[KOREAN-WAR-L:11389] Re: Books-No Gun Ri

["Walter E. Wallis, P.E." <unclgene@pacbell.net>]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: <charlesjh@att.net>
To: "KorWar-L" <KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu>
Sent: Sunday, February 15, 2004 1:54 PM
Subject: [KOREAN-WAR-L:11386] Books-No Gun Ri


> In response to Walter Wallis's e-mail:
>
> You raise highly relevant points. I'd like to make some observations:
>
> > AS AN EARLY ON COMBATANT FROM 7 AUG 50 AND AS ONE WHO HAS CRITICIZED THE
> LACK OF TRAINING OF THE OCCUPATION TROOPS I CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE IMAGE
> OF THEM AS SCARED TEENAGERS PANICKING. THEY DID THE BEST THEY COULD
AGAINST
> THE FORCE AGAINST THEM, AND THEY HELD UNTIL I GOT THERE TO TAKE OVER.
>
>      1) The AP team interviewed perhaps 150 U.S. Army veterans of those
first weeks in Korea. Most were teen-agers (a few 16 years old, at least one
15 years old), and not surprisingly they remembered they were scared.
***Anyone who was not scared was crazy, See my comments on retreating.***The
night before the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, killed the refugees at No Gun
Ri, it pulled back in an unfounded ***easy to say - how about "withdrew to a
more defensible position because of suspicious activities in front of
them?"*** panic. The record shows about 120 discarded personal weapons had
to be recovered from the route of withdrawal the next morning. ***I wonder
how many of those weapons were out of ammo or malfunctioning?***
>       2) On the other hand, a career soldier later recalled (p. 159 of
``The Bridge at No Gun Ri''): ``By the time we knew what we were doing, we
lost 50 percent of our men. But those who remained had become damned good
soldiers.'' ***Perhaps the real good soldiers are the ones who covered the
retreat of the survivors so they could live long enough to "become damn good
soldiers."***
>
> CIVILIANS DO NOT BELONG IN A COMBAT ZONE. CIVILIANS SHOULD NOT ADVANCE
INTO
> AN ARMED POSITION AFTER RECEIVING WARNING SHOTS
>
>       1) The U.S. military and ROK government handling of refugees was
utterly confused in July 1950. Simultaneous orders and ``policies'' were
promulgated for villagers to head south, to stay put, and even to head north
as the fast-moving combat zone rolled over them.
>       2) The hundreds of refugees who approached No Gun Ri on July 26,
after being rousted and escorted south from their villages by U.S. troops
(almost certainly 5th Cavalry), were not given warning shots. ***You are
sure of this? Sounds suspicious to me.*** First, they were suddenly attacked
by U.S. warplanes (the 5th Air Force, against its operations chief's better
judgment, was complying with a standing Army request to strafe refugee
columns approaching Army lines). ***The operations chief was a 5 minute walk
from the Officer's Club bar, not dug in to a rice paddy.not knowing what was
coming around the bend in the road***Next, it appears that a mortar or
artillery round landed squarely in a close-packed group of them. Around the
same time, dug-in troops opened up with small-arms fire. Refugees who
survived jammed into the No Gun Ri railroad underpasses, where many were
killed by machine-gun fire over the next two days. (That basic scenario is
based on accounts of both Korean survivors and ex-soldiers.) ***Some of the
ex-soldiers, and possibly some of the so-called survivors may have had
reasons to say what they did other than a love of truth.***
>
>  WHEN CIVILIANS SHIELD BELLIGERENTS AND PROVIDE COVER FOR THEIR ADVANCES
THEY BECOME CANNON FODDER FOR THE SIDE UTILIZING THEM.
>      There is no evidence that this was the case at No Gun Ri. In
addition, a retired colonel and a retired command sergeant major who entered
the underpasses at different times said there were no infiltrators there.
***I am sure all infiltrators carried signs that said "I am an infiltrator."
I question the Colonel's standing to make such a statement, and since we did
not have a rank of "Command Sergeant Major" back then, I question the
veracity of him also. We do know that a whole lot of guys who were not there
said they were.***
>      --
> Again, documents relevant to the above (such as the 5th Air Force memo
describing the blanket policy of attacking refugees) can be found at website
http://www.henryholt.com/nogunri/documents.htm
> ***I am aware of the documentation just as I was aware of the policy 53
years ago. I am aware of strafing, having been strafed once by a P-51 and
once by a B-26, and I suspect that around 50% of the arty that came to visit
me was ours.  Strafers do not deliver warning shots. I stand by my previous
criticism, and I believe you should be ashamed of the dishonor you have
heaped on your betters. Why not visit Pyongyang and accept Kim Junior's
personal thanks for advancing his cause?***
> Thanks. ***You're welcome***
> Charlie Hanley
>
***WEW/Inspire 28***