[KOREAN-WAR-L:11428] "Behind the lines: Secret Naval raids in Korea"

[Mike Yared <mikeyared@yahoo.com>]

Behind the lines: Secret Naval raids in Korea 
John B Dwyer. 
Military History. 
Dec 2002. Vol. 19, Iss. 5;  pg. 66, 7 pgs 
ISSN/ISBN: 08897328 

The CIA sponsored a variety of activities during the
Korean War, among which were behind-the-lines maritime
operations. Yung Do Island, connected by an isthmus to
Pusan, served as the base for those operations, which
were carried out by well-trained Korean guerrillas.
 
If you think the U.S. Navy's activities off Korea were
limited to offshore bombardment and carrier strikes,
you don't know JACK!  
 
The Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a variety of
activities during the Korean War, among which were
behind-the-lines maritime operations. Yong Do Island,
connected by a rugged isthmus to Pusan, served as the
base for those operations, which were carried out by
welltrained Korean guerrillas. The four principal
American advisers responsible for the training and
operational planning of those special missions were
"Dutch" Kramer, Tom Curtis, George Atcheson and Joe
Pagnella. All of them had been processed through the
ClAs front organization, Joint Advisory Commission,
Korea (JACK), headquartered at Tongnae, a village near
Pusan, on the peninsula's southeast coast. 

JACKs first commander was Army Colonel Albert R.
Harvey, until he was succeeded by a decorated 82nd
Airborne Division veteran, Colonel Benjamin
Vandervoort. They oversaw planning and support for the
agency's sea, air and ground operations, to include
insertion and extraction of agents, coastal and
demolition raids, and support for the Far East Air
Force's Escape & Evasion Program. 

One of JACK's projects, code-named "Blossom," had as
its objective the planting of anti-Communist personnel
in the North who would "blossom" as pro-democracy
advocates after the South won the war. Most of those
political infiltrators did not survive. 

A big, tough Marine, Major Vincent R. "Dutch" Kramer
had served in the Pacific and with U.S. Naval Group,
China, during World War II. As the Group's Camp 3
commander, he supervised the training of Nationalist
Chinese guerrillas, then took the field with them for
raids and ambushes against the Japanese. 

Equally large and tough was Lieutenant Tom Curtis. A
15year Marine veteran, he had served with the
Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet's secret
Scout-Observer Group, before joining the Office of
Strategic Services. He earned Bronze and Silver Stars
for sabotage and guerrilla missions in Greece and
China. 

An Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) 3 officer,
Lieutenant George Atcheson was in Japan heading up a
10-man detachment when the Korean War broke out on
June 25, 1950. He subsequently participated in
seaborne raids and recons with Amphibious Group l's
Special Operations Group. Atcheson had led the first
attempted UDT raid of the war on August 5, when he and
other Team 3 men paddled rubber boats into Yosu from
the high-speed destroyer transport Diachenko
(APD-123), but had to abort the mission under heavy
enemy fire. 

A veteran of two combat jumps in Korea, swarthy,
powerful Sgt. 1st Class Joseph "Pag" Pagnella came to
the island via the 187th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
Airborne Regimental Combat Team. He later recalled his
first meeting with Colonel Vandervoort who, upon
seeing Sergeant Pagnella and other noncoms with him,
exclaimed, "Now I've got me some sergeants!" 

Kramer was in charge of Yong Do operations. His Korean
counterpart was Major Han Chul-Min, who had recruited
several hundred South Koreans and disaffected North
Koreans to be trained for clandestine missions.
Working together with Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella,
Han selected 40 men to become members of the Special
Mission Group (SMG), which would be trained for
prisoner snatches, ship-launched and -supported
ambushes and the destruction of North Korean coastal
railroad tracks and bridges. Assisted by Sergeant
Pagnella, Lieutenant Atcheson was senior adviser and
trainer for the SMG, whose Korean officer in charge
was a Mr. O Pak, a former river pirate. Described by
Pagnella as "a stately, middle-aged man with a light
build, stringy mustache and beard and hair curling
from beneath his Marine-emblemed fatigue hat," O Pak
was a master of kendo and an accomplished boxer who
taught even Pagnella a thing or two during martial
arts training. 

Atcheson handled all rubber boat training and
amphibious raiding instruction, including swimming and
demolitions. Pagnella served as weapons instructor, on
everything from M-I rifles to .50-caliber machine guns
and 57mm recoilless rifles. He also trained SMG
personnel in the use of hand grenades, mines, booby
traps and instinctive fire. He later built a
1,000-inch range, a 250-yard rifle range and a
parachute landing fall platform on the rocky terrain
of Yong Do with the help and support of Atcheson and
the SMG personnel, 25 of whom became airborne
qualified. An expert pistol shot, Lieutenant Curtis
gave separate classes in the .45 automatic and added
his knowledge and expertise to unarmed combat
instruction and classes in guerrilla warfare. Majors
Kramer and Han, plus his staff, consulted on the
entire training program, which included foreign
weapons (Chinese and Russian), first aid, map reading,
patrolling, ambushes, small-unit operations and
mortars. 

The SMG's principal mission platform was the destroyer
transport, or APD. Fast and agile, with a shallow
draft that enabled them to get close to hostile
shores, high-speed destroyer transports, with their
four 36-foot LCPRs (landing craft personnel, ramped)
had proven themselves during World War II carrying
Marine raiders and UDTs throughout the Pacific
campaign. Four APDs served in Korea: Diachenko, Horace
A. Bass (APD- 124), Wantuck (APD- 125) and Begor (APD-
127). From 1951 through 1952, Horace A. Bass, Wantuck
and Begor took turns supporting CIA-sponsored
behind-the-lines operations. 

Standard operating procedure for launching and
recovering SMG teams was based on years of war-time
experience and subsequent tactical refinement. An APD
would halt on station several thousand yards off the
target beach at night. In silence and darkness, LCPRs,
or sometimes LCVPs (landing craft vehicle, personnel),
were launched and tows engaged to guerrilla-laden
rubber boats. About 500 yards from shore, the tow was
released, after which the raiders started paddling
their rubber boats toward the coast, stopping about
250 yards offshore. From there, swimmer scouts were
dispatched to reconnoiter the target. If an "All
clear" was signaled via infrared light, the guerrillas
paddled on in for the mission. 

Recovery was accomplished by rubber boats paddled out
to the designated pickup point at the prearranged
time, hooked up for tow, and returned to the ship by
its LCPRs or VPs. Guidance to the target beach was by
radar vectoring and radio communications. The command
rubber boat had a small reflector attached, so the
radar operator in the APD's combat information center
could track it, relaying directions by radio as the
boats proceeded toward the shore. While those
procedures were fairly cut and dried, the
circumstances under which they were conducted were
definitely not a matter of routine. APD sailors, and
especially the boat crews, were operating in enemy
waters at night off hostile shores, dealing with
tension, stress and sometimes lack of sleep. 

On March 19, 1952, Wantuck arrived off Yong Do to pick
up a group of SMG guerrillas, their rubber boats, gear
and equipment. Joining them and their leader, 0 Pak,
were interpreter Chon Do-Hyun--better known among the
Americans as John Chun--Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella.
Atcheson had selected the coastal target north of the
38th parallel from aerial photos and maps of the area
in consultation with Kramer and Pagnella. The mission:
Ambush a supply convoy, capture the drivers and
determine their cargo. 

Atcheson and O Pak divided the SMG into six five-man
teams, each armed with a BAR (Browning automatic
rifle), M- rifles, carbines and .45-caliber submachine
guns. Three-man boat security teams were made up of
swim scouts. O Pak, Chun and Pagnella would go in with
the recoilless rifle team. The rest of the SMG was
assigned to either the primary assault group or north
and south roadblocking details. The rehearsal had gone
well, the plan looked good and everyone was satisfied
with the prospect of a successful mission. 

A day out at sea, with Wantuck on a northerly heading,
Pagnella requested permission to test-fire the
recoilless rifle. The ships captain, Commander John B.
Thro, agreed, provided that Pag only fired from the
APD's bow. As they had done in training, Pag, his SMG
gun crew and the firepower of their shoulder-fired
weapon impressed their audience. 

At 2000 hours that night, general quarters was
sounded. The seas were calm as the crewmen manned
their battle stations while the boats were lowered
away for a successful mission rehear-sal that involved
towing the manned rubber boats to within 500 yards of
the coast. 

On March 21, the mission began in earnest. Darkened
conditions had been imposed aboard the ship when
battle stations was sounded at 2045, and Wantuck,
4,000 yards offshore, was on station off the target
beach. In 25 minutes all LCPRs had been lowered and
the rubber boats deployed, loaded and hooked up for
tow. Kramer, O Pak, Pagnella and Chun were in the
command boat. Atcheson followed in PR-2, ready to
assist any boats in trouble or deal with any
intervening North Korean small craft. At night the
only sign of approaching SMG boats towed by personnel
carriers with muffled engines were phosphorescent
wakes on the surface of the Sea of Japan. The tow was
released 300 yards offshore, and all hands waited for
the signal from Han, the swimmer scout. 

Command boat personnel noticed faint flickers of light
near the target area, then saw the signal light for
"All clear." As Dutch Kramer whispered, "Good luck,
Sarge," Pag, his recoilless rifle crew, O Pak and Chun
boarded a rubber boat. 

"We moved slowly to the beach," recalled Pagnella, "in
diamond formation. Our speed picked up as the men
paddled in unison. O Pak, Chun and I crouched low as
our coxswain guided on the lead boat. We could see the
beach now and heard gentle surf. The boats fanned out,
and we eased onto the sand, unloading quickly, then
turned all boats seaward. The beach security element
guided us to a trail leading from the cliff behind us
to a road beyond the beach. Once on top, Mr. Yu's
north roadblock team and four ambush teams moved
swiftly to positions on high ground west of the road.
The south roadblock team took up its position with the
57 recoilless rifle team's primary sector. All
elements had deployed in 30 minutes. Han, the scout,
and assault leader Sergeant Yuan Bol Yo, returned to
the south roadblock and reported to O Pak that they
found no tracks of any kind on the road. I asked Chun
to ask O Pak, `How far past the north and south
blocking positions?' `Just to the curve of the roads,'
came the reply. O Pak caught my trend and said we
would check beyond the blocking positions. The four of
us along with two men from the southern position moved
out carefully, checking the road a good 100 yards
south toward a small village about a mile away. No
tracks. We returned to our southern blocking position.
O Pak, Chun, Yuan Bol Yo and I continued to the
northern blocking position, where we informed Mr. Yu
that we were going beyond the curve to inspect the
road. He joined us, bringing an automatic-rifle man
along. Chun whispered, `Sergeant Pag, this is very
dangerous,' and I replied, `Yes, but we must check
this road.' We walked along very cautiously,
eyeballing all the way-50, 100, 150 yards. No vehicle
tracks, not even a cart. When we returned to Mr. Yu's
position, 0 Pak told him and Yuan Bol Yo to wait 30
minutes, then withdraw carefully along with each
ambush team and returned to the beach through our
southern blocking position. The withdrawal went
smoothly, each team covering the other and the beach
security team covering the last until all boats had
been loaded and were underway." 

It had been a perfect insertion, ambush plan and
deployment, but the North Koreans did not
cooperate--none of them showed up that night. The keen
disappointment felt by the SMG members was shared by
Wantuck's crew. Kramer turned to his frustrated
sergeant and said, "You can't win 'em all, Pag." 

Missions scheduled for the next two days were canceled
due to rough seas and high surf. Then came March 24.
This time the mission was rail demolition. In clear
weather and moderate swells, Wantuck launched her
boats at 2100 hours. Four hundred yards offshore, the
boats waited for a signal from SMG swimmer scouts.
Forty minutes later, lead scout Han returned to the
command boat and reported heavy 6-foot waves--too high
for insertion. As the crews prepared to leave, the
team members were clearly disappointed. Then someone
spotted lights ashore, flickering at a road bunker
position 600 yards north of the beach. Pagnella asked
Kramer if he could lay a couple of 57mm recoilless
rifle rounds into the position, since their command
boat was only 1,000 yards offshore. "Go ahead, Pag,"
replied Kramer. 

The sergeant moved to the bow with his favorite
weapon. Chou, his first gunner, loaded a round and
gave Pag an "up" tap on the head. The first round was
a bit low, the second on target, and the third
produced a secondary explosion. Pag squeezed off three
more high-explosive rounds for effect and later said,
"We hit the bunker and were happy to leave a calling
card." Back aboard Wantuck, one of her chief petty
officers told Pagnella, "Sergeant Pag, we may not have
hit a home run, but we know damn well we're in the
ball game!" 

Horace A. Bass succeeded Wantuck as the SMG
operational platform, and her introduction to the
CIA-sponsored activity was pure cloak and dagger. On
April 20, 1952, the APD arrived at Pusan's outer
harbor on hurry-up orders. Her commanding officer,
Commander Lefteris "Lefty" Lavrakas, sent his boat
officer, Lieutenant Hilary D. Mahin, ashore with
orders to proceed to a certain phone booth, dial a
certain number at a specific time and ask for "Jack."
Mahin's reply was to be "Discount Jig," Bass' call
sign. "Jack" gave Mahin a series of numbers that
turned out to be coordinates for Yong Do. There,
Lefty, "Hi" Mahin and other ship's officers met with
Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella for a mission briefing.
The mission was similar to earlier ones except that
top priority was given to capturing North Korean
transportation workers with knowledge about ID cards.
The CIA had learned that the North Koreans regularly
changed card stamps and paper colors, which meant that
operatives forging IDs for South Korean agents needed
information. 

As before, the SMG area of operations was the
northeast coast of Korea, above the 38th parallel. It
ran from the Manchurian border south to
Pohang--rugged, mountainous territory with a railroad
hugging the coast. Access to rail bridges and tunnels
was afforded by medium-size beaches, nearly all of
them abutting small fishing villages. Lack of harbors
or inlets made them dangerous targets, as did coastal
countercurrents. 

Following a dress rehearsal at Chumunjin, Atcheson,
Pagnella, O Pak and the SMG guerrillas embarked in
Bass, which steamed north toward Target No. 1 on the
evening of April 21. Commander Lavrakas began his run,
closing tc within 6,200 yards of the beach. In calm
seas with moderate swells, general quarters was
sounded and boats were launched at 2230. The mission
officer in charge, Lieutenant Atcheson, rode in the
command boat, PR-3, along with John Chun and
Lieutenant Mahin, with eight guerrilla-laden rubber
boats in tow. Adding ballast to the command boat were
the demolitions for the raid: 120-pound Mark- 133 and
80-pound Mark- 1350 charges for tunnels, bridges and
tracks. 

Once the tow was released, O Pak's men paddled to
within 200 yards of the beach, then paused to await
the signal from the swimmer scouts. They were greeted
by rifle and machine-gun fire and grenades, but
managed to withdraw. Atcheson, hearing gunfire, didn't
hesitate. Ordering PR-4 to accompany him, he closed to
within 150 yards of the beach while .30-caliber
machine gunners in the other PRs provided cover fire.
Leaving PR-4 on station, he took PR-3 and stalwart
coxswain Ken Eckert, with some rubber boats in tow,
and motored shoreward to recover his imperiled
swimmers. Hostile fire hit the boat, and John Chun,
standing next to Atcheson, was killed instantly by a
round. Thirty yards offshore, Atcheson found two
swimmers; one was dead and the other wounded. That
left one missing. 

Returning to PR-4, Atcheson transferred all hands save
himself and Eckert to the other boat, then motored
back to search for the remaining SMG swimmer. He
finally had to give up and return to Bass. Onboard, a
head count revealed that three guerrillas had been
killed, two of them drowned when their rubber boat
overturned, and the recovered swimmer was seriously
wounded. He was transferred to the cruiser Manchester,
whose crew found the missing SMG swimmer alive the
next day. Interpreter John Chun was returned to his
native soil for burial, with some sailors from Bass
and his friend Pagnella attending the funeral. 

Through the first week of May 1952, Bass continued to
land SMG guerrillas for raids against North Korean
targets. At times high surf prevented them from
completing their missions. On April 30, the SMG landed
in moderate seas near the site of Mission No. 1. After
moving ashore without opposition at 0200 hours, they
spotted a southbound train with front and rear
engines. The recoilless rifle team opened fire. The
team members could see that at least one round had hit
the train, but when they moved in closer for the kill,
the train crew managed to back out of harm's way. The
demolition team had better luck, setting a 120-pound
charge on a bridge and an 80-pounder on the tracks.
Both detonated as the guerrillas returned safely to
Bass with three captured North Korean civilians. 

On the next mission, O Pak sent half his men to the
northeast and half to the southwest of the target
bridge. Both teams heard a train approaching from the
south, just before it entered a tunnel. Soon
afterward, the northwest bridge squad encountered a
five-man enemy patrol and ordered it to surrender. The
North Koreans dived for cover instead, as SMG gunners
opened up on them with BAR, machine-gun and 57mm
recoilless rifle fire. Offshore, LCPR machine gunners
added .30-caliber fire support while the demo teams
placed their charges. All hands returned to the APD
and were later informed by Atcheson that they had
succeeded in completely destroying the bridge. 

Following a much-deserved break and a conference at
Pusan, the SMG was back at it in May. Apparently, Rear
Adm. George C. Dyer, commander, Task Force 95, had not
been fully informed about the CIA-sponsored
activities, and he requested more information.
Atcheson briefed him fully on the forthcoming planned
missions and later met with intelligence officers from
CTF 95 and from the Seventh Fleet. He then met with
the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Far East, Vice Adm.
C. Turner Joy, who, after Atcheson's briefing,
concurred with the proposed oper-ations. They would be
the last ones for the SMG. 

By June 23, 1952, the SMG was preparing for Mission
No. 3 of its final quartet. Number 2 had been canceled
due to foul weather, and No. 1 had netted three
prisoners. At 2200, Bass arrived off the target beach.
Visibility was only 100 yards. After gunfire support
ships pounded a nearby shore battery, the SMG
guerrillas landed unopposed a little after midnight. O
Pak deployed two roadblock teams, then accompanied the
rest of his men for a search of the village that was
their objective. By the time they returned to the
beach two hours later, SMG guerrillas had taken 10
prisoners and captured numerous documents. As they
departed, they disabled a large junk with BAR fire and
grenades. When all boats were recovered, Bass
contributed parting shots--31 rounds of 5-inch
ordnance aimed at boat concentrations and
radar-controlled shore batteries. 

The following night, O Pak's guerrillas carried out a
highly successful final raid. Besides finding and
seizing a huge cache of food, ammo, clothing, records
and maps, they captured several North Korean security
personnel who were aboard a sampan, making a total of
13 prisoners who were taken back to Bass for
interrogation. As the team withdrew, the SMG found
another sampan and destroyed it. 

More than 50 years later, George Atcheson and Joe
Pagnella have nothing but praise for the bravery of
the men of the Special Mission Group. In a relatively
brief period of time, they accomplished all that was
asked of them, sometimes dying in the process. They
also provided a model, along with the other
CIA-sponsored Korean operations, for Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observations
Group (MACV-SOG) activities conducted by the U.S.
military later, in Southeast Asia. Kramer, Atcheson
and Pagnella continued their work on Yong Do and
elsewhere through 1952, assisted by temporary duty
Department of the Army civilians, personnel hurriedly
trained by the CIA and sent to Korea. Some of the
other work involved Atcheson and Pagnella's
participating in behind-the-lines resupply airdrops
conducted from K-9 Air Base, east of Pusan, by Special
Air Missions Douglas C-47s and Curtiss C-46s. Kramer
and Atcheson earned the Navy Cross and the Silver Star
respectively for their CIA missions. Pagnella received
the respect of his SMG mates and the knowledge of a
professional NCO's job well done. MH 

For further reading, Vietnam veteran and military
historian John B. Dwyer recommends: In the Devil's
Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War,
by Michael E. Haas; and Shadow Warriors: The Covert
War in Korea, by William B. Brever 

[Sidebar] 
The CIA in the Far East, 1950-53  

[Sidebar] 
During the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency
under General Walter Bedell Smith operated by
authority granted in National Security Council
directives 4/A and 10/2. These directives sanctioned a
range of covert operations in Korea, from
psychological warfare to direct action, including
paramilitary, guerrilla and subversive activities.  
When the war broke out, the CIA was doing business
through its two branches, Frank Wisner's Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for all active
covert operations, and the Office of Special
Operations (OSO), which conducted passive intelligence
gathering. Beginning in 1948, William Duggan carried
out OSO missions from Japan's Yokosuka Naval Base.  
In May 1950, the CIA appointed Colonel Richard G.
Stilwell to run the OPC's Far East operations. His
area included Burma, China, Indochina and Korea.
Several months later, Hans V  

[Sidebar] 
Tofte arrived. From headquarters at Naval Air Station
Atsugi, Tofte set up five CIA stations in Japan. One
of them, Chigasaki, was a training facility. The main
OPC base in Korea was Yong Do Island. Tofte, like
Winner, had served with the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) in World War II.  
CIA activities in Korea were handled through Joint
Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). It reported to the
Documents Research Division (DRD), Special Staff, Far
East Command (FECOM). That was General Douglas
MacArthur's bailiwick, and--as is well known-- "Mac"
disliked the OSS and its successor agency The DRD was
technically part of his FECOM staff, however, and its
orders came directly from Washington, through
Stilwell. After General Smith visited MacArthur in
January 1951, there was a marked improvement in
FECOM-CIA relations. FECOM had its own agency for
coordinating covert  

[Sidebar] 
activities and agencies in Korea named CCRAK--Combined
Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea. Though
not required to, JACK maintained liaison with CCRAK.  
The large-scale escape and evasion project for pilots
shot down during operations in which JACK participated
was coordinated through the Joint Technical Advisory
Group, Far East Air Force (FEAF/TAG). Covert air
operations were conducted for the CIA by Civil Air
Transport.  
Taiwan was the operating base for a Korean War-related
CIA operation known as Western Enterprises. This
operation was headed up by OSS veteran Colonel William
R. Peers. Western Enterprises personnel trained
Nationalist Chinese for sabotage and other missions on
mainland China, but they failed in their primary
mission--to compel the Chinese to divert forces that
had been earmarked for Korea. J.B.D.  


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