[KOREAN-WAR-L:11431] Re: "Behind the lines: Secret Naval raids in Korea"

["Walter E. Wallis, P.E." <unclgene@pacbell.net>]

Anything on operation fishnet? Inspire 28

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Mike Yared" <mikeyared@yahoo.com>
To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 8:22 AM
Subject: [KOREAN-WAR-L:11428] "Behind the lines: Secret Naval raids in
Korea"


> Behind the lines: Secret Naval raids in Korea
> John B Dwyer.
> Military History.
> Dec 2002. Vol. 19, Iss. 5;  pg. 66, 7 pgs
> ISSN/ISBN: 08897328
>
> The CIA sponsored a variety of activities during the
> Korean War, among which were behind-the-lines maritime
> operations. Yung Do Island, connected by an isthmus to
> Pusan, served as the base for those operations, which
> were carried out by well-trained Korean guerrillas.
>
> If you think the U.S. Navy's activities off Korea were
> limited to offshore bombardment and carrier strikes,
> you don't know JACK!
>
> The Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a variety of
> activities during the Korean War, among which were
> behind-the-lines maritime operations. Yong Do Island,
> connected by a rugged isthmus to Pusan, served as the
> base for those operations, which were carried out by
> welltrained Korean guerrillas. The four principal
> American advisers responsible for the training and
> operational planning of those special missions were
> "Dutch" Kramer, Tom Curtis, George Atcheson and Joe
> Pagnella. All of them had been processed through the
> ClAs front organization, Joint Advisory Commission,
> Korea (JACK), headquartered at Tongnae, a village near
> Pusan, on the peninsula's southeast coast.
>
> JACKs first commander was Army Colonel Albert R.
> Harvey, until he was succeeded by a decorated 82nd
> Airborne Division veteran, Colonel Benjamin
> Vandervoort. They oversaw planning and support for the
> agency's sea, air and ground operations, to include
> insertion and extraction of agents, coastal and
> demolition raids, and support for the Far East Air
> Force's Escape & Evasion Program.
>
> One of JACK's projects, code-named "Blossom," had as
> its objective the planting of anti-Communist personnel
> in the North who would "blossom" as pro-democracy
> advocates after the South won the war. Most of those
> political infiltrators did not survive.
>
> A big, tough Marine, Major Vincent R. "Dutch" Kramer
> had served in the Pacific and with U.S. Naval Group,
> China, during World War II. As the Group's Camp 3
> commander, he supervised the training of Nationalist
> Chinese guerrillas, then took the field with them for
> raids and ambushes against the Japanese.
>
> Equally large and tough was Lieutenant Tom Curtis. A
> 15year Marine veteran, he had served with the
> Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet's secret
> Scout-Observer Group, before joining the Office of
> Strategic Services. He earned Bronze and Silver Stars
> for sabotage and guerrilla missions in Greece and
> China.
>
> An Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) 3 officer,
> Lieutenant George Atcheson was in Japan heading up a
> 10-man detachment when the Korean War broke out on
> June 25, 1950. He subsequently participated in
> seaborne raids and recons with Amphibious Group l's
> Special Operations Group. Atcheson had led the first
> attempted UDT raid of the war on August 5, when he and
> other Team 3 men paddled rubber boats into Yosu from
> the high-speed destroyer transport Diachenko
> (APD-123), but had to abort the mission under heavy
> enemy fire.
>
> A veteran of two combat jumps in Korea, swarthy,
> powerful Sgt. 1st Class Joseph "Pag" Pagnella came to
> the island via the 187th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
> Airborne Regimental Combat Team. He later recalled his
> first meeting with Colonel Vandervoort who, upon
> seeing Sergeant Pagnella and other noncoms with him,
> exclaimed, "Now I've got me some sergeants!"
>
> Kramer was in charge of Yong Do operations. His Korean
> counterpart was Major Han Chul-Min, who had recruited
> several hundred South Koreans and disaffected North
> Koreans to be trained for clandestine missions.
> Working together with Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella,
> Han selected 40 men to become members of the Special
> Mission Group (SMG), which would be trained for
> prisoner snatches, ship-launched and -supported
> ambushes and the destruction of North Korean coastal
> railroad tracks and bridges. Assisted by Sergeant
> Pagnella, Lieutenant Atcheson was senior adviser and
> trainer for the SMG, whose Korean officer in charge
> was a Mr. O Pak, a former river pirate. Described by
> Pagnella as "a stately, middle-aged man with a light
> build, stringy mustache and beard and hair curling
> from beneath his Marine-emblemed fatigue hat," O Pak
> was a master of kendo and an accomplished boxer who
> taught even Pagnella a thing or two during martial
> arts training.
>
> Atcheson handled all rubber boat training and
> amphibious raiding instruction, including swimming and
> demolitions. Pagnella served as weapons instructor, on
> everything from M-I rifles to .50-caliber machine guns
> and 57mm recoilless rifles. He also trained SMG
> personnel in the use of hand grenades, mines, booby
> traps and instinctive fire. He later built a
> 1,000-inch range, a 250-yard rifle range and a
> parachute landing fall platform on the rocky terrain
> of Yong Do with the help and support of Atcheson and
> the SMG personnel, 25 of whom became airborne
> qualified. An expert pistol shot, Lieutenant Curtis
> gave separate classes in the .45 automatic and added
> his knowledge and expertise to unarmed combat
> instruction and classes in guerrilla warfare. Majors
> Kramer and Han, plus his staff, consulted on the
> entire training program, which included foreign
> weapons (Chinese and Russian), first aid, map reading,
> patrolling, ambushes, small-unit operations and
> mortars.
>
> The SMG's principal mission platform was the destroyer
> transport, or APD. Fast and agile, with a shallow
> draft that enabled them to get close to hostile
> shores, high-speed destroyer transports, with their
> four 36-foot LCPRs (landing craft personnel, ramped)
> had proven themselves during World War II carrying
> Marine raiders and UDTs throughout the Pacific
> campaign. Four APDs served in Korea: Diachenko, Horace
> A. Bass (APD- 124), Wantuck (APD- 125) and Begor (APD-
> 127). From 1951 through 1952, Horace A. Bass, Wantuck
> and Begor took turns supporting CIA-sponsored
> behind-the-lines operations.
>
> Standard operating procedure for launching and
> recovering SMG teams was based on years of war-time
> experience and subsequent tactical refinement. An APD
> would halt on station several thousand yards off the
> target beach at night. In silence and darkness, LCPRs,
> or sometimes LCVPs (landing craft vehicle, personnel),
> were launched and tows engaged to guerrilla-laden
> rubber boats. About 500 yards from shore, the tow was
> released, after which the raiders started paddling
> their rubber boats toward the coast, stopping about
> 250 yards offshore. From there, swimmer scouts were
> dispatched to reconnoiter the target. If an "All
> clear" was signaled via infrared light, the guerrillas
> paddled on in for the mission.
>
> Recovery was accomplished by rubber boats paddled out
> to the designated pickup point at the prearranged
> time, hooked up for tow, and returned to the ship by
> its LCPRs or VPs. Guidance to the target beach was by
> radar vectoring and radio communications. The command
> rubber boat had a small reflector attached, so the
> radar operator in the APD's combat information center
> could track it, relaying directions by radio as the
> boats proceeded toward the shore. While those
> procedures were fairly cut and dried, the
> circumstances under which they were conducted were
> definitely not a matter of routine. APD sailors, and
> especially the boat crews, were operating in enemy
> waters at night off hostile shores, dealing with
> tension, stress and sometimes lack of sleep.
>
> On March 19, 1952, Wantuck arrived off Yong Do to pick
> up a group of SMG guerrillas, their rubber boats, gear
> and equipment. Joining them and their leader, 0 Pak,
> were interpreter Chon Do-Hyun--better known among the
> Americans as John Chun--Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella.
> Atcheson had selected the coastal target north of the
> 38th parallel from aerial photos and maps of the area
> in consultation with Kramer and Pagnella. The mission:
> Ambush a supply convoy, capture the drivers and
> determine their cargo.
>
> Atcheson and O Pak divided the SMG into six five-man
> teams, each armed with a BAR (Browning automatic
> rifle), M- rifles, carbines and .45-caliber submachine
> guns. Three-man boat security teams were made up of
> swim scouts. O Pak, Chun and Pagnella would go in with
> the recoilless rifle team. The rest of the SMG was
> assigned to either the primary assault group or north
> and south roadblocking details. The rehearsal had gone
> well, the plan looked good and everyone was satisfied
> with the prospect of a successful mission.
>
> A day out at sea, with Wantuck on a northerly heading,
> Pagnella requested permission to test-fire the
> recoilless rifle. The ships captain, Commander John B.
> Thro, agreed, provided that Pag only fired from the
> APD's bow. As they had done in training, Pag, his SMG
> gun crew and the firepower of their shoulder-fired
> weapon impressed their audience.
>
> At 2000 hours that night, general quarters was
> sounded. The seas were calm as the crewmen manned
> their battle stations while the boats were lowered
> away for a successful mission rehear-sal that involved
> towing the manned rubber boats to within 500 yards of
> the coast.
>
> On March 21, the mission began in earnest. Darkened
> conditions had been imposed aboard the ship when
> battle stations was sounded at 2045, and Wantuck,
> 4,000 yards offshore, was on station off the target
> beach. In 25 minutes all LCPRs had been lowered and
> the rubber boats deployed, loaded and hooked up for
> tow. Kramer, O Pak, Pagnella and Chun were in the
> command boat. Atcheson followed in PR-2, ready to
> assist any boats in trouble or deal with any
> intervening North Korean small craft. At night the
> only sign of approaching SMG boats towed by personnel
> carriers with muffled engines were phosphorescent
> wakes on the surface of the Sea of Japan. The tow was
> released 300 yards offshore, and all hands waited for
> the signal from Han, the swimmer scout.
>
> Command boat personnel noticed faint flickers of light
> near the target area, then saw the signal light for
> "All clear." As Dutch Kramer whispered, "Good luck,
> Sarge," Pag, his recoilless rifle crew, O Pak and Chun
> boarded a rubber boat.
>
> "We moved slowly to the beach," recalled Pagnella, "in
> diamond formation. Our speed picked up as the men
> paddled in unison. O Pak, Chun and I crouched low as
> our coxswain guided on the lead boat. We could see the
> beach now and heard gentle surf. The boats fanned out,
> and we eased onto the sand, unloading quickly, then
> turned all boats seaward. The beach security element
> guided us to a trail leading from the cliff behind us
> to a road beyond the beach. Once on top, Mr. Yu's
> north roadblock team and four ambush teams moved
> swiftly to positions on high ground west of the road.
> The south roadblock team took up its position with the
> 57 recoilless rifle team's primary sector. All
> elements had deployed in 30 minutes. Han, the scout,
> and assault leader Sergeant Yuan Bol Yo, returned to
> the south roadblock and reported to O Pak that they
> found no tracks of any kind on the road. I asked Chun
> to ask O Pak, `How far past the north and south
> blocking positions?' `Just to the curve of the roads,'
> came the reply. O Pak caught my trend and said we
> would check beyond the blocking positions. The four of
> us along with two men from the southern position moved
> out carefully, checking the road a good 100 yards
> south toward a small village about a mile away. No
> tracks. We returned to our southern blocking position.
> O Pak, Chun, Yuan Bol Yo and I continued to the
> northern blocking position, where we informed Mr. Yu
> that we were going beyond the curve to inspect the
> road. He joined us, bringing an automatic-rifle man
> along. Chun whispered, `Sergeant Pag, this is very
> dangerous,' and I replied, `Yes, but we must check
> this road.' We walked along very cautiously,
> eyeballing all the way-50, 100, 150 yards. No vehicle
> tracks, not even a cart. When we returned to Mr. Yu's
> position, 0 Pak told him and Yuan Bol Yo to wait 30
> minutes, then withdraw carefully along with each
> ambush team and returned to the beach through our
> southern blocking position. The withdrawal went
> smoothly, each team covering the other and the beach
> security team covering the last until all boats had
> been loaded and were underway."
>
> It had been a perfect insertion, ambush plan and
> deployment, but the North Koreans did not
> cooperate--none of them showed up that night. The keen
> disappointment felt by the SMG members was shared by
> Wantuck's crew. Kramer turned to his frustrated
> sergeant and said, "You can't win 'em all, Pag."
>
> Missions scheduled for the next two days were canceled
> due to rough seas and high surf. Then came March 24.
> This time the mission was rail demolition. In clear
> weather and moderate swells, Wantuck launched her
> boats at 2100 hours. Four hundred yards offshore, the
> boats waited for a signal from SMG swimmer scouts.
> Forty minutes later, lead scout Han returned to the
> command boat and reported heavy 6-foot waves--too high
> for insertion. As the crews prepared to leave, the
> team members were clearly disappointed. Then someone
> spotted lights ashore, flickering at a road bunker
> position 600 yards north of the beach. Pagnella asked
> Kramer if he could lay a couple of 57mm recoilless
> rifle rounds into the position, since their command
> boat was only 1,000 yards offshore. "Go ahead, Pag,"
> replied Kramer.
>
> The sergeant moved to the bow with his favorite
> weapon. Chou, his first gunner, loaded a round and
> gave Pag an "up" tap on the head. The first round was
> a bit low, the second on target, and the third
> produced a secondary explosion. Pag squeezed off three
> more high-explosive rounds for effect and later said,
> "We hit the bunker and were happy to leave a calling
> card." Back aboard Wantuck, one of her chief petty
> officers told Pagnella, "Sergeant Pag, we may not have
> hit a home run, but we know damn well we're in the
> ball game!"
>
> Horace A. Bass succeeded Wantuck as the SMG
> operational platform, and her introduction to the
> CIA-sponsored activity was pure cloak and dagger. On
> April 20, 1952, the APD arrived at Pusan's outer
> harbor on hurry-up orders. Her commanding officer,
> Commander Lefteris "Lefty" Lavrakas, sent his boat
> officer, Lieutenant Hilary D. Mahin, ashore with
> orders to proceed to a certain phone booth, dial a
> certain number at a specific time and ask for "Jack."
> Mahin's reply was to be "Discount Jig," Bass' call
> sign. "Jack" gave Mahin a series of numbers that
> turned out to be coordinates for Yong Do. There,
> Lefty, "Hi" Mahin and other ship's officers met with
> Kramer, Atcheson and Pagnella for a mission briefing.
> The mission was similar to earlier ones except that
> top priority was given to capturing North Korean
> transportation workers with knowledge about ID cards.
> The CIA had learned that the North Koreans regularly
> changed card stamps and paper colors, which meant that
> operatives forging IDs for South Korean agents needed
> information.
>
> As before, the SMG area of operations was the
> northeast coast of Korea, above the 38th parallel. It
> ran from the Manchurian border south to
> Pohang--rugged, mountainous territory with a railroad
> hugging the coast. Access to rail bridges and tunnels
> was afforded by medium-size beaches, nearly all of
> them abutting small fishing villages. Lack of harbors
> or inlets made them dangerous targets, as did coastal
> countercurrents.
>
> Following a dress rehearsal at Chumunjin, Atcheson,
> Pagnella, O Pak and the SMG guerrillas embarked in
> Bass, which steamed north toward Target No. 1 on the
> evening of April 21. Commander Lavrakas began his run,
> closing tc within 6,200 yards of the beach. In calm
> seas with moderate swells, general quarters was
> sounded and boats were launched at 2230. The mission
> officer in charge, Lieutenant Atcheson, rode in the
> command boat, PR-3, along with John Chun and
> Lieutenant Mahin, with eight guerrilla-laden rubber
> boats in tow. Adding ballast to the command boat were
> the demolitions for the raid: 120-pound Mark- 133 and
> 80-pound Mark- 1350 charges for tunnels, bridges and
> tracks.
>
> Once the tow was released, O Pak's men paddled to
> within 200 yards of the beach, then paused to await
> the signal from the swimmer scouts. They were greeted
> by rifle and machine-gun fire and grenades, but
> managed to withdraw. Atcheson, hearing gunfire, didn't
> hesitate. Ordering PR-4 to accompany him, he closed to
> within 150 yards of the beach while .30-caliber
> machine gunners in the other PRs provided cover fire.
> Leaving PR-4 on station, he took PR-3 and stalwart
> coxswain Ken Eckert, with some rubber boats in tow,
> and motored shoreward to recover his imperiled
> swimmers. Hostile fire hit the boat, and John Chun,
> standing next to Atcheson, was killed instantly by a
> round. Thirty yards offshore, Atcheson found two
> swimmers; one was dead and the other wounded. That
> left one missing.
>
> Returning to PR-4, Atcheson transferred all hands save
> himself and Eckert to the other boat, then motored
> back to search for the remaining SMG swimmer. He
> finally had to give up and return to Bass. Onboard, a
> head count revealed that three guerrillas had been
> killed, two of them drowned when their rubber boat
> overturned, and the recovered swimmer was seriously
> wounded. He was transferred to the cruiser Manchester,
> whose crew found the missing SMG swimmer alive the
> next day. Interpreter John Chun was returned to his
> native soil for burial, with some sailors from Bass
> and his friend Pagnella attending the funeral.
>
> Through the first week of May 1952, Bass continued to
> land SMG guerrillas for raids against North Korean
> targets. At times high surf prevented them from
> completing their missions. On April 30, the SMG landed
> in moderate seas near the site of Mission No. 1. After
> moving ashore without opposition at 0200 hours, they
> spotted a southbound train with front and rear
> engines. The recoilless rifle team opened fire. The
> team members could see that at least one round had hit
> the train, but when they moved in closer for the kill,
> the train crew managed to back out of harm's way. The
> demolition team had better luck, setting a 120-pound
> charge on a bridge and an 80-pounder on the tracks.
> Both detonated as the guerrillas returned safely to
> Bass with three captured North Korean civilians.
>
> On the next mission, O Pak sent half his men to the
> northeast and half to the southwest of the target
> bridge. Both teams heard a train approaching from the
> south, just before it entered a tunnel. Soon
> afterward, the northwest bridge squad encountered a
> five-man enemy patrol and ordered it to surrender. The
> North Koreans dived for cover instead, as SMG gunners
> opened up on them with BAR, machine-gun and 57mm
> recoilless rifle fire. Offshore, LCPR machine gunners
> added .30-caliber fire support while the demo teams
> placed their charges. All hands returned to the APD
> and were later informed by Atcheson that they had
> succeeded in completely destroying the bridge.
>
> Following a much-deserved break and a conference at
> Pusan, the SMG was back at it in May. Apparently, Rear
> Adm. George C. Dyer, commander, Task Force 95, had not
> been fully informed about the CIA-sponsored
> activities, and he requested more information.
> Atcheson briefed him fully on the forthcoming planned
> missions and later met with intelligence officers from
> CTF 95 and from the Seventh Fleet. He then met with
> the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Far East, Vice Adm.
> C. Turner Joy, who, after Atcheson's briefing,
> concurred with the proposed oper-ations. They would be
> the last ones for the SMG.
>
> By June 23, 1952, the SMG was preparing for Mission
> No. 3 of its final quartet. Number 2 had been canceled
> due to foul weather, and No. 1 had netted three
> prisoners. At 2200, Bass arrived off the target beach.
> Visibility was only 100 yards. After gunfire support
> ships pounded a nearby shore battery, the SMG
> guerrillas landed unopposed a little after midnight. O
> Pak deployed two roadblock teams, then accompanied the
> rest of his men for a search of the village that was
> their objective. By the time they returned to the
> beach two hours later, SMG guerrillas had taken 10
> prisoners and captured numerous documents. As they
> departed, they disabled a large junk with BAR fire and
> grenades. When all boats were recovered, Bass
> contributed parting shots--31 rounds of 5-inch
> ordnance aimed at boat concentrations and
> radar-controlled shore batteries.
>
> The following night, O Pak's guerrillas carried out a
> highly successful final raid. Besides finding and
> seizing a huge cache of food, ammo, clothing, records
> and maps, they captured several North Korean security
> personnel who were aboard a sampan, making a total of
> 13 prisoners who were taken back to Bass for
> interrogation. As the team withdrew, the SMG found
> another sampan and destroyed it.
>
> More than 50 years later, George Atcheson and Joe
> Pagnella have nothing but praise for the bravery of
> the men of the Special Mission Group. In a relatively
> brief period of time, they accomplished all that was
> asked of them, sometimes dying in the process. They
> also provided a model, along with the other
> CIA-sponsored Korean operations, for Military
> Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observations
> Group (MACV-SOG) activities conducted by the U.S.
> military later, in Southeast Asia. Kramer, Atcheson
> and Pagnella continued their work on Yong Do and
> elsewhere through 1952, assisted by temporary duty
> Department of the Army civilians, personnel hurriedly
> trained by the CIA and sent to Korea. Some of the
> other work involved Atcheson and Pagnella's
> participating in behind-the-lines resupply airdrops
> conducted from K-9 Air Base, east of Pusan, by Special
> Air Missions Douglas C-47s and Curtiss C-46s. Kramer
> and Atcheson earned the Navy Cross and the Silver Star
> respectively for their CIA missions. Pagnella received
> the respect of his SMG mates and the knowledge of a
> professional NCO's job well done. MH
>
> For further reading, Vietnam veteran and military
> historian John B. Dwyer recommends: In the Devil's
> Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War,
> by Michael E. Haas; and Shadow Warriors: The Covert
> War in Korea, by William B. Brever
>
> [Sidebar]
> The CIA in the Far East, 1950-53
>
> [Sidebar]
> During the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency
> under General Walter Bedell Smith operated by
> authority granted in National Security Council
> directives 4/A and 10/2. These directives sanctioned a
> range of covert operations in Korea, from
> psychological warfare to direct action, including
> paramilitary, guerrilla and subversive activities.
> When the war broke out, the CIA was doing business
> through its two branches, Frank Wisner's Office of
> Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for all active
> covert operations, and the Office of Special
> Operations (OSO), which conducted passive intelligence
> gathering. Beginning in 1948, William Duggan carried
> out OSO missions from Japan's Yokosuka Naval Base.
> In May 1950, the CIA appointed Colonel Richard G.
> Stilwell to run the OPC's Far East operations. His
> area included Burma, China, Indochina and Korea.
> Several months later, Hans V
>
> [Sidebar]
> Tofte arrived. From headquarters at Naval Air Station
> Atsugi, Tofte set up five CIA stations in Japan. One
> of them, Chigasaki, was a training facility. The main
> OPC base in Korea was Yong Do Island. Tofte, like
> Winner, had served with the Office of Strategic
> Services (OSS) in World War II.
> CIA activities in Korea were handled through Joint
> Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). It reported to the
> Documents Research Division (DRD), Special Staff, Far
> East Command (FECOM). That was General Douglas
> MacArthur's bailiwick, and--as is well known-- "Mac"
> disliked the OSS and its successor agency The DRD was
> technically part of his FECOM staff, however, and its
> orders came directly from Washington, through
> Stilwell. After General Smith visited MacArthur in
> January 1951, there was a marked improvement in
> FECOM-CIA relations. FECOM had its own agency for
> coordinating covert
>
> [Sidebar]
> activities and agencies in Korea named CCRAK--Combined
> Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea. Though
> not required to, JACK maintained liaison with CCRAK.
> The large-scale escape and evasion project for pilots
> shot down during operations in which JACK participated
> was coordinated through the Joint Technical Advisory
> Group, Far East Air Force (FEAF/TAG). Covert air
> operations were conducted for the CIA by Civil Air
> Transport.
> Taiwan was the operating base for a Korean War-related
> CIA operation known as Western Enterprises. This
> operation was headed up by OSS veteran Colonel William
> R. Peers. Western Enterprises personnel trained
> Nationalist Chinese for sabotage and other missions on
> mainland China, but they failed in their primary
> mission--to compel the Chinese to divert forces that
> had been earmarked for Korea. J.B.D.
>
>
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