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Sir,
I can understand your opinion about generals being a mainstay of any
successful campaign in winning any war, but the facts remain that there has to
be a certain amount of strategic capability to back up such campaigns. Any
serious study about Germany's war-making capabilities; such as Woodward's ROAD
TO STALINGRAD, the writings of Glantz or Ziemke, and even the German's own
studies, all clearly show that they were incapable of ever seriously threatening
the complete overthrow or Russia.
The taking of Moscow, Leningrad, and even the oil-fields in the Caucasus,
would not in and of themselves caused a collapse of the SU or communist Russia.
Stalin's plans for a complete retreat to behind the Urals were never seriously
considered necessary. Though any or all of the just mentioned strategic areas
would have spelled serious set-backs and operational obstacles for the SU to
have to address, they would not have spelled the end of Russia.
These same arguments could be made about how China could withstand all of
the assaults of Japan during that same war and still not fall. In the same
example, the US would not have fallen if Hawaii or Alaska had been lost
either.
The fighting in the city of Stalingrad did not spell the end of the German
Army Group B. Even if the city had been completely avoided and all the efforts
had been made toward the Caucasus and the oil-fields, there was still the vast
distances involved in transporting the logistical supplies needed to keep that
push going. Besides the single rail-line going to Stalingrad and the south, the
Germans were forced to use transports to fly in fuel to keep their tanks going
in the south.
And what spelled the doom for Paulus in Stalingrad was not the city itself,
but the cutting of the rail-line from across the steppes, which could have been
done anywhere along its route. Even Fritz Erich von Lewinski genannt von
Manstein was constantly complaining about how he was either being constrained by
the German's "fuel-tactic" of never having enough fuel reserves, or his panzer
corps were being used as "Feuerwehr Brigade" ("fire-fighting
brigade"), being rushed from one crisis spot to the next with no time to rest or
refit in between. And it was these last two factors that Patton himself
constantly complained about and was the reason for the German failure at
Kursk.
And it must also be
remembered that Hitler had to bring in his own allies troops to take the war to
the Russians during his summer campaign in 1942, he just did not have the troops
available to do anything else. And in order to fill out his new panzer
divisions, he stripped one regiment from each of his existing divisions to make
up these new formations. Hardly an effective way to fight a
war.
And to return to an example closer to this threads more commonly known
facts, the Marine involvement in Korea after Inchon were never used completely
effectively. And even when they were, they were never given adequate support to
fully take advantage of the gains that they did make. Could one say that US
forces won the Korean war because they almost took all of the land area of NK?
Taking and holding real estate are two separate things. Bringing an enemy to the
peace table are different matters completely.
Just as Stain was willing to lose millions more than he did in the first
year of WW-II, after the telling losses he suffered in the second required him
to fight a more intelligent one after that. So too must the same example be
applied to the fighting in Korea. The massive materiel losses suffered by the SU
and the human losses of the Chinese together were what finally brought them to
the peace table.
In the end it is logistical support that spells victory on the battlefield,
as well as good generals. If all of the above is taken together, then Korea can
be viewed as a victory as the country is still free. In Vietnam we had the
logistical support and good generals, we just did not have the will as a nation
to follow such a war to its successful conclusion. In that sort of war we
as a nation were not willing to burn an entire nation to the ground to save it,
though that is almost what we did in Korea.
In closing, one thing can be said about Hitler's war against Russia that
was a positive note. If a single German officer had not been responsible for
steeling the surprised German forces in the South in 1941, Barbarossa could very
well have failed. And one can only conjecture what an aroused and only startled
Stalin would then have done to Europe. But that is another story.
Harold Stockton
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2003 5:54
PM
Subject: Re: revising air war kill
tallies
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2003 6:08
AM
Subject: Re: revising air war kill
tallies
Dear Cookie and all,
I have followed this thread with some interest and must state
again that almost every AF aerial claims were overstated. Be that as it
may, it must also be stated that comparing a single loss to a claim is an
almost impossibility for any war. But there are some very noted examples of
individual single claims that can be verified. It must also be stated, that
for the most part, that official loss records cannot be absolutely be used
as final proof, as even the German loss records of WW-II have
glaring holes in them for different periods of the war.
But the Korean question still boils down to the fact that the US was
not committed to a victory on the ground or in the air, but rather a return
to the status quo. As such, and the same was wanted in Moscow as well so as
to tie up American interests away from Europe, Korea was only ever used by
the US and Moscow as a bleeding ground for the other side. And for that
purpose alone, to draw any conclusions about who won or lost would have to
then be viewed about how the US allowed itself to react in and toward
Taiwan, Vietnam and in NATO.
Certain things can be ascertained about the aerial victories in Korea.
NATO, as even today, is only interested in short term European interests.
Korea is still a hot bed of claims and threats from the North, and there is
still no clear road to peace.
It can also be stated that the Korean conflict did cause a significant
drain on Russian aerial production capabilities. The Lagg-15 and MiG-9s were
relegated to almost complete obscurity for battlefield use, and
also ate up precious production line capabilities. And the MiGs were
clearly only a match for the F-86s if backed-up by a clearly superior pilot,
irrespective of how the Chinese or NK want to interpret history. China was
clearly blunted in its ambitions to drive the US from Korea and from Taiwan,
and a serious dent was put into Russia's production capability to fight a
lasting war of attrition against the US, on the ground or in the air.
If nothing else was learned in Moscow, it was that they did not
have enough WW-II veterans to match the US in a protracted aerial war, and
that they also knew that any future war was not going to be like
anything that they had experienced in WW-II against the Germans. Contrary
to many individuals thoughts out there, the Germans could never have won the
was against Russia during WW-II, their strategic capability in steel and oil
production was just never there. [rbmooney's emphasis followed by comment].
HAROLD: "I profoundly disagree. Let me
mention something IKE and Bradley alluded to so often when the endless
question surfaced about defeating the Germans, and do note that I'm
paraphrasing: When it takes the whole world to defeat an enemy they never
convince that enemy that he has been beaten. Never. If a gang of
thugs takes a whole day to beat up one innocent passerby, what do you think
will happen to any one of those thugs when he meets the once-battered
passerby on a dark street? The thug is going to get his ass whipped
that's what. Today, Germany "rules" Europe financially! They
even rule the U.S. financially! In fairness to the other countries of
the EU, none of them wants American paper dollars anymore. Worse, a
trade war is now underway by the EU against the U.S.! One can only
assume that if war is ?politics by other means then politics is war by other
means.' We can't even whip a handful of terrorists in IRAQ and yet we
have all the resources here to destroy the world! Three nuclear
submarines could do the job in two or three hours in one afternoon! We
also have enough oil where Germany didn't because Hitler was so dumb that he
petulantly attacked Stalingrad though General von Paulus-- Hitler's
key planner of Barbarossa (the German invasion of the Soviet Union) was
adamantly against it! Though von Paulus was commander of the 6th Army
in January 1942 (which operated on the Eastern Front in the Caucasus area)
he successfully captured all of Kharkov in May, but reluctantly
moved his summer-clothed army towards Stalingrad in the coldest weather the
SU had had and would ever experience. In October 1942, he had captured
most of the city, but within 2 months of bitter ugly fighting in sub-zero
weather Barbarossa had failed. Had Adolph not given such a
stupid order as to turn von Paulus North, instead of as planned in
Barbarossa to the South, (Hitler hated Stalin and thus hated Stalingrad!)
which had nothing to do with defeating the SU, the SU would have collapsed
in several months. Hitler's Generals begged him to move immediately
towards the oil fields in the South and capture them. (Two years later
our General Patton was stealing fuel from the Brits to keep his tanks moving
towards Berlin!). Nevertheless, the Balkan oil fields would have
fallen into Germans hands as Barbarossa was designed to effect (except
for the insane Hitler's petulance) intact! The American Southern Civil
war General, Nathan Beford Forrest, would have by-passed Stalingrad and
captured the oil fields in one heroic push southward. The SU
would have been whistling in a graveyard! But General von Paulus lost
his Army at Stalingrad and the oil fields remained in the SU's hands.
Finally, I've never read or heard of any General on either side of the 2nd
WW question who thought of Normandy as being the end for Germany! Such
and idea was never advanced by any Allied General, according to Stephen
Ambrose and other top writer's of 2nd WW actions and activities.
Simply the crossing of the Channel was feat enough. IKE signed a
pre-release letter to his bosses in Washington to the effect that if
the Normandy Invasion failed it is "my fault alone." Normandy could
easily have meant the death of the West, if the right German Generals had
dominated the last two years of the 2nd WW. Sixty million people died
in the 2nd WW and 10 million were Germans. But let me return
momentarily to what I hinted at above about the American South's greatest
General: Nathan Bedford Forrest. He was the greatest strategist,
tactician, and General of Southern soldiers in the Civil War. His
victories dominate all other conquests by both the North and the South's
great leaders and Generals. Ironically, he was a non-West Point grad
who entered the war formally uneducated--but became in 2 years the
South's one warrior every Northern General and Lincoln feared in the
most!. Had General von Paulus possessed the guts and moral
courage as General Nathan Bedford Forrests owned in spades, he would have
done what Forrest did when General Braxton Bragg tried to suppress Forrest's
growing record of successes in every battle by transferring Forrest to a
weaker General's camp: von Paulus would have traveled to Bragg's
headquarters to "personally beat the hell out of Bragg for issuing stupid
and potentially fatal orders to our side." With the right leaders and
more common sense planning (don't shoot the surrendering Russian
peasants! Adopt them!) the Germans could have won the war in 2 or 3
years. They were light years ahead of the so-called Western World
technologically and in dedication. Had they NOT been foolishly led by
a maniac and his syncophants we'd all be speaking German
today."
But the US was something else for the Russians to think about. Moscow
could interpret aerial losses and claims from both sides just as well
as Washington. One thing was clear to Uncle Joe, he just could not afford to
continue losing MiGs as fast as the US could shoot them down. And if the
Chinese could not interpret aerial losses equally well, why did not they
send any of their numerous MiG-9s down to Vietnam or their southern
airfields to threaten that area in 1954? To do so would have brought a
response from the USN navy carriers that they knew were there just in case
of such an eventuality.
I think that it is a very rewarding venture to try and establish
individual loss/claims on both sides of any conflict, but to get too close
to such an issue can be very much like trying to establish which British
archer killed such and such French nobleman at Augencourt. The French lost
to tactics and to technical superiority of the English long-bow to French
armor. So too in Korea, American tactics and material production
capabilities just outspent the Moscow/Beijing/Pyongyang will for a
proletariat victory in the air or on the ground. The jungles on SE-Asia were
too much of a match for anything that America could, or would be willing, to
commit.
Harold Stockton
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2003
11:55 AM
Subject: Re: revising air war kill
tallies
There is no prize on
either side for making the enemy assessment of effectiveness any
easier.
Inspire
28
That's true, but in many other cases the Russians are starting to be
brutally honest about how things really were. A recent study just proved
that Prokhorovka -- one of the legendary battles of WWII and according to
the Soviets the biggest single tank battle in history -- was not the
crushing defeat on the Germans the Soviets claimed. They found out they
lost over 700 tanks out of about 750 involved, whereas the Germans only
lost 400 out of 600. But at the end of the day, the Germans ran out of
fuel and ammo, which forced a withdrawal.
The jury is still out on Korea.
Cookie Sewell
AMPS
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