Military Historical Library

"The War in Korea 1950-1953"

Chief Editor N. L. Volkovskiy
Editor I. V. Petrova
OOO Izdatel'stvo Poligon, Saint Petersburg 2000; 928 pp.
ISBN 5-89173 - 113-4

((pp. 246-297))

Chapter 5. Combat Operations by the Sides during the Course of Negotiations for a Ceasefire [1]

(Fourth Stage of the War: 10 July 1951 – 27 July 1953)

 

1. Situation and Force Groupings of Troops of the Sides in Korea as of 10 July 1951

Per the proposal of the USSR representative to the UN and the Security Council on 10 July 1951 representatives of the Supreme High Command of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Volunteers and representatives of the American command began negotiations for a ceasefire in the city of Kaysen .  

The relationship between the ground forces at this time was relatively even. The forces of both sides had gone over to the defensive, and the war in Korea had taken up a positional nature. In this the forces of the CPV and KPA went over to the defense with the goal of maintaining a solid hold on their positions at the front and repulsing any possible landings on their coasts. The UN forces as well as the South Korean army, other than the domination of their fleet of the waters of Korea , were only defending along the front line.   

            When the negotiations began the front, beside the area of Kaysen, was 10-55 kilometers north of the 38^th Parallel along the line Yoson River Delta – south of Kaysen – Suuk – Chorwon – Kumhwa – Konkol’ – Yimonchijon – Matsadin.  

            The force grouping of troops of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army was as follows.  

            In the western and central sectors of the front and running along an overall distance of 130 kilometers were the defenses of the CPV. The 19^th CPV Army with four corps (47^th, 63^rd, 64^th and 65^th) defended an 80 kilometer line from the Yoson River delta to Chorwon. The line from Chorwon to the Bukhan River covered 50 kilometers and was defended by the 9^th CPV Army with three corps (20^th, 26^th and 27^th). The operational structure of the armies was in two echelons.  

            The army corps, which each had three divisions, were defending as follows: the 64^th CPV Corps defended from the Yoson River Delta to Suuk. Combat order of this corps was in a single echelon. The zone from Suuk to Haktori was defended by the 47^th CPV Corps. Combat order of this corps was structured in two echelons: one division formed the first echelon, and two divisions formed its second echelon. In the zone from Orichon to Gaysonri was the 63^rd CPV Corps with its combat order structured in three echelons. The zone from Pyongkan to Kumhwa was defended by the 26^th CPV Corps. Combat order of this corps was structured in two echelons. The line Hasori – Maetol’bau was held by the 20^th CPV Corps with its combat order in a single echelon. At the seam between the 19^th CPV Army and the 9^th CPV Army and somewhat behind it along the line Tesudon – Sangapni – Chongdon was the 42^nd CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army defending in two echelons; this corps was now directly subordinate to the Unified Command. The width of the zones defended by the corps depended on their mission, their makeup and the nature of the terrain and varied from 15 to 55 kilometers.  

            The 65^th CPV Corps of the 19^th CPV Army and the 27^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army were held in the second echelon of their respective armies and situated with the former being in the area west of Singae and the latter being in the area of Chingdori.  

            The 1^st KPA Army, consisting of the 8^th, 19^th and 47^th KPA Infantry Divisions, was deployed along the Ahyonni – Hokuni – Teondon line in order to defend the Yenan area and support the right flank of the 19^th CPV Army.  

            The line from the Bukhan River to the seacoast was defended by the forces of the 5^th, 2^nd and 3^rd KPA Armies. The 5^th KPA Army (the 6^th, 12^th and 32^nd KPA Infantry Divisions) defended the line Sonumoku – Konkol’. To its left, along the line of the pass north of Imdamni – Jingoge – Siaehiri – Sangol, the 2^nd KPA Army (the 2^nd, 13^th and 28^th KPA Infantry Divisions was defending. These armies had two divisions in their first echelon and one in their second. The zone from Sangol to Matsadyan was defended by the 15^th KPA Infantry Division of the 3^rd KPA Army. Two divisions of this army (the 45^th and 1^st KPA Infantry Divisions) defended along the coast in the sectors at Koson and Paetchen. The width of the zones defended by the KPA armies varied from 20-30 kilometers.  

            For that reason, along the 200 kilometers of the front there were 36 infantry divisions defending, of which 24 were CPV and 12 were KPA, and of these 18 divisions were in the first echelon, four supported the flanks, and the rest were in the second and third echelons of the army corps and second echelon of the armies.  The average density saw one infantry division covering 6 kilometers.[2]  

            The densest grouping of forces and means was in the center on the front from Suuk  to the Bukhan River . The average operational density in this sector was one division per 3.8 kilometers of front.  

            The west coast, stretching more than 500 kilometers from Yenampo to Haeju was defended by the forces of the 4^th and 6^th KPA Armies and the 13^th CPV Army.  

            The 4^th KPA Army, consisting of the 4^th, 5^th and 10^th KPA Infantry Divisions, the 105^th Mechanized Division and the 26^th KPA Marine Brigade, defended the area from Anju to Nampo on a front of 140 kilometers. Only the 26^th KPA Marine Brigade was directly responsible for coastal defense, and the rest of the forces were concentrated 20-25 kilometers inland in readiness to move to launch a counterstrike against an enemy naval landing at any point along the coast. The 10^th KPA Infantry Division was concentrated in the area of Undaen, the 105^th Mechanized Division was concentrated north and south of Sukchen, the 4^th KPA Infantry Division was in the area of Kiyanri, and the 5^th KPA Infantry Division was in the area southwest of Tintiri.  

            The 6^th KPA Army, consisting of the 9^th and 18^th KPA Infantry Divisions, the 17^th Mechanized Division, and the 23^rd KPA Marine Brigade, defended the coastline from Nampo to Haeju on a front of 250 kilometers. Only the 26^th KPA Marine Brigade was directly responsible for coastal defense, and the rest of the forces were concentrated 30-80 kilometers inland in readiness to move to launch a counterstrike against an enemy naval landing at any point along the western and southern directions. The 18^th KPA Infantry Division was concentrated southwest of Synhori, the 17^th Mechanized Division was in the area of Sariwon, and the 9^th KPA Infantry Division in the area west of Techunin.  

            The 13^th CPV Army, consisting of four corps, was using its own 50^th CPV Corps, to defend the coast from Yenampo to Anju (a front of 130 kilometers), and the rest of the corps were in readiness to launch counterstrikes: the 38^th and 39^th CPV Corps were in the zone of the 4^th KPA Army and the 40^th CPV Corps was in the zone of the 6^th KPA Army. The corps were concentrated along 50-70 kilometers from the coast in the following areas: the 38^th CPV Corps – in the Sunchon area; the 39^th CPV Corps – north of Sonchon; and the 40^th CPV Corps – in the Fanju area.  

            Overall the defense of the west coast along the front from Yenampo to Haeju saw 17 deployed infantry divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, and 2 marine brigades. The average operational density was 25 kilometers per division.[3] The most densely defended force grouping of troops and means were in the Tonju and Nampo sectors. Average operational density here was 12.5 kilometers per division.  

            The east coast ran from Paetchen to Chengjin and covered nearly 500 kilometers which was defended by the 7^th KPA Army, consisting of four infantry divisions and two marine brigades. The main body of the army (three divisions and one brigade) were concentrated in the Wonsan area and deployed as follows: the 3^rd KPA Infantry Division – the Anbien area; the 37^th KPA Infantry Division – west of Sokken; and the 7^th KPA Infantry Division – in the Mantszanni area. The 46^th KPA Infantry Division was located in the Hamhyn area, and the 24^th and 63^rd KPA Marine Brigades were defending directly on the coastline with the former in the Wonsan area and the latter northeast of Hamhyn.[4] The 20^th CPV Army with the 67^th and 68^th CPV Corps was concentrated in the areas of Yandok, Tonyan, and Kocha, kept in readiness to launch counterstrikes on any enemy naval landings in the Wonsan area.  

            Overall, coastal defense was allocated 10 infantry divisions and two marine brigades. The average operational density was around 45 kilometers per division.[5] The heaviest density of force groupings of troops and means were in the Wonsan area along the Hekkok – Munchen front. Average operational density in this sector was one division per 5 kilometers.  

            In reserve the Unified Command had the 3^rd CPV Army (the 12^th, 15^th and 60^th CPV Corps) which was concentrated in the Koksan, Namden and Karechu areas.  

            Overall there were 72 infantry divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, 4 marine brigades (of which 51 infantry divisions were CPV and 23 divisions and 4 marine brigades were KPA), 3 howitzer artillery divisions, 1 rocket artillery division, 2 antitank artillery divisions, 4 antiaircraft artillery divisions, an independent howitzer artillery regiment, an independent mortar regiment, 3 antiaircraft artillery regiments [6], 11 engineer and engineer-sapper regiments, 3 antiaircraft artillery battalions, and 2 independent tank companies.  

            The average size of a Chinese Volunteer division was 10,500 men, and those of the Peoples Army were 9,037 men.  

            The CPV and KPA air forces operated as part of the Unified Air Army (OVA) which included 6 fighter, 3 ground attack, 2 bomber and 1 combination aviation divisions, with a total number of 588 aircraft. The air army was based at airfields in the areas of Antung, Sinuiju , and the Supung hydroelectric power station, and was given the mission of covering important objects in the rear area.  

            The DPRK Navy did not have any warships and was only able to provide coastal mine-laying activities.  

            For that reason, the force grouping of CPV and KPA forces was created with the necessity to ensure that it could solidly hold the line immediately adjacent to the front and repulse any enemy landings on the coast.  

The overall size and weapons quantities held by the CPV and KPA forces is shown in Table 14.  

Table 14

	CPV Forces	KPA Forces	Total
Personnel	948,299	393,014	1,341,313
Field Artillery Weapons	1,249	731	1,980
Mortars	1,664*/73**	1,248	2,912/73
AT Weapons	498	537	1,035
Tanks and SP Guns	118	243	361
Aircraft	452	136	588, of which 318 were fighters

*-Note: less 60mm mortars

**-Note: the latter indicates rocket launchers

            The artillery units and subunits of the CPV and KPA were still facing a shortage of fire control equipment, and their personnel were still poorly trained in conducting fire under mountainous conditions. The tankers did not have a great deal of driving skills and knowledge of how to correctly operate their vehicles. Engine resources hours on many of the tanks and self-propelled guns were expended. Spare parts for repairs of tanks were not available. Repair units were not able to guarantee the timely and quality repair of vehicles. In the air forces the KPA forces only had 60 well-trained crews[7], which did not permit them to make full use of their available air park. Beside that, the CPV and KPA air forces suffered from a dangerous shortage of spare parts with the consequence that a significant portion of their aircraft was non-operational. Supplying the CPV and KPA with all types of goods was frequently not carried out in a timely manner due to the lack of a sufficient number of trucks and the effects of enemy aviation on their access routes.  

            Against the CPV and KPA forces stood the 8^th US Army consisting of the I, IX and X US Corps and the I ROK Corps.  

            I US Corps consisted of the 1^st Cavalry, 3^rd and 25^th US Infantry Divisions, the 1^st and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions, the 28^th and 29^th British Infantry Brigades, the 25^th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and the independent Turkish Infantry Brigade, with one division in reserve to defend the zone from the delta of the Imjin River to Kumhwa. The zone from Kumhwa to the Buhang River was defended by the IX US Corps with the 7^th and 24^th US Infantry Divisions and the 2^nd and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions. All of these divisions were placed in a single echelon. The zone from the Buhang River to Uimonjong was defended by the X US Corps, consisting of the 1^st Marine Division, the 2^nd US Infantry Division, and the 5^th, 7^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions with one division in reserve. The I ROK Corps with the 3^rd, 11^th and Capital Infantry Divisions was defending the zone from Uimonjong to the coast. The combat order of this corps was in a single echelon. The width of the zones for each corps varied from 30 to 100 kilometers. Beside that, the UN forces had a number of independent regiment and battalion of ROK Marines and two detachments of South Korean coastal defense forces, an independent Thai infantry regiment and four independent infantry battalions (French, Dutch, Greek and Filipino) directly on the front lines.  

            In their reserves the American and South Korean command had 10 independent infantry regiments, 11 independent infantry and security battalions, and 5 coastal defense detachments from the South Korean forces, whereas the Americans had an airborne regiment and Ethiopian and Colombian infantry battalions.  

            Overall in Korea they deployed 16 infantry divisions, one marine division (of which 7 were American and 10 were South Korean), 4 infantry brigades, 11 independent infantry, 2 independent tank, and 2 independent field artillery regiments, an airborne regiment, an independent marine regiment, 17 independent infantry and security battalions, an independent marine battalion, 3 independent tank battalions, 18 independent field artillery battalions, 9 independent antiaircraft artillery battalions, and 7 independent coastal security detachments.  

            The average strength of the American divisions was 16,000 men whereas the South Korean divisions numbered 10,180 men.[8] The average operational density was 8 kilometers per division.[9] The densest force grouping of forces and means was in the center along the Chorwon – Buhang River front, where the density in this sector approached one division per 6 kilometers of front.[10]  

            For replacements for those divisions operating at the front the South Korean command had a territorial army, “Protectors of the Motherland,” in which they had one corps headquarters, seven reserve divisions, and one reserve regiments.  

            For that reason, the entire UN forces and South Korean army were able to deploy immediately to the front with the American divisions defending those directions where they were best able to use the might of their military technology. The South Koreans had their forces operating in the intervals between the American divisions and on the most inaccessible terrain.  

            As well as the 5^th Air Army tactical aviation, they also deployed three strategic bombing wings, a Marine Air Wing, as well as aircraft carriers and land-based aviation. Overall the UN air forces numbered 1,595 aircraft. Their aviation carried out immediate support for the ground forces, as well as destruction and disruption of industrial centers, settlements, airfields and lines of communication.  

            The UN naval forces and the South Korean army numbered 180 warships and more than 120 naval auxiliaries, landing ships and transports. They carried out the mission of blockading the DPRK from the sea, carried out systematic bombardment of ports, settlements and other objects close to the coast, as well as provide fire support for ground forces operating in the coastal areas of the front. These tasks were carried out by the ships of the fleet, as is correct, in cooperation with carrier aviation.  

            The size and numerical elements of the American and South Korean armies are shown in Table 15.

 Table 15

	US Forces	ROK Forces	Others	Total
Personnel	220,000	250,000	35,500	505,000
Field artillery weapons	500	300	80	880
Mortars	400	700	56	1,156
AT Weapons	600	150	48	798
AA Weapons	400	-	-	400
Tanks and SP Guns	700	-	120	820
Aircraft	1,495	-	100	1,595*

*Note – does not take into consideration transports and of this number 675 aircraft are fighters or fighter-bombers.

           

            The ratio of forces fighting in Korea for the sides is shown in Table 16.

 Table 16

	CPV and KPA Forces	UN and ROK Forces	Ratio
Personnel	1,341,313	505,000	2.7:1
Field Artillery weapons	1,980	880	2.2:1
Mortars	2,912	1,156	2.5:1
AT weapons	1,035	798	1.3:1
AA weapons	1,028	400	2.6:1
Tanks and SP Guns	361	820	1:2.2
Aircraft	588	1,595	1:2.7

 

            For that reason, the overall superiority in personnel, artillery and mortars was on the side of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army, but tanks and aircraft were in the favor of the UN forces and the South Korean army.  

            But at the same time the correlation of forces immediately at the front in personnel, artillery and mortars was about even, but tanks and aircraft were more favorable to the American side, as a significant part of the CPV and KPA forces and means (29 infantry divisions and 4 brigades with their reinforcing means) were allocated for defense of the east and west coasts, and their aviation carried out covering important objects in the rear area.  

            The correlation of forces directly at the front is shown in Table 17.

 Table 17

	CPV and KPA Forces	UN and ROK Forces	Ratio
Personnel	423,416	345,000	1.2:1
Field Artillery weapons	1,219	880	1.4:1
Mortars	1,056/73*	1,156	1:1
AT weapons	539	798	1:1.5
AA weapons	170	352	1:2
Tanks and SP Guns	118	820	1:7
Aircraft	-	1,020	-

*Note – the second item shows rocket launchers.

 

2. Combat Operations by the Sides and the Course of Negotiations in 1951

             Drawn into the negotiations for a ceasefire in Korea , the ruling circles in the USA did not want to strive to quickly terminate the way the war had developed for them and proposed to use all efforts to break off these negotiations. With this goal in mind the American representatives put forth unacceptable demands. They called for the establishment of a demarcation line and the creation of a demilitarized zone that stretched deep into the rear of the positions of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army, which would cover more than 13,000 square kilometers of the territory of the DPRK (see figure 4.)  

The Americans representatives called for the right for control over the rear area of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, e.g. they were striving to use the negotiations to interfere with the internal affairs of the DPRK.  

Along with this the Americans continued to make systematic attempts to provoke military incidents in the neutral zone in the Kaysen (Kaesong) area and by that means create unacceptable conditions for the work of the Sino-Korean delegation, which made the conduct of negotiations nearly impossible. As a result negotiations broke off on 23 August.  

From the very beginning of negotiations and with the goal of putting pressure on the Sino-Korean side, the Americans likewise interfered with the latter by refusing to offer a ceasefire through the aggressive operations of their forces.  

Beginning in July 1951 the Americans gradually rebased the majority of their aviation (except for their B-29 strategic heavy bombers and fighter reserves) from Japan to airfields in South Korea and sharply increased their aerial bombardment of troops and especially objects in the rear areas of the CPV and KPA. Every day the Americans carried out up to 700 sorties.  

Simultaneously the UN forces increased naval bombardments of settlements, lines of communication and other objects on the west and east coasts as well as the active operations of their forces directly at the front.  

On 18 August the enemy went over to the offensive on the eastern sector of the front against the forces of the 5^th, 2^nd and 3^rd KPA Armies with the forces of eight divisions (the 2^nd US Infantry Division, the 1^st Marine Division, and the 3^rd, 5^th, 7^th, 8^th, 11^th, and the Capital ROK Infantry Divisions) with the support of naval artillery and with the goal of moving the front lines to the north and by that in and of itself put into effect the unfounded demands of the American delegation to the conference in Kaysen (Kaesong) on establishing the line of demarcation somewhat north of the 38^th Parallel and in the rear of the positions of the CPV and KPA. (See Figure 5).  

The enemy advanced on the entire front with independent reinforced regiments and battalions and but no single strong force grouping of forces and means was sent on any single direction. Divisions, as is correct, operated in zones of 8-10 kilometers. During the course of the offensive KPA strong points and nodes of resistance were sequentially suppressed by artillery fire and air strikes, after which they were taken by infantry subunits. The offensive developed slowly, took on an indecisive nature and was primarily carried out by troop movement in straight lines. The enemy moved only 1-5 kilometers to the north over the course of several days.  

To stop the offensive, the forces of the 5^th, 2^nd and 3^rd KPA Armies went over to the offensive on 26 August and threw back the enemy in a number of sectors, moving up to 5 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defenses. The enemy launched numerous counterattacks against the KPA forces wedging their way in and during the course of violent battles forced them back to their starting positions by 2 September.  

With the breakdown of the offensive in the eastern sector of the front, the enemy turned to the western sector for active operations at the end of September, and then to the central sector of the front. On 25 September 8^th US Army commander General Van Fleet reported the beginning of the fall UN and South Korean army offensive. In planning this offensive, the enemy went for the same goals he had during the summer offensive.  

On 3 October three enemy divisions (the 1^st British, 1^st Cavalry, and 3^rd US Infantry) went over to the offensive against the forces of the 64^th, 47^th and 42^nd CPV Armies in the Manjan- Chorwon sector (see Figure 6.)[11]  The divisions advanced in zones of up to 10 and more kilometers and had the mission of taking important individual tactical heights in the CPV defenses.  

The enemy succeeded in seizing several heights and settlements in the defenses of the Chinese Volunteers, but at the same time, eventually running into stiff opposition and taking heavy losses, they were forced to break off the offensive on 8 October. The greatest depths achieved by UN forces in this sector were 4-5 kilometers.  

On 13 October, enemy forces consisting of four infantry divisions (24^th and 7^th US and 2^nd and 6^th ROK), with 200 tanks and massive air support, went over to the offensive in the Kumhwa – Bukhan River sector against the forces of the 67^th CPV Corps of the 20^th CPV Army. (See Figure 7)  

The offensive in this sector was carried out by reinforced regiments and battalions on individual directions. During the course of the offensive the enemy strove to take Chinese Volunteer strong points with a goal of taking them from the flank or rear.  

The battles took on a terrible nature. The enemy, using their superiority in aviation and tanks, had reached Kimsong by 20 October, wedging up to 10 kilometers into the CPV defenses. Ultimately their attempts to break through to the north were stopped by the CPV units.  

For that reason, following the breakdown of the summer offensive by the UN armed forces was the failure of their so-called fall offensive. During the enemy offensive the CPV forces, artfully making use of the conditions of mountainous terrain, took the enemy units and subunits from the flanks by skillfully counterattacking him. In a case where the enemy had a superiority of forces and there was no way that their positions could be held any further, the CPV forces would withdraw, simultaneously preparing their forces for a counterattack. The counterattacking units normally had the mission of destroying the penetrating enemy and restoring their positions. When the counterattack was unsuccessful, they would repeat it several more times and continue until that point in time when the enemy was either destroyed or their own forces had suffered such losses that further operations were impossible.    

With the breakdown of their summer and fall offensives, the UN returned to the negotiations for a ceasefire once again. On 25 October 1951 the delegations of both sides carried out their first meeting since the breakdown in talks. They jointly decided to move the talks from Kaysen ( Kaesong ) to Panmunjong (Hammontaen) which was located close to Kaysen.  

On 27 November 1951 an agreement was reached on the demarcation line, which was then established based on the current lines held by the opposing forces of the sides, and in early 1952 an agreement was reached on all of the points put forth with the exception of the exchange of prisoners of war.  

According to the conditions of the agreement the established demarcation line would not change if the ceasefire was signed within 30 days. If the agreement for the ceasefire was not signed in that period of time, then after the achievement of a ceasefire on all other points the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone would undergo the necessary changes in accordance with the operational lines of the opposing forces.  

By 27 November 1951, the lines of the opposing forces covered 225 kilometers and basically followed the 38^th Parallel from the delta of the Han River – Panmunjong – Orichon – Hasori – south of Kimsong – south of Baugol – Chansong – Phoyedin. This line was held with insignificant changes through the end of the war.  

At the moment of the conclusion of the agreement on the demarcation line, the force grouping of troops of the sides were in the following locations.  

Along the line from the delta of the Yaesong River to Chunsimpo, a distance of 170 kilometers, the CPV forces were defending. The 19^th CPV Army (42^nd, 47^th. 63, 64^th, and 65^th CPV Corps) were in a single echelon operational formation defending 100 kilometers of the line from the delta of the Yaesong River to Wolchon. The 20^th CPV Army (12^th, 26^th, 67^th and 68^th CPV Corps) was in a two-echelon operational formation, defending the 70 kilometers from Wolchon to Chunsimpo. The second echelon army – the 67^th CPV Corps – was concentrated in the area of Saepori. The corps were defending positions 12 to 33 kilometers in width, and they maintained their combat order in two echelons.  

The line from Chunsimpo to the east coast was 55 kilometers wide and was held by the forces of the 2^nd and 3^rd Korean Peoples Army Armies, deployed in an operational formation of two echelons, and defending zones of up to 15 kilometers wide. The 6^th KPA Army had one division directly on the front line, which was defending a zone 25 kilometers wide. Two infantry divisions of this army (the 9^th and 18^th KPA Infantry Divisions) were defending the coast from Koson to Paetchen.  

Overall there were 36 divisions deployed (27 Chinese and 9 Korean) of which 20 were in the first echelon, and the rest were in the second echelons of the corps and armies.[12] The average operational density was 6.6 kilometers per division.[13]  

The west coast from Yenampo to the delta of the Yaesong River was defended by the forces of the 4^th and 1^st KPA Armies, the 105^th Mechanized Division, and the 10^th KPA Infantry Division, the 13^th CPV Army and the 50^th CPV Corps – a total of 17 divisions and two machine gun artillery brigades.[14] The main force grouping (13 divisions and one brigade) remained as before in the sector from Anju – Nampo.  

The east coast from Paetchen to Pukchyon was defended by the forces of the 7^th and 5^th KPA Armies, the 46^th KPA Infantry Division, and the 24^th and 25^th KPA Machine Gun Artillery Brigades, as well as the 9^th CPV Army and 47^th CPV Infantry Division – a total of 14 divisions and two brigades. All of these forces with the exception of one machine gun artillery brigade were located in the Paetchen – Hamhin sector.  

Overall the coastal defenses on the east and west coasts were allocated 31 divisions and four machine gun artillery brigades.  

In reserve the Unified Command had the 3^rd CPV Army (15^th and 60^th CPV Corps) which were concentrated south of Koksan.  

These force groupings were retained to the end of the war. They were maintained by the primary method of replacing one formation with another.  

Overall, on 27 November 1951 there were 75 divisions and 4 brigades located in Korea , e.g. one division more than there was at the beginning of negotiations.[15]  

For closer cooperation between CPV and KPA forces, in early October 1951 a unified command of forces was created on the western and eastern coasts who had all forces carrying out coastal defense missions subordinated to them.[16]  

As before, the CPV and KPA forces were opposed by the I, IX and X US Corps and the I ROK Corps of the 8^th US Army.  

I US Corps (the 1^st US Cavalry Division and 3^rd US Infantry Division, the 1^st British Division, the 1^st and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions, and the Turkish Infantry Brigade) were defending a 90 kilometer zone from the Han River delta to Wolchon. From Wolchon to the Bukhan River a 55 kilometer zone was defended by the forces of IX US Corps (the 2^nd, 24^th and 25^th US Infantry Divisions, and the 2^nd and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions). The zone from the Bukhan River to Sachenni, stretching 50 kilometers, was defended by the X US Corps (1^st Marine Division, 7^th US Infantry Division, and 3^rd, 7^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions) and from Sachenni to the coastal area the 25 kilometer wide zone was defended by I ROK Corps (5^th, 11^th and Capital ROK Infantry Divisions.) All corps kept one infantry division in reserve.  

Overall the enemy maintained 18 divisions, 1 brigade, 1 independent regiment, and 19 independent battalions at the front, with 14 divisions and 1 brigade in their first echelon and 4 divisions in the second echelon. In reserve, the Americans and South Koreans had one regiment and 19 battalions. The overall correlation of forces by 27 November 1951, not considering losses taken from August-October 1951, was nearly unchanged.