units of the 64th IAK.
Second, after 1945 Soviet service members received only a limited amount of experience with national
cadres outside their own borders under conditions of continuous combat operations. Third, the national
leadership acquired operational-strategic experience on the use of forces under the conditions of conducting
combat operations in local wars. Fourth, it permitted the first introduction and testing under wartime
conditions of individual models of domestic weapons and military technology, especially jet-powered
aircraft.

After the end of the war, confrontation between the DPRK and ROK not only did not cease, in
some cases it was exacerbated. To a large degree this was due to the direct participation of the great powers
the USSR/Russia, USA, China, and Japan in the "Korean Question" who each had this or that interest in
this specific region.

And that was no accident. At the present time on the Korean peninsula (e.g. in a limited territory)
there is the largest concentration of forces and combat technology nearly 2,000,000 soldiers and officers,
equipped with 30,000 tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft and ships. More than that, here there are commensurate
missile plans being carried out. Per a 1994 agreement between the DPRK and USA on the termination of its
nuclear programs, the USA is to build them two light-water reactors for electrical power production, which
will test the durability of this treaty. In case of violation, Pyongyang will renew its nuclear program. It was
noted in Russia that there was sharp reaction by Japan and the USA to the launching of an increased range
ballistic missile by the DPRK on 31 August 1998. Washington and Tokyo responded to this by actively
working out a plan to create a regional system of antimissile defense.

While the DPRK and ROK signed a number of documents between them during the second half of
the 1990s, oriented on the peaceful unification of the two nations, most of this has remained as only a paper
implementation.69 Both nations continue to field forces for mutual destruction, and present a constant
danger of political and border area armed conflict. This can be seen in incidents such as the grounding of a
North Korean submarine with 26 assault troops on board off the coast of South Korea in September 1996,
or the defection of one of the highly-placed workers of the Central Committee of the Workers Party Kwang
Dong Oba, who immediately was branded as an "anti-national politician" by official Pyongyang.

Together with that, the current situation on the Korean peninsula has actual prospects for
controllability. The leaders of both sides are completely realistic in their approach to understanding the
situation that divided their peninsula during the Cold War and to turn it into a region of stability and
security. Beside that, it was the first time in the 20th Century that the major powers could reflect their own
interests in fractious relations between Pyongyang and Seoul. The question is only one of what methods
they will use to achieve this goal.

A special role here must be played by Russia, which has been deeply connected with the events in
Korea that lasted over the course of the second half of the 20th Century and cost it a great deal of forces and
means (not just discussing those related to human lives) in all that took place in the region. Beside that,
Pyongyang must have international support in the person of Moscow, so that it can participate with Seoul
and Washington in the course of encouraging its political contacts. Russia today, if you please, is the only
nation in the world that has direct lines of communication with both the DPRK and the ROK. The Russian
position must be the following: it is necessary to set up a new peace structure in Korea, which will
correspond to the changing situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole, where the Cold
War is over, Russian and China have normalized relations with South Korea, the DPRK and ROK are
members of the UN, etc.; the agreement on the ceasefire from 1953 is outmoded, and therefore at the
present time should be brought up in a wider international forum for control of the "Korean Question" with
participation by all of the interested governments until this happens, all that will take place is the
maintenance of the status-quo on the peninsula.

As the basis for their position on Korea, in our view, the Russian government needs to lay out
three basic principles. First, it is necessary to ensure a real cessation of external forces being used to rupture
the internal structures of the DPRK. Second, it is vital to create conditions for normalized relations between
North Korea and all of the other powers participating in the Korean problem. And finally, third, it is
necessary to recognize that the control of the situation on the Korean peninsula at corresponding levels
must have the participation of six nations: the ROK, the DPRK, China, the USA, Russia, and Japan. Any
attempt to deviate from this set plan, or to generally move outside of the framework of control by any of the
"Six" only slows things down, and in some cases break off the process of normalizing the situation.70

With the establishment of a fully-empowered and reliable negotiations process, there is the chance
of peaceful resolution of the problems of interrelationships between the two Korean governments. There is
no prospective value in the use of armed force. The results of the war on the Korean peninsula itself (and
the postwar developments) are the best support for the former approach.

Immediately after the end of the Korean war, confrontation increased between the recent allies of
the Anti-Hitlerist Coalition. They would achieve a practical implementation in the subsequent multi-year
wars soon to begin in Indochina.

End Notes

24 See the following: Vartanov, V.N.; Operation Z: Soviet Volunteers in the Anti-Japanese War of
the Chinese People during the 1930s and 1940s, Moscow, 1992, pp. 36-48, 96-120

25 Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (later AP RF) F. 45, Opus 1, D. 328, L.34,
139-140; D. 329, L. 13-14, 38-39; Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation (later TsAMO RF) F. 40, Opus 178443, D. 23, L. 15-22; Novaya I Noveyshaya
Istoriya No. 1-1997, pp. 31-33

26 TsAMO RF F. 23, Opus 173346, D. 474, L. 1-2

27 Ibid. L. 38-39

28 Ibid. L. 25-26

29 Ibid. D. 473, L. 1-3; Opus 638040, D. 3 L. 2; Opus 539808, D. 3, L. 4 (top); D. 39, L. 21-39;
Kniga Pamyati 1946-1982 Volume 10, Moscow, 1999, pp. 36-95

30 Krasnaya Zvezda 23 June 1998

31 TsAMO RF F. 40, Opus 178435, D. 14, L. 5

32 Ibid. L. 8, 10

33 See also Ibid, F. 5 Opus 918795 D. 122, L. 9-14

34 AP RF F. 3 Opus 65, D. 775, L. 74-76

35 The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, New York, 1961, p. 644

36 Kissinger, H.; Diplomacy, Moscow 1997, page 431

37 TsAMO RF F. 64 IAK Opus 173543 D. 95, L. 138

38 AP RF F. 3, Opus 65, D. 776, L. 163; F. 45, Opus 1, D. 347, L. 72-73; TsAMO RF F. 5, Opus
918785, D. 124, L. 89-90

39 TsaMO RF F. 487, Opus 178748, D. 85, L. 98-101

40 Ibid. Opus 179343, D. 58, L. 163-164

41 Ibid, F. 64 IAK Opus 173543 D. 95 L. 138

42 Ibid. F 16A Opus 3139 D. 16 L. 131

43 Ibid. F. 5 Opus 953847 D. 72 L. 68-70

44 Ibid. F. 16 Opus 3139 D. 55 L. 106

45 Ibid. F. 23 Opus 953912 D. 59 L. 438-442

46 AP RF F. 3 Opus 65 D. 829 L. 8-12

47 German, A.A., Seidov, I.A. Red Devils on the 38th Parallel, Kiev, 1998 page 83

48 Krasnaya Zvezda 7 September 1990, 1 October 1994

49 TsAMO RF F. 16 Opus 3139 D. 135 L. 82-83

50 Ibid. F. 64 IAK Opus 174045 D. 186 L. 24, 26

51 Ibid. F. 15 Opus 178612 D. 88 L. 22, 23, 26-27

52 There are no initials on the document in the archive.

53 Aviatsiya I Kosmonavtika No. 2-1991, page 32

54 TsAMO RF F. 64 IAK Opus 174045 D. 186 L. 32

55 Ibid. F. 15 Opus 178612 D. 88 L. 121

56 Voprosy Istorii No. 11-1994 page 5

57 Kasatonov, I. The Navy Went to Sea, Moscow 1996, Page 354

58 TsAMO RF F. 64 IAK Opus 174045 D. 186 L. 32

59 Ibid. F. 16A Opus 3139 D. 157 L. 280-283

60 Ibid. F. 64 IAK Opus 174045 D. 186 L. 32

61 This number was calculated from data logged in the notebook of the 64th IAK, where it says that
35 pilots received the highest government awards. In the opinion of the authors' collective, the
number of Heroes provided by the staff of the corps included those pilots who were awarded this
title during the Great Patriotic War as well (see Opus 565836 D. 1 L. 28)

62 Ibid. F. 16A Opus 3139 D. 157 L. 280-283

63 These numbers were amended based on later archival data in the TsAMO RF (F. 58, Opus 152730,
D. 4; Opus 175512 D. 1; Opus 687571, D. 1; F. 16 Opus 3139 D. 157). This is the first time they
have been scientifically calculated. They were given out in the book "Grif Sekretnosti Snyat'"
(With the Secret Stamp Removed: The losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat
operations and military conflicts) (Moscow 1993 page 395). They list the Soviet losses as
determined to be 299 men, of which 138 were officers and 161 sergeants and privates.

64 The Encyclopedia of Air Warfare, Long Island, New York 1975, pp. 169-171

65 TsAMO RF F. 16 Opus 3139 D. 157, L. 280-283; F. 64 IAK Opus 174045 D. 186 L. 32

66 J. Holliday, B. Cumings; Korea: The Unknown War, New York 1988 pp. 200-201

67 J. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, New York, 1982 page 10

68 Peng Dehai, Memoirs of a Marshal, Moscow, 1988, page 358

69 Beginning on 4 June 1972, when the DPRK and the ROK signed the Joint Resolution of Three
Principles of a Unification Program to Create One Korea, which went into force with the
"Agreement on the Ceasefire, Partnership, and Exchange Between the North and the South" and
"Joint Declaration of Non-Nuclear Status for the Korean Peninsula".

70 Similar efforts have already been suggested. Thus, in an April 1996 meeting on the South Korean
island of Chepjudo, ROK President Kim En Som and President Bill Clinton offered to host a four-
power conference (ROK, DPRK, USA, PRC) on the "New World Structure" in Korea without the
participation of the Russian Federation.



Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523