In March- April 1950 the
command of the South Korean army began to move new units to the 38th
Parallel and strengthen the forces that they had placed there. The divisions
and regiments were manned to full tabular strength by means of a new draft.
Heavy weapons were taken from units within the depths of the country and
moved closer to the 38th Parallel. The units and formations began
to increase their combat training. The manning and training of the forces
was examined by a commission from the South Korean Headquarters and their
American advisors.
In the first half of May 1950
General Roberts, in assessing the status of the South Korean army, said that
it was manned, armed and trained per American regulations and was a
completely modern army, able to carry out war with any army that was twice
or even three times its numerical size, under conditions of identical
technical equipping.
At the end of May –
beginning of June the command of the South Korean army began to increase the
preparations of the army for possible conflict with the DPRK. Divisional and
corps headquarters moved to practical deployment of their forces per the
plans for possible scenarios of operations. By mid June the South Korean
forces were concentrated in their initial areas and brought to full combat
readiness.
Just before the start of the
armed conflict Secretary of Defense Johnson, head of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Bradley, and State Department advisor Dulles made a special
trip to
Japan
where they met with General McArthur on the question of the possible onset
of military operations. Immediately after this meeting Dulles went to
South Korea
, where he became familiar with the status of the South Korean armed forces
located on the 38th Parallel. Appearing before the “National
Assembly” of
South Korea
on 19 June 1950, Dulles approved of the preparation of the forces for
military operations and asserted that the
USA
was prepared to provide the necessary moral and material support to
South Korea
in its struggle against the North Koreans.
The American military were
sure that the South Koreans were able to crush the Korean Peoples’ Army
without any special difficulty and to occupy the DPRK. Therefore the Singman
Rhee regime was assured that with the start of a military conflict they
would receive support, but only in the form of American aviation and naval
power. If necessary, the American divisions located in
Japan
would be rapidly sent to the aid of the South Korean army.
By the summer of 1950 out of
eight infantry divisions (with a total of 21 infantry regiments), one
independent infantry regiment, two independent infantry battalions, three
independent artillery battalions, and one aviation detachment that composed
the South Korean army, five divisions with 15 infantry regiments were
located along the 38th Parallel (more than 70% of the overall
number of infantry regiments) as well as one independent cavalry regiment,
one independent battalion, the three independent artillery battalions, and
all of the aviation assets. The most powerful of the force groupings was
located on the
Pyongyang
direction north of
Seoul
. It follows to stress that the most well trained divisions were
concentrated along the 38th Parallel, fully manned with personnel
and all materiel components.
In the Soviet historiography
it stresses that the command of the South Korean army and their American
advisors, in considering all of the tasks to be carried out in case of
offensive combat operations, paid insufficient attention to the organization
of the defense. Defense was only organized over a short depth and without
consideration of the tactical qualities of the terrain. In the main it was
planned around a number of strong points and nodes of resistance, covering
the main roads and mountain valleys. Only along the
Seoul
direction (the sectors of Kaysen and Sinuipin) was there a system of
developed defensive works and barriers. On this direction the depth of the
defense extended for 20 kilometers.
In May 1950 the government of
the DPRK, in preparing for conflict, also carried out training of its forces
in combat operations. First and foremost they took measures to strengthen
the defensive line immediately behind the 38th Parallel and in
the depths of the territory, especially along the
Pyongyang
direction. In addition to their six infantry divisions they began forming
four more infantry divisions (the 4th, 10th, 13th
and 15th.)
Along the 38th
Parallel, as well as the two border brigades and two divisions already there
(the 1st and 3rd) they concentrated another seven
infantry divisions (the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th,
12th, 13th and 15th), the 105th
Tank Brigade, and the 603rd Motorcycle Regiment. The main body of
the force grouping was deployed in the Kimchong-Unchong sector to cover the
Pyongyang
direction. Here the forces were deployed in two echelons with consideration
given to creating a reasonably deep defense. The 10th Infantry
Division was located in the
Pyongyang
area.
The 3rd Border
Brigade was operating along the western coast, reinforced by one infantry
regiment, an artillery battalion and a self-propelled artillery battalion
from the 6th Infantry Division.
There were six infantry
divisions deployed along the Pyongyang direction (the 1st, 3rd,
4th, 6th, 13th and 15th) as well
as the 105th Tank Brigade and 17th Independent
Artillery Regiment, with the 1st, 3rd, 4th
and 6th in the first echelon and the 13th and 15th
in the second echelon. The main body of the 105th Tank Brigade
(less the 203rd Tank Regiment) was located in the second echelon
as well; the 203rd Tank Regiment had its battalions allocated to
the 1st, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions
with the goal of reinforcing their defense. The 17th Independent
Artillery Regiment was allocated out by battalions to the 3rd, 4th
and 6th Infantry Divisions.
The 1st Border
Brigade was deployed along the eastern coast along with the 10th
Infantry Regiment, an artillery battalion and a battery of self-propelled
guns from the 5th Infantry Division, and the main body of the 5th
Infantry Division formed the second echelon in the Koson area.
As a result, thanks to the
timely regrouping of the KPA from the depths of the country to the 38th
Parallel, the force relationships were as follows (See Table 1).
|
Type
of Unit
|
KPA
Forces (1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th,
2nd, and 12th ID, 105th TBr, 17th
IndAR
|
South
Korean forces (1st, 7th, 6th, 8th,
and Capital ID, IndCavRegt, two IndInfBn, three IndArtyBn
|
Force
Ratio*
|
|
Across
the Entire Front
|
|
Battalions
Guns
and Mortars
Tanks
and SP Guns
Aircraft1
Ships
|
51
787
185
32
19
|
39
699
31
25
43
|
1.3
:
1
1.1
: 1
5.9
: 1
1.2
: 1
1
: 2.2
|
|
On
the Ongdin and
Yenan
Peninsulas
|
|
Battalions
Guns
and Mortars
Tanks
and SP Guns
|
1
27
5
|
4
57
-
|
1
: 1.3
1
: 2
-
|
|
On
the
Pyongyang
Direction
|
|
Battalions
Guns
and Mortars
Tanks
and SP Guns
|
27
436
173
|
19
432
31
|
1.4
:
1
1
: 1
5.5
: 1
|
|
On
the Huachen and Koson Directions
|
|
Battalions
Guns
and Mortars
Tanks
and SP Guns
|
21
324
7
|
21
210
-
|
1
: 1
1.5
: 1
-
|
|
1Overall
the KPA had 172 combat aircraft but only 32 trained pilots.
|
*
Force ratios based on the tabular size of the sides.
For that reason, the numerical
and qualitative superiority of the KPA forces concentrated on the 38th
Parallel and especially on the
Seoul
direction gave them advantageous preconditions for succeeding in carrying
out the missions levied on the KPA during the course of a possible armed
conflict.
2.
The Start of the
Military Conflict in
Korea
Soviet sources indicate that
on 19 June 1950 the chief of the General Staff of the South Korean army gave
an order to convert their forces over to the offensive. But at the same
time, they were not able to go over to the offensive, as the headquarters of
the 1st Corps had not set up any command and control for the use
of artillery. A commission from the headquarters of the South Korean army
was quickly sent to the headquarters 1st Corps along with a large
group of American advisors. After examining the reasons for the breakdown in
the offensive and making the necessary changes the offensive was designated
to start on 25 June 1950. And starting on 23 June the South Korean forces
opened up a sustained artillery bombardment of KPA positions, so that by
dawn on 25 June, with artillery and aviation support, they could go over to
the offensive along the entire length of the front along the 38th
Parallel and in some places had invaded the territory of the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea to a depth of 1-2 kilometers. The forces of the
KPA put up a strong resistance to the South Korean forces and drove back
their offensive. It was only along the Chorwon and Kimchong directions and
north of the Ongdin that South Korean forces succeed in advancing to a depth
of 1-2 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel.
American sources claim that at
0400 hours on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean forces began their
military campaign with the political goal of reuniting North and
South Korea
under Communist power. The military goals of the campaign were to seize and
establish supremacy over
South Korea
. The publication of a host of materials in contemporary
Russia
indirectly support that claim.
But at the same time all sides
from the very beginning support the fact that the KPA began its offensive on
25 June 1950. The concept for this offensive consisted of the points that,
by launching the main strike from the areas of Kimchong, Yongchong, Chorwon
in the general direction of Seoul, Suwon and a secondary strike from Huachen,
Inde, and Yangu to enter Seoul from the southeast in the direction of Suwon
would break enemy resistance, encircle and destroy his main forces in the
Seoul area, and moved towards the line Suwon – Wonchu – Samchok.
The 6th, 1st,
4th and 3rd Infantry Divisions with the 105th
Tank Brigade had to be on the main axis of advance towards
Seoul
.
The 2nd and 12th
Infantry Divisions and the 603rd Motorcycle Regiment received the
mission to launch the strike towards Yangu,
Suwon
and cut off the line of retreat for the main body of the South Korean forces
to leave
Seoul
towards the south and southeast.
The 1st Border
Brigade with the 10th Infantry Regiment from the 5th
Infantry Division had to advance in the direction of Kannin to joint up with
a naval landing (two battalions of marines and two student battalions) which
it had been proposed to land in the Kannin area with the mission of seizing
Kannin to prevent the enemy from withdrawing to the south, as well as
prevent him from moving reserves north to the front lines.
The 3rd Border Brigade with the regiment from the 6th
Infantry Division, deploying to the right of the main force grouping, had to
liberate the Ongdin and Yenan peninsulas.
The ultimate goal was to destroy the enemy’s reserves and developing
the offensive on these directions:
Suwon
, Chyongnan, Nonsan, Kuanju,
Mokpo
; Ochonin, Chongju,
Taejon
, Namwon, Resu; Wonju, Andong,
Pusan
– which would virtually liberate all of
South Korea
.
After a 30 minute artillery
preparatory fire, the forces of the Korean Peoples Army went over to the
counteroffensive.
On the Seoul direction, as the
result of good organization and conduct of the system of artillery
preparatory fires, the enemy was suppressed, and the units of the 1st,
4th and 3rd KPA Infantry Divisions along with the 105th
KPA Tank Brigade were able to penetrate 6-8 kilometers to the south of the
38th Parallel even in the first few hours of the offensive, and
the units of the 6th KPA Infantry Division had been able to seize
Kaysen after the first two hours of the counteroffensive.
The command of the South
Korean forces strove to bring order to demoralized units that were operating
in the first echelon, and began to swiftly bring up the second echelon and
the reserves. The enemy was able to succeed in taking up tactically
advantageous points and lines along the direction of advance and put up a
stiff resistance before the KPA forces. In specific, the enemy used
counterattacks and fires to stop the advance of the 1st KPA
Infantry Division after only 6-8 kilometers south of the 38th
Parallel by the end of 25 June.
After crushing enemy forces in
Kaysen, the 6th KPA Infantry Division began to pursue the 12th
Infantry Regiment of the 1st ROK Infantry Division, and by the
end of the day on 25 June had moved to the
Han River
in the sectors of Yonchonni and Baykoku.
The 3rd and 4th KPA Infantry Divisions, who were
fighting with the second echelon, overwhelmed enemy resistance and by the
end of the day were fighting in Donduchen and Sinuipin.
For that reason, as a whole the offensive on the
Seoul
direction on the first day had developed successfully. The greatest success
on this day was achieved by the 6th, 4th and 3rd
KPA Infantry Divisions, who had covered 8-12 kilometers, penetrated the
enemy’s defenses and driven in the flanks of the enemy’s force grouping
operating on the
Seoul
direction.
On
the Ongdin peninsula, units of the 3rd KPA Border Brigade,
reinforced by the 1st KPA Infantry Regiment, an artillery
battalion and a battery of self-propelled artillery guns from the 6th
KPA Infantry Division, successfully attacked the enemy and by the end of the
day on 25 June had eliminated organized resistance. During the course of the
battles they had captured nearly 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers and all
of the combat technology of the 17th ROK Regiment of the ROK
Capital Infantry Division. During the night of 26 June the remnants of the
17th ROK Regiment, numbering 400 men in all, used boats and rafts
to cross to
Teyonphyondo
Island
(whose garrison was evacuated on 29 June to Kunsan). By 1030 hours on 26
June the Ongdin peninsula was totally cleared of enemy forces. By this time
units of the 3rd KPA Border Brigade had obliterated the 1st
Battalion, 12th ROK Regiment, 1st ROK Infantry
Division, and seized the Yenan peninsula as well.
The offensive in the eastern
sector of the front developed with less success. Units of the 2nd
and 12th KPA Infantry Divisions and the 1st KPA Border
Brigade, operating under difficult terrain conditions and encountering
strong enemy resistance, only managed to penetrate to a depth of 2-5
kilometers. By the evening of 25 June a naval landing had taken place on the
coast in the area of Kannin and Samchok.
On the morning of 26 June the
Korean Peoples Army renewed their offensive.
The units of the 6th
KPA Infantry Division, who on the previous evening had advanced to the
Han River
, prepared to make a forced crossing of this serious water obstacle. The
width of the river in places was up to six kilometers, and its depth was
five meters. Due to a lack of crossing equipment and some disorganization
only three battalions with two 76mm regimental guns had been moved to the
left bank of the river. These subunits seized a bridgehead of up to 3
kilometers deep. By morning on 27 June, and in spite of strengthening
resistance by the enemy, the main body of the 13th and 15th
KPA Regiments, two batteries of an artillery regiment, and a battery of the
2nd Battalion 17th Independent KPA Artillery Regiment
had been moved across the river. The remaining forces of the division
crossed on the night of 28 June.
After a short artillery preparation at dawn on 27 June, the 13th
and 15th KPA Infantry Regiments attacked the enemy and widened
the bridgehead to 5-6 kilometers. By the end of the day units of the
division had crossed the Siomari-Suitanri line. Further advances were halted
by fire and counterattacks by the 12th Regiment 1st
ROK Division and 22nd Regiment 3rd ROK Division, sent
up from
Taegu
, two student battalions from the
Seoul
Infantry
Academy
, and other enemy subunits moved out of
Seoul
.
The 1st KPA
Infantry Division, brought up from the second echelon, once again renewed
the offensive on the morning of 26 June. But at the same time the enemy had
brought up the 11th Regiment 1st ROK Infantry Division
during the night. The battle dragged on ceaselessly during the day and no
one gained success. It was only by evening that the units of the 1st
KPA Infantry Division silenced enemy resistance and began to move forward.
By 1600 hours on 27 June they had taken Munsan, but having not organized a
method to prevent the enemy from moving, gave them the opportunity to again
reinforce the heights 7 kilometers southeast of Munsan, and therefore their
attempts to continue their offensive on that day were not successful.
Units of the 4th
KPA Infantry Division, which went on the offensive on the morning of 26
June, were able to destroy the 1st Regiment 7th ROK
Infantry Division in the Dokchonni area thanks to skillful and decisive
operations, and then continue to develop the offensive in the direction of
Uidenpu.
The 3rd KPA Infantry Division, together with units of the
105th Tank Brigade, took Sinipni and, after destroying subunits
of the 3rd Regiment 7th ROK Infantry Division and the
5th Regiment of the 2nd ROK Infantry Division that had
been rushed into that area, likewise advanced on Uidenpu. At
1700 hours on 26 June units of the 4th and 3rd KPA
Infantry Divisions, along with the 105th Tank Brigade attached
the enemy in Uidenpu and after a hour and a half battle took the city.
At 0900 hours on 27 June the 4th and 3rd KPA
Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank Brigade renewed the
offensive. Withdrawing units of the 7th ROK Infantry Division and
the 5th Regiment 2nd ROK Infantry Division put up
resisting fires, blew up bridges, roads, and planted mines in individual
sectors. By 2100 hours the advancing units had moved to a line 4-7
kilometers northwest, north and northeast of
Seoul
.
After a two-day battle the 2nd
KPA Infantry Division took Chunchen on the evening of 27 June and by the end
of the day was moving towards Kaphyon. At this time one battalion of the 6th
Regiment, advancing through the mountains, took Kaphyon and cut a railway
bridge 2 kilometers north of the city that led into
Seoul
. The 12th KPA Infantry Division, slowly moving forward, by the
end of the day on 27 June had occupied a line 14 kilometers northeast of
Honchen. The 1st Border Brigade at this time was fighting a
battle for the city of
Kannin
.
As a result of this three day
offensive KPA forces had inflicted heavy losses on the main body of enemy
forces concentrated along the 38th Parallel. The greatest success
for the KPA was on the
Seoul
direction, having moved up to 50 kilometers and taking up the immediate
approaches to
Seoul
itself.
The enemy, striving to halt
the movement of the advancing KPA forces, had quickly brought up his
reserves into the
Seoul
area. Even on 26/27 June elements of the 22nd Regiment 3rd
ROK Infantry Division were engaged in combat in the Siomari and Konsonri
areas, and the 5th Regiment 2nd ROK Infantry Division
in the area south of Sinuipu. Later other units of the 2nd ROK
Infantry Division, as well as the 5th ROK Infantry Division, were
sent directly into
Seoul
.
The
entrance of UN armed forces into the war. The destruction of the main
body of South Korean forces and the threat to completely and rapidly crush
the Singman Rhee regime called for a rapid reaction by the
USA
at the UN. At an emergency session of the Security Council of the UN (the
USSR
was boycotting this session, so the opportunity to use its veto was even
more sorely missed) there was a call for an immediate cessation of
hostilities and a withdrawal of DPRK forces.
Immediately after this
US
President Truman gave an order for
US
air and naval forces to provide cover and support to South Korean forces. At
the same time Truman ordered the US 7th Fleet “to prevent a
strike against Formosa” and made plans to speed up military assistance to
the Philippine government, which was fighting against its own people, and
French forces who were leading the war against the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. For that reason, the
US
government, in breaking up the armed conflict in
Korea
, was simultaneously taking direct unfriendly actions against the
Peoples
Republic
of
China
, by occupying the
island
of
Taiwan
(
Formosa
) and increasing their interference in internal affairs of the
Philippines
and going down a path which would widen combat operations against the
Vietnamese people.
In his book “McArthur and
His Meeting with History”
American General Whiting observed that American aviation commenced combat
operations in South Korea on order from McArthur even before that order was
given by his superior Truman, and from 27 June onward these operations took
on a character of massive strikes not only against the KPA but on objects
north of the 38th Parallel as well. On that day the US Navy
conducted naval bombardment of Korean coastal villages.
On the evening of 27 June, e.g. when the American
armed forces had already begun their war with the DPRK, an incomplete
meeting of the Security Council of the UN was held, which was illegal, but
the members present approved a resolution backing the use of American forces
in
Korea
.
On 7 July, per a request from the American
representative, an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council was held in
which all of the members of the UN who supported the resolution of 27 June,
voted to provide armed forces and other assistance under the auspices of a
unified command for the war against the DPRK. Simultaneously the Security
Council asked the
USA
to take command of these forces and decide on their while flying the
independent flag of the UN during the course of operations against the
forces of
North Korea
simultaneously with the flags of the participating nations.
The American government designated the Supreme Commander of American
Armed Forces in the
Far East
, General McArthur, to be the commander of UN forces.
With the introduction of American armed forces into the war, the
situation for the DPRK worsened sharply. To support combat operations by
their ground forces, the American command allocated the 19th
Strategic Aviation Group (19th Bomb Group) to be moved from its
bases on Guam to the island of Okinawa, the US 5th Air Force
which was located in Japan, two aircraft carrier groups (the 5th
US and 13th British) based around the USS
Valley Forge and HMS Triumph,
and No. 77 Squadron RAAF which was based at Iwakuni (Japan). Out of the
tasked formations and units now operating against the DPRK in early July
1950 there were 740 aircraft (30 heavy and 90 medium bombers, 430 fighters,
90 reconnaissance aircraft, and 100 transports). Beside that, starting on 13
July the 22nd and 92nd Heavy Bombardment Groups (65
aircraft) from the 15th Air Force (strategic aviation) also took
part in combat operations.
American aviation, striving
first of all to destroy KPA aviation, launched raids on the airfield at
Pyongyang
, with the result that 19 aircraft were destroyed. Simultaneously American
aviation launched strikes against industrial objects in the DPRK and moved
to destroy the main railway nodes and lines of communication. The systematic
bombardment also included the combat order, headquarters and rear services
of the advancing KPA forces.
The KPA aviation, which was significantly inferior in numbers to that
of the Americans, even in the first days of the war suffered heavy losses in
both men and combat material (by 3 July they had lost 36 combat aircraft)
and were not able to put up any resistance to superior enemy forces, and
were therefore forced to only carry out reconnaissance missions on behalf of
the ground forces.
The ships of the US Navy located in Korean territorial waters began a
systematic bombardment of the coastal areas beginning on 27 June.
On 28 June the governments of
England
,
Australia
and
New Zealand
pledged their readiness to support the American command with their naval
forces that were located in the
Pacific Ocean
. From that point onward there were 19 American ships operating in Korean
waters (a heavy aircraft carrier, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, 12
destroyers, and 4 submarines) and 23 English and Australian ships (two light
aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, eight destroyers, and 10 support
vessels.)
The tiny navy of the DPRK, which consisted of few warships and which
had already lost three torpedo boats and two sub chasers, could not put up
reasonable resistance. Superiority at sea was thus yielded to the enemy.
But at the same time the
ground forces of
South Korea
continued to withdraw from the blows of the KPA forces. The American
command, upon seeing that the South Korean forces, in spite of the complete
superiority of American air and naval power, suffered one defeat after
another and could carry out any of the missions laid before them, began to
move units of the 24th US Infantry Division from Japan to Korea
beginning on 1 July. One battalion of this division was brought into Taechon
by transport aviation into on 2 July, but the rest of the division followed
by sea. During the first period of the armed conflict, when only individual
subunits of the American ground forces arrived in
Korea
, command and control over them was placed in the immediate hands of the
chief of the military advisory group, who subordinated them to a field
headquarters created on 27 June in
Korea
. On 2 July the command of American ground forces in
Korea
was turned over to the commander of the 24th US Infantry
Division, Major General Dean.
The command of the KPA, by
studying the possibility that this war could drag on and that they lacked
reserves, moved to form the 8th and 9th KPA Infantry
Divisions on 1 July (based on the 1st and 3rd Border
Brigades), two infantry brigades, two marine brigades, two tank brigades,
two independent tank regiments, seven reserve regiments, two tank destroyer
battalions, and five independent antiaircraft artillery battalions. Somewhat
later on they began to form the 7th KPA Infantry Division from
the 7th Border Brigade.
The size of the newly formed
divisions was reduced in comparison with the tables of organization of the
previous formed divisions. The new tables showed reduced numbers of rifles
and carbines but a slight increase in the number of artillery and mortar
weaponry. An antiaircraft artillery battalion was added to the tables of
organization of the division.
The infantry brigades were
formed from three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, an antitank
battalion, a self-propelled artillery battalion, a 120mm mortar battalion,
an automatic rifle battalion, a signals battalion, a sapper-engineer
battalion, and a medical battalion.
The normal tabular size and
armaments of the newly formed infantry divisions and brigades is shown in
Table 2.
|
Formation
|
Infantry
Division
|
Infantry
Brigade
|
|
Personnel
|
9,689
|
6,067
|
|
Rifles
and carbines
|
6,547
|
3,315
|
|
Automatic
rifles
|
1,932
|
772
|
|
Light
machine guns
|
345
|
162
|
|
Heavy
machine guns
|
202
|
60
|
|
Heavy
caliber machine guns (antiaircraft)
|
36
|
24
|
|
Antitank
rifles
|
129
|
72
|
|
37mm
AA guns
|
12
|
-
|
|
45mm
Antitank Guns
|
52
|
18
|
|
76mm
and 122mm weapons
|
48
|
36
|
|
82mm
and 120mm mortars
|
105
|
51
|
|
SU-76
SP artillery weapons
|
16
|
12
|
|
Cargo
trucks
|
285
|
156
|
|
Special
duty trucks
|
37
|
26
|
Personnel in the newly formed
formations and units, as well as replacements for operational forces, were
acquired primarily by asking for volunteers and only then by conscription by
local governmental agencies.
It was significantly more
difficult to man the newly formed units, as well as replace losses in the
operational forces, with officer personnel since the KPA had possessed no
officer reserves at the beginning of the war. Together with this all
leadership positions in the army called for being filled by Party members
and government workers. The best cadres previously had been those who were
former partisan detachment commanders. Measures were taken to increase the
network of military training establishments to train junior officers, but
the training period for students in the military academies was reduced from
one year to two months. Courses were created to improve formation commanders
and broaden the courses for improving officers via the 1st
Central
Academy
.
3.
Destruction of Enemy
Force Groupings in the
Seoul
Area and Withdrawal to the Hangan-Kannin Line (28 June – 2 July.)
In spite of the heavy effects
of American aviation on KPA forces, on 28 June the offensive continued. At
dawn on 28 June units of the 6th KPA Infantry Division attacked
the enemy along the Siomari-Suitanri line, driving them back to the Kimpo
area and after a ten-hour battle took the city. In order to prevent the
further advance of the 6th KPA Infantry Division, the enemy moved
the 18th ROK Infantry Regiment of the Capital Infantry Division
into the area of Kimpo. During 29 June the 6th KPA Infantry
Division, after repulsing several enemy counterattacks which were supported
by artillery and aviation strikes, fought a terrible battle for Kimpo
airfield. Starting on the morning of 30 June the division again attacked the
enemy, and overcoming stiff resistance, moved forward 6-8 kilometers and cut
the Inchon-Seoul road. During 1 and 2 July units of the division fought
along the line they had achieved, repulsing enemy counterattacks and
persevering even under heavy enemy air attacks.
The 1st KPA
Infantry Division, in stiff combat that continued for all of 28 June,
destroyed the enemy in the Konsonri area. Remnants of enemy forces hastily
withdrew to the south. After seizing Konsonri the 1st KPA
Infantry Division was assigned to the second echelon.
The 4th and 3rd
KPA Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank Brigade, who had
advanced to the outskirts of
Seoul
by the end of 27 June, encountered enemy resistance in prepared defensive
positions. During the night the infantry took up positions on the heights
overlooking the city. At 0430 hours on 28 June the 3rd KPA
Infantry Division and the 105th Tank Brigade attacked the enemy.
An hour later the 4th KPA Infantry Division also went back on the
offensive. By 0530 hours on 28 June the forward detachment of the 105th
Tank Brigade had broken in
Seoul
, and by 0600 hours the main body of the brigade had seized the radio
station, the electrical power plant, the post office, the telegraph and
other administrative establishments of the city. Units of the 4th
KPA Infantry Division, who broke into the city virtually at the same time as
the 105th Tank Brigade, had taken the northern and central parts
of the city by 1600 hours; the 3rd KPA Infantry Division, coming
into
Seoul
from the south, by that time had taken the southern part of the city. The
enemy, abandoning his combat technology and equipment, hastily withdrew to
the southern bank of the
Han River
.
Consequently the commanders of
the units and formations of the KPA that had reached the Seoul area but did
not immediately organize for a crossing of the Han River and did nothing to
prevent the enemy from withdrawing permitted them to blow up the bridge over
the river, and after bringing up units of the 2nd and 5th
ROK Infantry Divisions, strengthened their defenses on the south bank of the
river.
In order to reinforce their force grouping in the
Seoul
area, the KPA command transferred the 13th KPA Infantry Division
to that area.
By this time a Stavka of the High Command had been created in the area
of Sopho (12 kilometers north of
Pyongyang
.)
The great distance of the General Staff from the forces (120 to 300
kilometers) and their inability to immediately control all of their
formations made it necessary to create two operational groups with their
headquarters deployed in Yongchon and Yangu. The 1st KPA
Operational Group had control of the 1st, 3rd, 4th,
13th and 15th KPA Infantry Divisions, and the 2nd
KPA Operational Group had control of the 2nd and 12th
Infantry Divisions and the 603rd Motorcycle Regiment. The 5th,
6th and 10th KPA Infantry Divisions and the 105th
Tank Division
remained immediately subordinate to the High Command. With a goal of closer
leadership over the forces, an auxiliary command post of the General Staff
was established in Chorwon.
After a 15 minute artillery barrage at dawn on 29 June, the forward
detachment of the 105th Tank Division, consisting of a battalion
from the motorcycle regiment, a company of tanks and a battery of SP guns,
forced a crossing of the Han River and seized a bridgehead of up to 2
kilometers in frontage and 1 kilometer in depth. But at the same time the
crossing of the forces and the dispersion of their force on the bridgehead
left them with insufficient crossing means, and coupled with the continuous
operations by American aviation meant that the rest of the forces were slow
to cross. The main bodies of the 3rd and 4th KPA
Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank Division had no success in
crossing for three days. An insignificant amount of artillery had crossed
with the leading subunits, and what had crossed had no prime movers or
enough ammunition. The battle for the bridgehead took on a violent,
protracted nature. The main body of the 3rd KPA Infantry Division
only managed to get completely across the
Han River
by the morning of 2 July, the 4th KPA Infantry Division was
completely across by the morning of 3 July, and the 105th Tank
Division on 4 July. The 105th Tank Division for the most part had
to cross via a bridge that was built by KPA sapper-engineers on 3 July with
the help of local residents.
The 2nd KPA
Infantry Division, operating in difficult terrain and with insufficient
skill in the use of its own artillery, slowly moved forward, overcoming
stiff enemy resistance. By 30 June the division had reached the
Han River
, and after forcing a crossing, seized Kwanju on 2 July. The 12th
KPA Infantry Division advanced in the general direction of Oronri, Hongchen
and Hensen, and on 2 July seized Wonju. In conjunction with that the
offensive of the 2nd and 12th KPA Infantry Divisions
had been slow from the very beginning, but when there was a breach between
the flanks of the two divisions, the KPA command sent the 15th
KPA Infantry Division into that breach and on 30 June they engaged in combat
in the Hongchen area along with the forces of the 603rd
Motorcycle Regiment’s motorcycle battalion along the direction of Inholi.
By 2 July the division had moved to the
Han River
in the Inhoni and Hinhonli sectors and moved to force a crossing of the
river.
On the east coast, the 1st
Border Brigade with the 10th Regiment from the 5th KPA
Infantry Division had seized Kannin by 28 June and joined up with the naval
landing which came ashore on 25 June, as well as partisans operating in the
enemy’s rear area. After seizing Kannin the 1st Border Brigade
received a mission to defend the coast in the Kannin area and south. The 5th
KPA Infantry Division assembled in the Kannin area during 29-30 June, and on
the morning of 1 July began to advance and on 2 July seized Samchong.
For that reason, as a result of combat operations from 25 June to 2
July the KPA forces, advancing with an average speed of 10 kilometers per
day, had moved 75-80 kilometers and liberated a significant amount of the
territory of South Korea including the capital city – Seoul. Forcing the
Han River
, they created conditions to develop a further offensive to the south.
During the course of combat operations the South Korean forces
concentrated on the
Seoul
direction had suffered heavy losses and in point of fact were shattered. But
at the same time the KPA troops were unable to surround and crush the
enemy’s
Seoul
force grouping as had been planned.
The reasons for this were that the advancing forces operating on the
Seoul
direction had developed the offensive more slowly than had been planned. The
2nd and 12th KPA Infantry Divisions, along with the
603rd Motorcycle Regiment, who were supposed to take Seoul from
the southeast and cut off the retreat of the Seoul force grouping to the
south and southeast, found their division commanders could not maintain
tight control over their units and subunits, and the lack of artillery with
the advancing forces and the difficult terrain conditions meant they could
not carry out their missions. At the same time the units of the 3rd
and 4th KPA Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank
Division, who took Seoul, failed to immediately organize a forced crossing
of the Han River, which permitted the enemy to withdraw his forces in good
order, organize a defense on the south bank of the river, and later move his
forces to the south.
American aviation was a major factor in the slow tempo of the KPA
forces’ offensive, launching continuous attacks upon their troops,
headquarters, and lines of communication starting on 27 June.
The Ministry of National Defense also had an extremely limited effect
upon the successful development of the offensive due to its underestimation
of troop command and control. Taking immediate command of all subordinate
divisions, command and control was sorely tested. The creation of the 1st
and 2nd Operational Groups using officers from this Ministry’s
headquarters proved that they could not just be knocked together and they
did not have sufficient communications assets. At the same time the
commanders in a number of units and formations did not strive to ensure
uninterrupted communications with higher chiefs or their neighbors, did not
have firm control over their subordinate forces and failed to pay sufficient
attention to reconnaissance.
There was no consciousness of
the fact that if the KPA forces had succeeded in surrounding and destroying
the
Seoul
force grouping of the South Korean army, then further events, undoubtedly,
would have developed much more favorably for
North Korea
.
4.
Development of the
Offensive and Entry of the Forces of the Korean Peoples Army to the Line
Poson – Kimsan – Yendong – Yonju – Yondok (3-25 July 1950)
By 3 July the KPA forces on
the main direction had secured a bridgehead on the left bank of the
Han River
, ensuring for conditions to further develop the offensive. The most
powerful force grouping was concentrated in the
Seoul
area on the
Suwon
direction (the 6th, 4th, 3rd, and 2nd
KPA Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank Division.) The 15th
and 12th KPA Infantry Divisions and 603rd Motorcycle
Regiment were operating along the central direction, and the 5th
KPA Infantry Division was on the east coast. The High Command had the 13th
KPA Infantry Division (in
Seoul
), the 1st KPA Infantry Division (west of Yonchonni) and the 10th
KPA Infantry Division (in
Pyongyang
) in reserve.
The main force grouping
of the South Korean forces was likewise located north of
Suwon
. Here they had the 18th ROK Infantry Regiment from the Capital
Division, the remnants of the 1st and 7th ROK Infantry
Divisions, the 5th and 2nd ROK Infantry Divisions, and
the 22nd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Infantry Division.
Facing the 15th and 12th KPA Infantry Divisions were
units of the 6th ROK Infantry Division and the 2nd ROK
Infantry Regiment of the enemy’s Capital Division. The 8th ROK
Infantry Division had the bulk of its forces from the Kannin area withdraw
to the southwest, but part of its units remained in the Samchok area. To
reinforce those forces that were operating in Samchok, they hastily sent in
the 23rd Regiment of the 3rd ROK Infantry Division and
the 1st Independent ROK Infantry Battalion.
The destruction inflicted upon the South Korean forces was sharply
reflected in their combat capability and morale level. These were the
conditions presented to the American command that led them to send their own
forces into combat after moving them in from
Japan
.
Having created these conditions, the KPA command decided to renew the
offensive on the morning of 3 July.
The goal of this offensive was conclude the destruction of the South
Koreans and successfully prevent the arrival of American forces in Korea, a
well as rapidly seize the ports along the southeastern coast at Pusan,
Ul’san, and Pohang. Seizing these ports would limit the ability of the UN
forces to send in new formations and material assets.
In order to rapidly achieve
its stated goals, the KPA command decided to concentrate its main effort
along the central direction, e.g. along those strips of terrain that formed
limits by a conditional line to the west through Suwon – Taejon – Pusan
and along the east from Wonju – Andong – Pohang.
The Suwon-Nonsan-Kwangju direction had the best terrain conditions,
but at the same time it would not permit rapid accomplishment of tasks as it
was too far from the ports of
Pusan
, Ul’san and
Pohang
. The shortest route to the ports was via Kannin, Samchok, and
Pohang
, but this could not permit sufficient volume of traffic to pass, was too
far from the main force grouping of the KPA forces, and was too vulnerable
to both naval and air interdiction.
At 0500 hours on 3 July, after a preparatory artillery bombardment
against enemy troops and fire support assets units of the 6th KPA
Infantry Division struck to the southeast and units of the 4th
KPA Infantry Division drove west to simultaneously strike the enemy in
Yendinpo, and by 0930 hours they had seized the city. The remnants of enemy
forces, defending in Yendinpo, took heavy losses and part of their forces
pulled back to
Inchon
and part of them pulled back to
Suwon
. After liberating Yendinpo the 13th Regiment of the 6th
KPA Infantry Division with the 203rd Tank Regiment of the 105th
Tank Division began to develop the offensive towards
Inchon
and by 0740 hours on 4 July had taken the port city.
Simultaneously with the beginning of the battles for Yendinpo the 3rd
and 2nd KPA Infantry Divisions, along with the 105th
Tank Division, also attacked the opposing enemy forces, forcing them from
their occupied line and began to pursue them.
After suffering destruction in the battles for Yendinpo and on the
left bank of the Han River to the south and southeast of
Seoul
, the remnants of the
Seoul
force grouping began to hastily withdraw. At that time the lead elements of
the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th US Infantry
Division, flown in from
Japan
, were moving towards Usan. The main body of this regiment was assembling in
Chyonan.
On 4 July units of the 105th Tank Division and the 4th
KPA Infantry Division took
Suwon
, destroyed a battalion of the 24th US Infantry Division in the
area of Usan, and on 6 July took Pyongtaek. The 2nd KPA Infantry
Division at this time took Ansong.
The enemy, who was attempting to set up a line at Chyonan –
Chinchong, prepared both cities for all-around defense, and destroyed and
mined the roads leading into these cities from the north. They carried out
particularly heavy destruction and mining of the sector of road from
Pyongtaek to Chyonan. American aviation increased its activity, continually
striking the KPA forces advancing along that direction.
With a goal of rapidly
destroying the enemy in Chyonan the 105th Tank Division, along
with a battalion of artillery and a self-propelled artillery battalion from
the 4th KPA Infantry Division, moved down back roads towards
Chyonan from the northwest. Simultaneously the 4th KPA Infantry
Division moved along the destroyed roads towards the city from the north. At
0400 hours on 8 July both divisions simultaneously attacked the enemy in
Chyonan, and in a terrible battle destroyed the 21st US Infantry
Regiment and the remnants of two South Korean infantry regiments, and on 9
July the city was completely taken.
The 2nd KPA Infantry Division, after overcoming enemy
resistance, fought a battle on 8 July for Chinchon. During the course of the
terrible three-day battle the division destroyed up to two South Korean
infantry regiments and on 10 July took the city.
On the central and eastern directions the KPA forces, advancing under
difficult conditions in mountainous terrain, slowly moved forward. The 15th
KPA Infantry Division, after forcing the
Han River
, took Chongju on 4 July, and Mugikli on 8 July. The 12th KPA
Infantry Division took Chungju with one regiment on 6 July, and on 9 July
the main body seized Tanyan. The 5th KPA Infantry Division,
developing the offensive along the east coast, destroyed the enemy in the
Samchok area with the cooperation of the partisans, and on 8 July took Uljin
and moved to the south of this city. On 9 July, the enemy used naval
bombardment to support the naval landing of two battalions of infantry in
the rear of the 5th KPA Infantry Division, with the concept in
mind to operate in conjunction with forces attacking at the front in order
to destroy the units of the 5th KPA Infantry Division. But this
concept was folly. Subunits of the 5th KPA Infantry Division were
rapidly rushed to the point of the landings, and as a result of their
skillful and decisive actions the enemy landing was surrounded and crushed
by 11 July.
For that reason, and in spite of complete air superiority, the enemy
suffered destruction and was forced to pull back to the south. As a result
of the blows inflicted by the KPA forces the South Korean forces were
demoralized and command and control was lost. In the first clashes with KPA
formations the lead elements of the 24th US Infantry Division had
taken serious losses. In
conjunction with that the American command moved the 25th US
Infantry Division into
Korea
from
Japan
by sea during 8-14 July. Simultaneously they prepared to move the 1st
US Cavalry Division in from
Japan
as well.
On 12 July the lead elements of the US 8th Army
headquarters arrived in Korea, headed by Lieutenant General Walker, who had
accepted command of all US forces in South Korea. Taking the harshest
measures, the Americans to some level succeeded in restoring order in the
South Korean forces. With a goal of creating a reserve the American command
reorganized the 5th ROK Infantry Division in
Kwangju
and the 7th ROK Infantry Division in Namwon. They began to form
the 10th ROK Infantry Division in
Pusan
, and on
Sanjuchado
Island
, a ROK marine division. They hastily replaced personnel and armaments in
the divisions operating at the front.
After meeting only failure
in their attempts to hold the line of Chyonan – Chinchon – Chunju, the
American command took measures to halt the offensive by the KPA forces at
the line of the
Kim
River
– Poyin – Yongu – Pyoyenye. With this goal in mind they deployed the
main body of the 24th US Infantry Division along the
Kim
River
in the area of Konju, and on the Poyin – Yenchon – Yenju line the main
body of the newly arrived 25th US Infantry Division, which sent
out forward detachments.
The KPA command, with the goal of disrupting these efforts and
destroying the enemy forces along those lines, decided to send the 3rd
and 6th KPA Infantry Divisions into combat on the
Taejon
direction, and the 1st KPA Infantry Division into the area of
Chunju to operate between the 15th and 12th KPA
Infantry Divisions. The 603rd Motorcycle Regiment was taken out
of the Wonju area, reorganized in the Chyonan area, and prepared to operate
with the 6th KPA Infantry Division.
In the interests of improving command and control and getting the
leadership closer to the forces, on 13 July a front command and control was
established based on the auxiliary command post of the General Staff, and
two group armies (armies) were formed from the two operational groups –
the 1st KPA Group Army with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
and 6th KPA Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank
Division and 603rd Motorcycle Regiment, and the 2nd
KPA Group Army with the 1st, 5th, 12th, and
15th KPA Infantry Divisions. The 13th KPA Infantry
Division became the Front Reserve, and the 10th KPA Infantry
Division the reserve of the High Command.
On 11 July the 6th KPA Infantry Division began its
offensive with the 13th KPA Infantry Regiment along the coast
road, and on 14 June the main body, along with the 603rd
Motorcycle Regiment, moved forward along the direction of Onchonni-Kangye.
They met with success and, crushing police units, likewise threw the enemy
out of the ports of
Mokpo
and Resu which were held by marine battalions, and by 25 July had cleansed
the enemy from the entire southwestern part of
Korea
. During the offensive they had again crushed the 5th ROK
Infantry Division, which had reformed in the Kwanju area and was sent into
combat on the 22nd in the Chonyp area.
The 4th KPA
Infantry Division, reinforced with a tank battalion from the 105th
Tank Division, after taking Chyonan deployed to advance to the south and on
10 July had moved to the approaches to Konju, where they met stiff
resistance from the units of the 24th US Infantry Division.
During the period 11-13 July units of the 4th KPA Infantry
Division fought a terrible battle on the approaches to Konju and it was only
on 14 July that they managed to crush the enemy on the north bank of the
Kim
River
. After a short preparatory bombardment, at 1730 hours on 14 July they
forced the river in the areas west and north of Konju and by 2200 hours had
seized the city. In the battle for the city they wiped out more than 400
enemy soldiers and officers, captured 15 artillery weapons, 8 antiaircraft
machine guns, 40 trucks, 20 radio sets and other equipment. After taking
Konju the division received a mission to use its main body to pursue the
enemy in the direction of Kimsan, but one regiment with the tank battalion
would strike
Taejon
from the northwest, joining up with the 3rd KPA Infantry Division
and the 105th Tank Division to destroy the enemy in this region.
The 105th Tank
Division and the 3rd KPA Infantry Division fought a terrible
battle between 9-11 July on the approaches to Chochiwon and it was 12 July
before they could take the city. All of the roads leading out of Chochiwon
to the south were destroyed by the enemy and mined. A strong point had been
established in the area of Fukoni. Together with this the decision was made
to cover the front with part of the forces and use the main body of the 105th
Tank Division and 3rd KPA Infantry Division to come around Fukoni
from the west. By 1100 hours on 13 Jukly the main bodies of these divisions
had reached the
Kim
River
in the area of Tyepenni, but at the same time attempt