You asked about topics. H-War might have some clues. I'm going to forward
a few other things.
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Silbey" <hwar@COMCAST.NET>
To: <H-WAR@H-NET.MSU.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2004 5:57 PM
Subject: REVIEW: Snead on Bateman, _No Gun Ri: A Military History of the
Korean War Incidents_
> H-NET BOOK REVIEW
> Published by H-War@h-net.msu.edu (January 2004)
>
> Robert L. Bateman. _No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War
Incident_. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002. xvii + 302 pp.
Notes, bibliography, maps, and index. $22.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-8117-1763-1.
>
> Reviewed by David L. Snead <david.snead@ttu.edu>, Department of History,
Texas Tech University
>
> Challenging the AP: Clarifying the No Gun Ri Incident
>
> On July 26, 1950, American soldiers from the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry
Regiment opened fire on Korean refugees near No Gun Ri in south-central
South Korea. No one disputes this claim. However, the how and why of the
events of that day occurred have been hotly disputed since the Associated
Press (AP) published a story on the incident in late September 1999. The AP
reported that the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion had received direct orders
to fire on the refugees and that between 300 and 400 Koreans died in the
massacre, including 100 in strafings by the air force. In _No Gun Ri: A
Military History of the Korean War Incident_, Robert Bateman enters the
debate by claiming that while American soldiers did indeed kill civilians
that summer day, they did so unintentionally and were largely acting in the
"fog of war". He then challenges the AP's research and objectivity by
asserting that it either carelessly or deliberately misled its readers.
Bateman's book represents sound s
> cholarship and shows the danger of the AP's shallow and incomplete
research.
>
> Bateman breaks his study into two distinct parts to describe what he
considers to be the two different stories arising from the No Gun Ri
incident and the AP's story. In the first, he addresses the military
history of the incident by examining the American units that were near No
Gun Ri in late July 1950. He details their lack of training, inadequate
leadership, and insufficient supplies. He then describes how the events
surrounding the incident on July 26 unfolded. In the second part, he
provides a primer on how historical research should be conducted by
critiquing the methods utilized by the AP. He concludes that American
soldiers did fire over the refugees' heads to get them to stop and returned
fire after being shot at by communist guerillas from with the refugee
column. However, he stresses that the AP exaggerated the newness of the
story and casualties suffered by the refugees.
>
> Bateman meticulously traces the situation that led to the incident in the
first five chapters. He explores the division of Korea and the civil war
that existed in South Korea in the late 1940s. He then examines problems
faced by the U.S. Army, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment in particular, as the
United States demobilized after World War II, yet raised its commitments
around the world. The American occupation force in Japan, including the 7th
Cavalry, was under manned, trained, and supplied. Its men rarely trained in
numbers above the platoon level and its best officers and men were
transferred to other units immediately before the regiment was deployed to
Korea. As a result, the soldiers that arrived in Korea in July lacked both
training and leadership. To make matters worse, they were thrust into a
battle that had already seen the destruction of several American and most
South Korean units.
>
> Bateman describes the fear and confusion that these young, poorly trained
American soldiers experienced in the summer of 1950. On the night of July
25-26, the men of the 2nd Battalion believed they were under attack. In
reality, the supposed enemy of that night was a lost American unit.
Unfortunately, most of the men in the 2nd Battalion broke and ran, many of
them abandoning their equipment. The next morning the battalion began to
reorganize and recover its equipment. The men were still shaken, and there
were growing fears that the North Koreans were trying to infiltrate the
American lines by hiding in the many refugee columns. The situation turned
tragic when the 2nd Battalion tried to stop a group of refugees approaching
its position.
>
> According to Bateman, the tragedy occurred because of a convergence of
events. Poorly trained and led soldiers were placed in a difficult
situation; rumors were rampant that communist forces were using refugees to
hide their movements; and several communists did fire upon the Americans
from within the refugee column. After between thirty and ninety seconds of
American return fire, up to thirty-five refugees had been wounded or killed.
>
> If not for the AP's 1999 story, Bateman would not have written this book.
However, the story piqued his interest because he had recently served as an
officer in the 7th Cavalry. He knew personally one of the chief witnesses
in the AP story, Edward Daily, and wondered how such an event could have
occurred. As his investigation unfolded, however, he increasingly came to
conclude that the AP's story was inaccurate and that much of its research
was incomplete at best.
>
> The first weak link in the story was the supposed order to shoot.
Although Bateman found some such orders during the Korean War, the 7th
Cavalry did not receive any order to fire on refugees in July 1950.
Instead, it was merely told to _stop_ the refugees from crossing its lines.
This order led to the unit's firing mortar shells in front of the column and
shooting rifles over their heads. Although these inadvertently causing at
least a few casualties, there was no direct targeting of the civilians.
Bateman also failed to discover any evidence of air force strafing missions
within several miles of No Gun Ri in late July. There were missions in
August along the railway line near No Gun Ri, but not earlier. Finally,
despite the AP's report of hundreds killed, Bateman could find no graves in
the vicinity of the incident. From Bateman's perspective, the AP story
simply could not have been true.
>
> In the second part of the book, Bateman evaluated the stories of the AP's
three main witnesses, Edward Daily, Delos Flint, and Eugene Hesselman. His
findings are shocking-"In reality, none of these three men were actually at
No Gun Ri during the events of July 26-29, 1950" (p. 136). Bateman
determined that each of these men either lied or had experienced a memory
failure. Daily's case is most troubling because he claimed to have been an
officer and to have personally fired on the refugees. Bateman's
investigation reveals that Daily never rose above the rank of sergeant and
only served in the 7th Cavalry in _1951_. Further, Bateman contends that
both Delos Flint and Eugene Hesselman were wounded the night of July 25-26
and evacuated before the incident ever occurred. The AP, Bateman concluded,
had relied on unreliable witnesses.
>
> It is doubtful that anyone will ever describe the No Gun Ri incident in
more detail or with more accuracy than Bateman. He has carefully marshaled
his evidence and drawn conclusions based on his own military experience and
scholarly training. A tragedy did occur on July 26, 1950. American
soldiers panicked under difficult conditions and killed innocent civilians.
Bateman, however, shows that their actions, although unfortunate, were
understandable considering their lack of training, inadequate leadership,
and the presence of communist guerillas within the refugee columns.
>
> Only a few problems mar this impressive book. Although unintentional,
Bateman's efforts to unravel the AP's story can cause the reader to forget
that a tragedy did occur in late July 1950 near No Gun Ri. By Bateman's own
estimates, up to thirty-five South Koreans died that day. Even if
unintentional, those losses should always be remembered. Also, Bateman
discounts the testimony of South Korean witnesses as being skewed by time
and/or motivated by the desire for reparations. While these accusations are
possibly true, Bateman should not have discounted them without making more
efforts to determine their validity. Finally, Bateman includes a short,
four-page section on the career of S.L.A. Marshall that has at best
tangential importance to his story. His own account of Edward Daily's
career provides sufficient evidence that some veterans have falsified their
records.
>
> Despite these few minor problems, Bateman has written a book that should
be a valuable resource for scholars, the media, and the general public. He
reveals the pitfalls of drawing conclusions from incomplete investigations
and shows how true historical research should be conducted.
>
>
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